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Sometimes Psychopaths get it Right: A Utilitarian Response to ‘The Mismeasure of Morals’

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 March 2014

TYLER PAYTAS
TYLER PAYTAS*
Affiliation:
Washington University in St Louis, [email protected]
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Abstract

A well-publicized study entitled ‘The Mismeasure of Morals’ (Bartels and Pizarro, 2011) purportedly provides evidence that utilitarian solutions to a particular class of moral dilemmas are endorsed primarily by individuals with psychopathic traits. According to the authors, these findings give researchers reason to refrain from classifying utilitarian judgements as morally optimal. This article is a two-part response to the study. The first part comprises concerns about the methodology used and the adequacy of the data for supporting the authors’ conclusions. The second part seeks to undermine the suggestion that if anti-social individuals are the ones most likely to endorse utilitarian solutions to the target dilemmas, we should be sceptical about those solutions. I argue that the character of individuals most likely to make a given moral judgement is an unreliable indicator of the quality of that judgement.

Type
Research Article
Information
Utilitas , Volume 26 , Issue 2 , June 2014 , pp. 178 - 191
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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References

1 Greene, Joshua D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., and Cohen, J. D., ‘An FMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment’, Science 293 (2001), pp. 2105–8CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Greene, Joshua D., Nystrom, L. E., Engell, A. D., Darley, J. M., and Cohen, J. D., ‘The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment’, Neuron 44 (2004), pp. 389–400CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Baron, Jonathan and Ritov, Ilana, ‘Protected Values and Omission Bias as Deontological Judgments’, Moral Judgment and Decision Making: The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, ed. Bartels, D. M., Bauman, C. W., Skitka, L. J. and Medin, D. L. (San Diego, 2009), pp. 133–67Google Scholar; Sunstein, Cass R., ‘Moral Heuristics’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (2005), pp. 531–42Google Scholar.

2 ‘Goodness Has Nothing to Do With It’, The Economist, Sep 24, (2011); Josh Rothman, ‘Are Utilitarians Psychopaths?’, <http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/brainiac/2011/09/are_utilitarian.html> (2011); Mark D. White, ‘Utilitarians Aren't Psychopaths – Are They?’, <http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/maybe-its-just-me/201109/utilitarians-arent-psychopaths-are-they> (2011).

3 Bartels, Daniel M. and Pizarro, David A., ‘The Mismeasure of Morals’, Cognition 121 (2011), pp. 154–61CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 Bartels and Pizarro, ‘Mismeasure’, p. 154.

5 Greene et al., ‘Investigation’; Green et al., ‘Neural’.

6 Greene's discussion focuses on consequentialism rather than utilitarianism, which is a particular version of consequentialism. Given that Bartels and Pizarro use ‘utilitarianism’ in their study, it will simplify things if I substitute ‘utilitarian’ for ‘consequentialist’ in my discussion of Greene. This substitution is innocuous for present purposes.

7 Green et al., ‘Investigation’.

8 Greene, Joshua D., ‘The Secret Joke of Kant's Soul’, Moral Psychology: The Neuroscience of Morality, ed. Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (Cambridge, MA, 2007), pp. 35–79, at 46Google Scholar.

9 Among the studies cited are Small, Deborah A. and Lowenstein, G., ‘Helping a Victim or Helping the Victim’, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 23 (2006), pp. 5–16Google Scholar; de Quervain, Dominique J.et al., ‘The Neural Basis of Altruistic Punishment’, Science, 305 (2004), pp. 1254–8CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; Carlsmith, Kevin M., Darley, J. M., and Robinson, P. H., ‘Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 83 (2002), pp. 284–99CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

10 Greene, ‘Secret Joke’, p. 64.

11 See Koeings, Michaelet al., ‘Damage to the Prefrontal Cortex Increases Utilitarian Moral Judgements’, Nature 446 (2007), pp. 908–11CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12 Bartels and Pizarro, ‘Mismeasure’, p. 155.

13 Bartels and Pizarro, ‘Mismeasure’, p. 158.

14 Bartels and Pizarro, ‘Mismeasure’, p. 158.

15 I elaborate on this point in sect. V.

16 Bartels and Pizarro, ‘Mismeasure’, p. 158.

17 This example is based on examples found in Parfit, Derek, On What Matters (Oxford, 2011), ch. 8Google Scholar.

18 D'Arms, Justin and Jacobsen, Daniel, ‘Expressivism, Morality, and the Emotions’, Ethics 104 (1994), pp. 739–63, at 742Google Scholar.

19 See Driver, Julia, Consequentialism (New York, 2012), pp. 41, 145–53Google Scholar.

20 For some forceful critiques see Berker, Selim, ‘The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (2009), pp. 293–329Google Scholar; Kahane, Guy, ‘On the Wrong Track: Process and Content in Moral Psychology’, Mind and Language 27 (2012), pp. 519–45Google Scholar.

21 Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 38th Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, and the 12th International Conference of the International Society for Utilitarian Studies. I thank audiences at those events for helpful feedback. I also thank Nich Baima, Ron Mallon and an anonymous reviewer for useful suggestions. I am especially grateful to Julia Driver and Sarah Kertz for many helpful and instructive conversations about these issues.