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Subjectivism without Idealization and Adaptive Preferences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 November 2020

Stéphane Lemaire Open the ORCID record for Stéphane Lemaire [Opens in a new window]
Stéphane Lemaire*
Affiliation:
Université de Rennes 1
*
*Corresponding author. E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

Subjectivism about well-being holds that an object contributes to one's well-being to the extent that one has a pro-attitude toward this object under certain conditions. Most subjectivists have contended that these conditions should be ideal. One reason in favor of this idea is that when people adapt their pro-attitudes to situations of oppression, the levels of well-being they may attain is diminished. Nevertheless, I first argue that appealing to idealized conditions of autonomy or any other condition to erase or replace adaptive pro-attitudes is mistaken. Second, I show that the most natural version of subjectivism that does not appeal to any such idealizing condition can explain why the well-being of people having adaptive pro-attitudes should not be restricted to the fulfillment of these pro-attitudes. In sum, the existence of adaptive preferences does not militate in favor of the introduction of conditions of idealization but against it.

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Article
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Utilitas , Volume 33 , Issue 1 , March 2021 , pp. 85 - 100
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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