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The Problem of the Second Best: Conceptual Issues

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 January 2009

Juha Räikkä
Juha Räikkä
Affiliation:
University of Turku, [email protected]
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Abstract

In this article I shall undertake a preliminary exploration of the notion of second best. I shall follow a three-step strategy. First, I shall introduce some applications of the theorem of the second best in different fields of philosophy and social sciences. Secondly, I shall make several conceptual distinctions related to the theorem. I aim to show that there are certain theoretical results that are similar but not identical to the theorem of the second best, and that the notion of second best is often used quite loosely. Finally, I shall try to shed some light on the question of how the theorem is description-sensitive. The overall aim of the paper is to pay attention to the generality of the problem of the second best and stress the importance of the theorem in political theory in particular.

Type
Articles
Information
Utilitas , Volume 12 , Issue 2 , July 2000 , pp. 204 - 218
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2000

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References

1 The theorem of the second best is often called ‘the general theory of second best’. The theorem was first formalized by Lipsey, R. G. and Lancaster, K. J. in ‘The General Theory of Second Best’, Review of Economic Studies, xxv (1956)Google Scholar.

2 Cf. Boadway, Robin, ‘The Role of Second-Best Theory in Public Economies’, EPRU Working Papers, 1995 (Copenhagen)Google Scholar.

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5 For a discussion on character traits and virtues, see e.g. Foot, Philippa, Virtues and Vices, Oxford, 1978, ch. 1Google Scholar.

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9 This is Goodin's example; ibid., 53.

10 Among others, Beitz, Charles evaluates the argument in his ‘Democracy in Developing Societies’, Boundaries: National Autonomy and its Limits, ed. Brown, P. G. and Shue, H., Totowa, 1981Google Scholar.

11 See e.g. Brink, David, ‘Moral Conflict and its Structure’, Philosophical Review, ciii (1994)Google Scholar.

12 Pietroski, Paul M., ‘Executing the Second Best Option’, Analysis, liv (1994)Google Scholar. See also Goldman, Holly S., ‘Doing the Best One Can’, Values and Morals, ed. Goldman, A. I. and Kim, J., Dordrecht, 1978CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jackson, Frank and Pargetter, Robert, ‘Oughts, Options, and Actualism’, Philosophical Review, xcv (1986)Google Scholar.

13 Bohman, James, ‘The Coming Age of Deliberative Democracy’, Journal of Political Philosophy, vi (1998), esp. 417Google Scholar.

14 Ackerman, Bruce A., ‘What Is Neutral about Neutrality?’, Ethics, xciii (1983), esp. 385Google Scholar.

15 Streissler, Erich and Neudeck, Werner, ‘Are there Intellectual Precursors to the Idea of Second Best Optimization?’, Journal of Economics, suppl. vol., v (1986), esp. 227CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a history of the second best, see also Guesnerie, Roger, ‘The Genealogy of Modern Theoretical Public Economics: From First Best to Second Best’, DELTA Working Papers (1994), Paris; cf. BoadwayGoogle Scholar.

16 See e.g. Margalit, 77.

17 Here I take it as self-evident that weakness of will is possible.

18 Føllesdal, Andreas, Contractualism and Bargaining, Oslo. 1993, p. 81Google Scholar. Cf. Margalit, 77 f.

19 Sher, George, Approximate Justice: Studies in Non-Ideal Theory, Lanham, 1997, p. 1Google Scholar.

20 Rawls, JohnA Theory of Justice, Oxford, 1972, p. 245 (italics added)Google Scholar. Cf. Feinberg, Joel, ‘Duty and Obligation in the Non-Ideal World’, in his Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty, Princeton, 1980, esp. pp. 256 fCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

21 See e.g. Mishan, E. J., ‘Second Thoughts on Second Best’, Oxford Economic Papers, new series, xiv (1962)Google Scholar.

22 For such proof, see e.g. Rowley, Charles K. and Peacock, Alan T., Welfare Economics: A Liberal Restatement, London, 1975Google Scholar; Ng, Yew-Kwang, Welfare Economics, London, 1979, ch. 9Google Scholar.

23 Cf. Goodin, , ‘Political Ideals and Political Practice’, 53nGoogle Scholar.

24 If an agent thinks that the most effective way to reach social justice is to promote civil liberties and construct a welfare safety net, then it does not matter whether we ask the agent to ‘promote civil liberties and construct a welfare safety net’ or to ‘promote social justice in the most effective way’.

25 Yes, there are people who think that socialism may have value in and for itself.

26 Certain theoretical models (in decision theory) deny all interaction effects and interdependence between the various strategies and ideals that different agents happen to hold. However, while these models may have certain mathematical advantages in comparison to models that allow for dependence, perhaps they must nonetheless be rejected, since representations based on them seem to be substantively misleading. Again, cf. Goodin, , ‘Political Ideals and Political Practice’, 52Google Scholar. For an account of ‘multiple objectives’, see Keeney, Ralph L. and Raiffa, Howard, Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value Tradeoffs, Cambridge, 1993CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

27 See e.g. Sen, Amartya, On Ethics & Economics, Oxford, 1987, esp. ch. 2Google Scholar; Kleindorfer, Paul R., Kunreuther, Howard C. and Schoemaker, Paul J. H., Decision Sciences: An Integrative Perspective, Cambridge, 1993CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Larmore, Charles E., Patterns of Moral Complexity, Cambridge, 1987, esp. ch. 6CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

28 See e.g. Cohen, L. Jonathan, ‘Verisimilitude and Legisimilitude’, What is Closer-tothe-Truth?, ed. Kuipers, T. A. F., Amsterdam, 1987Google Scholar.

29 Rawls, pp. 8 f.

30 For a discussion, see Burg, Wibren van der, ‘The Importance of Ideals’, Journal of Value Inquiry, xxxi (1997)Google Scholar.

31 I would like to thank Charlotte Beauchamp, Wibren van der Burg, Robert E. Goodin, Bo Pettersson, Mikko Wennberg and the editor of Utilitas and a referee for helpful discussion and written comments on an earlier version of this article, and I am grateful to the European University Institute (TMR Programme) for giving me financial support during my stay in Florence where this article was written.