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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 March 2008
I discuss Philip Pettit's argument that appreciation is not a proper response to value because it fails to satisfy the non-iteration constraint, according to which, where V is a value and R is a response to value, R-ing V must not be distinct from R-ing R-ing V. After motivating the non-iteration constraint and conceding that appreciation fails to satisfy the constraint, I argue that the consequentialist's preferred response to value, promotion, also violates the constraint, leaving Pettit with a dilemma: if he insists on the constraint, then promotion is not a proper response to value; if he does not insist on the constraint, then his argument against appreciation as a proper response to value fails.
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3 Philip Pettit, ‘Reply to Baron and Slote’ in Baron et al., Three Methods, p. 261.
4 Pettit, ‘Reply’, pp. 261–2; italics original, bold added.
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7 Pettit, ‘Reply’, pp. 261–2.
8 Thanks to Stuart Rachels for helpful comments on an earlier version of this article.