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Obedience to Rules and Berkeley's Theological Utilitarianism*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 January 2009

Matti Häyry  and
Heta Häyry
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Extract

According to what one might call ‘indirect” forms of utilitarian thinking, the proper end of all human action is the greatest happiness of the greatest number of individuals, but due to the fallibility of moral agents this end cannot, and must not, be directly pursued. Instead, according to at least one version of the indirect theory, moral agents have a duty to act in conformity with a set of general rules which, in their turn, have been designed to promote the greatest happiness of humankind. But acts which conform to such general rules can under exceptional circumstances occasion more suffering than happiness. This is clearly problematical to indirect utilitarians. If they follow the rules regardless of the evil consequences, it can be argued that they have abandoned the basic principles of utilitarianism. If, on the other hand, they refuse to follow the rules which normally promote the general good, their view can be seen to collapse into the direct form of the creed.

Type
Research Article
Information
Utilitas , Volume 6 , Issue 2 , November 1994 , pp. 233 - 242
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1994

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Footnotes

*

Our thanks are due to Mark Shackleton, Lecturer in English, University of Helsinki, for revising the language of the paper, and to Professor D. D. Raphael, and an anonymous referee of Utilitas, whose critical comments improved our arguments considerably.

References

1 This, in essence, is the argument David Lyons presented against the then-popular theory of rule-utilitarianism in his Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism, Oxford, 1965.Google Scholar

2 ‘Passive Obedience”, The Works of George Berkeley Bishop of Cloyne, ed. Luce, A. A. and Jessop, T. E., ix vols., London, 1948–1957, vi. 17–46.Google Scholar

3 Albee, E., A History of English Utilitarianism, New York, 1902, p. 65.Google Scholar

4 Jessop, T. E., ‘Editor's Introduction” to ‘Passive Obedience”, Works of Berkeley, vi. 7.Google Scholar

5 Copleston, F., A History of Philosophy, ix vols., London, 1946–1975, v. 202 ff.Google Scholar

6 MacIntyre, A., A Short History of Ethics, London, 1967CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Quinton, A., Utilitarian Ethics, 2nd edn., London, 1989Google Scholar. When reference was made to Berkeley in textbooks of moral philosophy during this era, the authors often focused their attention on his idealism—see, e.g., Mackie, J. L., Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, London, 1977, pp. 22–3Google Scholar; Raphael, D. D., Moral Philosophy, Oxford, 1981, p. 84.Google Scholar

7 Brandt, R. B., A Theory of the Good and the Right, Oxford, 1979, pp. 274, 286.Google Scholar

8 As Professor Raphael has pointed out to us, Berkeley's rule-utilitarianism is in fact limited to negative rules, or negative laws of nature, (Works of Berkeley, vi. 18 § 3Google Scholar). His position would, subsequently, enable him to evade the criticism that rule-utilitarianism cannot cope with a conflict of duties: he could simply state that conflicts can be avoided by doing nothing. Since utilitarians have, however, traditionally held the view that acts and omissions are morally symmetrical, this defence would make Berkeley a non-utilitarian, and, from our present viewpoint, uninteresting. We have, therefore, ignored this (otherwise important) distinction in the name of utilitarian consistency.

9 Works of Berkeley, vi. 19–21 §§5–7.Google Scholar

10 Works of Berkeley, vi. 19 §5.Google Scholar

11 Works of Berkeley, vi. 20 §§6–7.Google Scholar

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13 Works of Berkeley, vi. 20 §6.Google Scholar

14 On the existence of angels, see Alciphron or the Minute Philosopher, Works of Berkeley, iii. 172.Google Scholar

15 Works of Berkeley, vi. 21 §7Google Scholar. It should be noticed here that Berkeley clearly accepts without any qualms the feature of classical utilitarianism which has become the target of many criticisms in the twentieth century, namely the fact that the theory ‘fails to take seriously the distinction between persons”. The formulation of the criticism is quoted from Rawls, J., A Theory of Justice, Oxford, 1972, p. 187.Google Scholar

16 Works of Berkeley, vi. 21 §7.Google Scholar

17 See, e.g., Häyry, M., Liberal Utilitarianism and Applied Ethics, London and New York, 1994, ch. 1.Google Scholar

18 Paley, W., The Principles of Moral and Political PhilosophyGoogle Scholar, partly reprinted in British Moralists 1650–1800, ed. Raphael, D. D., 11 vols., Oxford, 1969, i. 257–62Google Scholar. See also Albee, , pp. 168 ff.Google Scholar

19 One of the most recent theorists who have held a version of theological utilitarianism was Stephen, James Fitzjames, who developed his views in Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, 2nd edn., ed. White, R. J., Cambridge, 1967Google Scholar. Cf. Häyry, H., The Limits of Medical Paternalism, London and New York, 1991, ch. 4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

20 All citations in this paragaph are from Works of Berkeley, vi. 21 §8.Google Scholar

21 Works of Berkeley, vi. 21 §9.Google Scholar

22 Works of Berkeley, vi. 22 §10.Google Scholar

23 Works of Berkeley, vi. 22 §10.Google Scholar

24 Works of Berkeley, vi. 23 §12.Google Scholar

25 Works of Berkeley, vi. 22 §11.Google Scholar

26 Works of Berkeley, vi. 25 §15.Google Scholar

27 Works of Berkeley, vi. 23 §13.Google Scholar

28 Works of Berkeley, vi. 24 §14.Google Scholar

29 Works of Berkeley, vi. 24 §14.Google Scholar

30 Cf. Works of Berkeley, vi. 24 §14, and especially 24, n. 1.Google Scholar

31 Human beings do know that certain moral principles are valid, because they are evident to ‘right reason”. But as Berkeley himself was forced to admit, obedience to these moral principles does not always promote the greatest happiness in individual cases. This apparent paradox will be at least partly resolved by the distinction between ‘necessary” and ‘accidental” consequences which will be drawn below.

32 Works of Berkeley, vi. 21 §8.Google Scholar

33 He wrote: ‘I say, the agreement of these particular practical propositions with the definition or criterion premised doth so clearly result from the nature of things that it were a needless disgression, in this place, to enlarge upon it.” (Works of Berkeley, vi. 25 §15.)Google Scholar

34 A clarification is required here. As Professor Raphael pointed out to us, ‘from the fact that we cannot assess with certainty the consequences of a particular action, it does not follow that we cannot infer, using Berkeley's theological argument, his general conclusion about the consequences of universal adherence to the laws of nature”. But while this is true, it is also true that we cannot identify the laws of nature by using Berkeley's methods, and this can be inferred from the fact that we cannot assess with certainty even the consequences of one particular action.

35 Cf. Works of Berkeley, vi. 23 §13Google Scholar; vi. 38–9 §41.

36 Works of Berkeley, vi. 22 §11.Google Scholar

37 Works of Berkeley, vi. 38 §41.Google Scholar

38 See e.g., Lyons and Brandt. Our thanks are due to our anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this point.