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Collective Reasons and Agent-Relativity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 September 2021

Alexander Dietz Open the ORCID record for Alexander Dietz [Opens in a new window]
Alexander Dietz*
Affiliation:
Cardiff University, Cardiff, Wales
*
Corresponding author. E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

Could it be true that even though we as a group ought to do something, you as an individual ought not to do your part? And under what conditions, in particular, could this happen? In this article, I discuss how a certain kind of case, introduced by David Copp, illustrates the possibility that you ought not to do your part even when you would be playing a crucial causal role in the group action. This is because you may have special agent-relative reasons against participating that are not shared by the group as a whole. I defend the claim that these are indeed cases in which you ought not to do your part in what the group ought to do. I then argue that we can expect these cases to produce a troubling kind of rational conflict.

Type
Article
Information
Utilitas , Volume 34 , Issue 1 , March 2022 , pp. 57 - 69
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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