Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-mkpzs Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T12:41:53.525Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Conditional and Conditioned Reasons

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 January 2009

David McNaughton  and
Piers Rawling
David McNaughton
Affiliation:
University of Keele, [email protected]
Piers Rawling
Affiliation:
Florida State Unviersity, [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This paper is a brief reponse to some of Douglas Portmore's criticisms of our version of the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction.

In his interesting and helpful paper ‘McNaughton and Rawling on the Agent-relative/Agent-neutral Distinction’, Douglas Portmore criticizes our formalization of duties on the grounds that we have over-looked an important class of conditional cases in which the antecedent of the conditional falls outside the scope of the deontic operator.

Type
Discussions
Information
Utilitas , Volume 14 , Issue 2 , July 2002 , pp. 240 - 248
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2002

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Utilitas, xiii (2001)Google Scholar.

2 See e.g. McNaughton, D. and Rawling, P., ‘Achievement, Welfare, and Consequentialism’, Analysis, lxi (2001)Google Scholar.

3 H. A. Prichard, ‘Duty and Ignorance of Fact’, repr. Moral Obligation, Oxford, 1949.

4 Forms (A) and (B) below we dub ‘universal reasons statements’. Whether reasons are universal is a matter of controversy that we shall not tackle here. However, when we agree (below) with Portmore that there are true statements of form (B) that are not equivalent to any statement of form (A), we have in mind that much can be packed into the antecedent of A→xR[B]. Some of the items in the antecedent might be described as reasons, others as background conditions, with the dividing line between the two being, perhaps, inquirer-relative.

5 We are guilty of confusing use and mention. We leave it to the concerned reader to make the obvious adjustments.

6 McNaughton, D. and Rawling, P., ‘Honoring and Promoting Values’, Ethics, cii (1992)Google Scholar.

7 See Parfit, D., Reasons and Persons, Oxford, 1984Google Scholar.