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The Greatest Happiness Principle and Other Early German Anticipations of Utilitarian Theory*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 January 2009

Joachim Hruschka
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Extract

Bentham was once thought to be the father of the principle which he called ‘the greatest happiness principle’. Now Hutcheson with his ‘greatest happiness for the greatest numbers’ is the generally accepted source of this test of moral behaviour. It is not in Britain, however, but in Germany that one finds its origin. A quarter of a century before Hutcheson's An Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725), a German philosopher provided a formulation of the principle on which Hutcheson relied.

Type
Research Article
Information
Utilitas , Volume 3 , Issue 2 , November 1991 , pp. 165 - 177
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1991

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Footnotes

*

I am very grateful to Dr Sharon Byrd, Universität Erlangen, Dr Knud Haakonssen, A. N. U., and Prof. David F. Norton, McGill University, for their suggestions during my preparation of this article, and to Mrs Elisabeth Short, Canberra, for her linguistic corrections.

References

1 Reddie, James, Inquiries elementary and historical in the Science of Law, London, 1840 pp. 68ffGoogle Scholar. Reddie expressly speaks of ‘the greatest happiness principle’, see, e.g. p. 12.

2 Hutcheson is mentioned, however, in other parts of Reddie, 's book, e.g. at p. 12 and p. 40.Google Scholar

3 Reddie, , p. 69.Google Scholar

4 A brief review of Gröning's achievements in the history of natural law is to be found in Glafey, Adam Friedrich, Vollständige Geschichte des Rechts der Vernunfft, Leipzig, 1739 (repr. Aalen 1965), p. 16.Google Scholar

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6 Gröning, , Musaeum, p. 44 ff.Google Scholar

7 Gröning, Johannes, Bibliotheca Juris Gentium Europaea, Seu De Juris Naturae et Gentium Principus juxta doctrinam Europaeorum libri III, Hamburg, 1703, Lib. III, Cap. XIII, §. XII (p. 352)Google Scholar. The quotation is given from that source, since Reddie's repetition contains a printing mistake which, strictly speaking, renders the proposition incompre-hensible. Reddie also does not provide the full title of Gröning's book and indicates an incorrect year of publication, referring to it as ‘De Juris Naturae et Gentium Principus, published in 1705’.

8 Gröning, , Bibliotheca, Lib. III, Cap. XIII (p. 346 ff.).Google Scholar

9 Monathlicher Auszug/Aus allerhand neu-herausgegebenen/nützlichen und artigen Büchern, Hanover, 1700, p. 371 ffGoogle Scholar. The dictum in question in contained in Obs. XII at p. 378.

10 See Gröning, , Bibliotheca, Lib. III, Cap. XII, §. XIV (p. 345).Google Scholar

11 In the copy of the Cocceji reprint, mentioned in footnote 18 below, shelfmark 4°, Jur. III/16, on p. 5.

12 The explanation given is valid for the time when Reddie first came across the dictum in Gröning's book. No explanation can be given for why Reddie did not discover the proposition's true origin later although he obviously could have found it. See footnote 14 below.

13 In ‘Discursus praeliminaris’ to Bibliotheca which apparently was written and printed later than the book itself, Gröning expressly refers to Lib. III, Cap. XII, §. XIV of Bibliotheca and he now says that the review is directed against Heinrich Cocceji's doctrine. Gröning also gives the title of the Cocceji thesis. See §. 12 on p. 10.

14 Reddie, Since, in his book, e.g. p. 19 and p. 31Google Scholar, refers to Leibniz, 's ‘Observationes de Principio Juris’Google Scholar in the Dutens-edition—Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Opera Omnia IV, Geneva, 1768 (repr. Hildesheim, Zürich, New York, 1989), pars tertia, continens opuscula ad Jurisprudentiam pertinentia, p. 270 ffGoogle Scholar.—it is hard to explain why he did not see that the chapter in Gröning's Bibliotheca which contains the dictum is nothing but a reprint of Leibniz's article. Duncan Forbes's remark about Reddie's learning—see ‘Natural Law and the Scottish Enlightenment’, The Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. Campbell, R. H. and Skinner, Andrew S., Edinburgh, 1982, p, 202 at footnote 5Google Scholar—cannot be accepted without qualifications therefore.

15 Obs. XIII: ‘Uti propositionum & aequalitatum, ita & aequitatis & convenientiae regulae aeternis rationibus constant.’

16 For instance in Buddeus, Johann Franz, ‘Historia Iuris Naturalis, aucta et ad hanc aetatem usque continuata’, Selecta Iuris Naturae et Gentium, Halle, 1704, §. XL VII (p. 65).Google Scholar

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18 Cocceji, Samuel, Tractatus Juris Gentium de Principio Juris Naturalis Unico, Vero, et Adacquato, pars prior et pars altera, Frankfurt-an-der-Oder, 1702, pars altera p. 5 ff.Google Scholar; Leibniz, 's dictum on p. 32.Google Scholar

19 Ludovici, Jakob Friedrich, Delineatio Historiae Juris Divini Naturalis et Positivi Universalis, Editio II, priori multo auctior & emendatior, Halle, 1714, §. LXXXIX (p. 150)Google Scholar; Leibniz, 's dictum on p. 156.Google Scholar

20 See Ludovici, Carl Günther, Ausführlicher Entwurff einer vollständigen Historie der Leibnitzischen Philosophie zum Gebrauch Seiner Zuhörer herausgegeben, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1737 (repr. Hildesheim, 1966), vol. i, §. 421 (436 ff)Google Scholar; and Heineccius, Johann Gottlieb, Elementa Iuris Naturae et Gentium, Editio II, Halle, 1742, Lib. I, §. X scholium (p. 8)Google Scholar. The first edition of Elementa was published in 1737.

21 Even in modern times Leibniz's dictum has been hardly noticed. Welzel, Neither Hans, Naturrecht und materiale Gerechtigkeit, 4th ed., Göttingen, 1962, p. 147 ff.Google Scholar, nor Schneider, Hans-Peter, Justitia Universalis, Frankfurt-am-Main, 1967, p. 233 ff. and p. 444Google Scholar, who expressly deal with the Leibniz-Cocceji dispute mention the dictum. The same is true for Sève, René, Leibniz et l'Ecole moderne du droit naturel, Paris, 1989Google Scholar, who deals with Leibniz's utilitarianism, but does not mention the dictum. Cairns, Huntingdon, Legal Philosophy from Plato to Hegel, Baltimore, 1949, p. 314Google Scholar, mentions the dictum, but does not concern himself with the historical relationship between Leibniz's thought and that of Bentham; see p. 315.

22 Hutcheson, Francis, An Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, London, 1725Google Scholar (repr. Collected Works of Francis Hutcheson, Facsimile Editions Prepared by Fabian, Bernhard, vol. i, Hildesheim, 1971), 164.Google Scholar

23 Beccarla, Cesare, Dei Delitti e delle Pene a cura di Gianni Farncioni (Edizione Nazionale delle Opere di Cesare Beccarla, diretta da Luigi Firpo, voi. i), Milan, 1984, p. 23.Google Scholar

24 I have borrowed the translation of Beccarla from An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, translated from the Italian; with a Commentary attributed to Voltaire, Mons. De, translated from the French, 3rd edn., London, 1770, p. 2 ff.Google Scholar

25 See Shackleton, Robert, ‘The greatest happiness of the greatest number: the history of Bentham's phrase’, in Essays on Montesquieu and on the Enlightenment, ed. Gilson, David and Smith, Martin, Oxford, 1988, p. 382 ff.Google Scholar

26 Beccaria, , p. 25.Google Scholar

27 See Pufendorf, Samuel, De Jure Naturae et Gentium libri octo, 2nd edn., Frankfurt-am-Main, 1684, Lib. II, Cap. VI (p. 308 ff.)Google Scholar, ‘De Jure et Favore Necessitates’. The case of the seven British sailors in §. 3 (p. 312). The first edition was published in 1672. See also Pufendorf, Samuel, De Officio Hominis et Civis libri duo, Lund, 1673, Lib. I, Cap. V, §§. 18 ff. (p. 59 ff.).Google Scholar

28 de Pufendorf, Samuelis L. B., De Officio Hominis et Civis juxta Legem Naturalem libri duo. Observationibus antea separatim editis… ac Supplementa… locupletati, Autore Gottlieb Gerhard Titio, Leipzig, 1709 (1st edn, 1703), Obs. 141Google Scholar—to Lib. I, Cap. V, §. 18–no. 8 ff. (p. 210 ff.), and Obs. 142 ff.—to Lib. I, Cap. V, §. 19 ff. (p. 211 ff.).

29 Le Droit de la Nature et des Gens, Systeme General… Traduit du Latin de feu Mr. Le Baron de Pufendorf, par Jean Barbeyrac. Avec des Notes du Tracteur… et une Préface, Tome Premier et Tome Second, Amsterdam, 1706, note 5 on Liv. II, Chap. III, §. XV (p. 179)Google Scholar; note 3 on Liv. II, Chap. V, §. XIV (p. 246)—Seconde Edition, revue et augmentée considérablement, Tome Premier et Tome Second, Amsterdam 1712, note 5 on Liv. II, Chap. III, §. XV (p. 195 if.); note 4 on Liv. II, Chap. V, §. XIV (p. 269).

30 See Carmichael, Gershom, Theses Philosophicae, Glasgow, 1707, §. XIII (p. 4).Google Scholar

31 Carmichael, Gershom, Supplemento et Observationibus ad C. V. Sam. Puffendorfii libros duos De Officio Hominis et Civis, Glasgow, 1718, Obs. 1 at Lib. I, Cap. V, §. IV (p. 75 ff.)Google Scholar: ‘Ut determinetur in talibus casibus, quid nostrae, quid aliorum saluti, debeamus; Tria praecipue rationum genera videntur in computationem adhibenda, & quasi in se invicem ducenda; Gravitas se. Malorum quae utrinque timentur; specialis Probabilitas, quae ab hac, vel ab illa parte, ea minatur eventura; & Numerus personarum quae utrinque periclitantur; ita tarnen, ut Numerum supplere possit Dignitas, in Persona multis utili: Caeteris vero prope modum paribus, unusquisque sibi proximus esse permittitur.’ Nearly the same words were used in Carmichael, 's Theses Philosophicae.Google Scholar

32 Hutcheson, , p. 163.Google Scholar

33 From an historical point of view, utilitarianism, in particular act utilitarianism, is to a certain extent dependent on the natural lawyers' discussions of these cases.

34 That Hutcheson adopted Leibniz's principle without any reference to his source is not surprising. He did the same with the universalization principle which he took from Johann Balthasar Wernher and Jean Barbeyrac. See my article ‘Universalization and Related Principles’, forthcoming. See also Raynor, David R. ‘Hutcheson's Defence Against a Charge of Plagiarism’, Eighteenth-Century Ireland, ii (1987), 177.Google Scholar

35 Mollat, Georg, Rechtsphilosophisches aus Leibnizens ungedruckten Schriften, Leipzig, 1885, p. 3 ff.Google Scholar

36 Mollat, , p. 4Google Scholar. The paragraph's exact wording is as follows: ‘Porro summus est scopus justitiam colentis, ut felicitas quam latissime diffundatur. Et cum felicitas sit status laetitiae durabilis, id agitur, quantum potest, ut quam plurimi sint laeti gaudiaque eorum durare possint excludanturque, quae perturbent. Itaque curandum est, ut multitude eorum, qui felices reddi possunt, augeatur, quousque sibi mutuo non obstant, id est propagation! et conservation! favendum est.’

37 Mollat, , p. 3.Google Scholar

38 Mollat, , p. 3Google Scholar: ‘Publicum… non paucorum, non certae gentis, sed omnium intelligitur, qui sunt in civitate Dei et… republica universi.’

39 Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1688, Lib. I, Cap. II, §. 96 (p. 77).

40 Heineccius, , Lib. I, §. LXXVI scholium (p. 58)Google Scholar: ‘Utilitatem humani generis pro iuris naturae principio habuerunt turn celeberrimus Leibnitius, turn omnes, qui cum laudatis-simo Thomasio commendarunt propositionem fundamentalem: Facienda esse omnia, quam vitam hominis reddant et maxime diuturnam, et felicissimam, et evitanda ea, quae vitam reddant infelicem, et mortem accelerent. Thomas. Fund. iur. et gent. I, 6. 21.’

41 In the passage cited in footnote 20 above.

42 Thomasius, Christian, Fundamenta Juris Naturae et Gentium ex sensu communi deducta, editio quarta, Halle and Leipzig, 1718 (repr. Aalen, 1963), Lib. I, Cap. VI, §. XXI (p. 172)Google Scholar. The first edition was published in 1705.

43 Thomasius, , Institutiones, Lib. I, Cap. II, §. 96 (p. 77).Google Scholar

44 Thomasius, , Fundamenta, Lib. I, Cap. IV, §. XXXIX (p. 131)Google Scholar; §. XLI and §.XLII (p. 132); Lib. I, Cap. VI, §. 39 (p. 173).

45 See Institutiones Eruditionis seu Philosophia, Synthetica, Editio tertia, posterioribus auctoris meditationibus accomodata, modisque concludendi aucta, Frankfurt-am-Main, 1717, p. 560 ff.Google Scholar

46 Rüdiger, Andreas, Philosophia Pragmatica, Editio altera, priore longe auctior et correctior, Leipzig, 1729, §. 518 (p. 489).Google Scholar

47 Walch, Johann Georg, Philosophisches Lexicon, Leipzig, 1726Google Scholar; Auflage, Vierte in zween Theilen, Leipzig, 1775 (repr. Hildesheim, 1968)Google Scholar. The two articles mentioned in the text are to be found in the 1st edition on p. 661/2 and p. 1251/2 ff., in the 1st vol. of the 4th edition on p. 921/2 and p. 1693/4 ff.

48 In his Institutiones Eruditionis of 1717, Rüdiger already refers to the Philosophisches Lexicon as a supplement to his own teachings (see Ad Lectorem, §.2). Therefore, it can be argued that he was writing the pertinent articles of the Lexicon at the time. See also Wundt, Max, Die deutsche Schulphilosophie im Zeitalter der Aufklärung, Tübingen, 1945 (repr. Hildesheim, 1964), p. 89.Google Scholar

49 Walch, , 1st edn., p. 1277/8, 4th edn., p. 1723/4 ff.Google Scholar

50 Another author with utilitarian tendencies was von der Lith, Johann Wilhelm, whose thesis De Primo Principio Legis Naturalis, Halle, 1699Google Scholar, was cited rather frequently during the eighteenth century. Von der Lith, who apparently also had studied with Thomasius, makes use of the ancient distinction between the good king and the tyrant. A good king is a ruler who enacts laws for the benefit of his subjects, a tyrant is a ruler who enacts them for his own benefit. God's government of the universe is compared by von der Lith with a good king's rule over his kingdom, and the good king is described as one who observes the happiness of all. From this it follows that the law of nature enacted by God aims at the happiness of mankind—‘finis legis naturalis est felicitas omnium hominum’— and, consequently, the first principle of natural law is as follows: ‘All acts which are necessary for bringing about the happiness of mankind, are to be performed; and all acts which are contrary to that happiness are to be omitted.’ —‘Quicquid felicitas humani generis necessario exigit, illud est faciendum; et quicquid eidem repugnat, omittendum.’ In his later life, von der Lith worked on theological rather than moral philosophical problems.

51 Müller, August Friedrich, Einleitung in die philosophischen Wissenschaften, 2nd edn., 3 vols., Leipzig, 1733, iii. 29.Google Scholar

52 ‘Die Person als ein Zweck an sich selbst—Zur Grundlegung von Recht und Ethik bei August Friedrich Müller (1733) und Immanuel Kant (1785), Juristenzeitung, xliv (1990), 1 ff.Google Scholar

53 Kant's gesammeite Schriften, herausgegeben von der Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. vi, Berlin, 1914, 331 ffGoogle Scholar. The passage quoted is often taken as evidence for Kant's so-called retributionism. For a more differentiated analysis based not only on a few passages, but on all pertinent historical material available, see Byrd, B. Sharon, ‘Kant's Theory of Punishment: Deterrence in its Threat’. Retribution in its Execution’, Law and Philosophy, viii (1989), 151 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar