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The Irrationality of Adaptive Preferences: A Psychological and Semantic Account

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 November 2020

Seena Eftekhari Open the ORCID record for Seena Eftekhari [Opens in a new window]
Seena Eftekhari*
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Tufts University
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Abstract

There is little agreement among moral and political philosophers when it comes to determining what it is that makes adaptive preferences problematic. The large number of competing explanations offered by philosophers illustrates the absence of any consensus. The most prominent versions of these explanations have recently come under attack by Dale Dorsey, who argues that adaptive preferences are a red herring: the problematic nature of adaptive preferences is not explained by the fact of adaptation but by an appeal to some other normative consideration. In this article I offer an account of adaptive preferences that both accommodates the thought that only some of our adaptive preferences are problematic and responds to the skeptical challenge pressed by Dorsey. I argue that some adaptive preferences are prima facie irrational as they exhibit a peculiar error in reasoning where individuals change the semantic content of the reasons underpinning the new preference.

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Article
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Utilitas , Volume 33 , Issue 1 , March 2021 , pp. 68 - 84
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

1 For exceptions, see Baber, Harriet, Adaptive Preference, Social Theory and Practice, 33.1 (2007), 105–26CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Dorsey, Dale, Adaptive Preferences Are a Red Herring, Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 3.4 (2017), 465–84CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 Dorsey enumerates a number of philosophers who hold this definition (p. 467). Jon Elster draws a more specific distinction between “character planning” and “adaptive preference formation,” where only the latter is considered to be problematic (Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 118 and passim). While the distinction is very important, I do not borrow Elster's terminology as it obscures the fact that adaptation – that an individual shapes her preference according to the availability or the perceived availability of options – occurs in both cases.

3 For an example that adaptive preferences are problematic because they fail to align with objective values, see Nussbaum, Martha, Women and Human Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For examples of the claim that adaptive preferences are problematic because they undermine our autonomy, see Elster, Jon, Sour Grapes: Utilitarianism and the Genesis of Wants, in Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. by Sen, Amartya and Williams, Bernard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 219–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar and his Sour Grapes (see n. 2); Sumner, L. W., Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996)Google Scholar; and Colburn, Ben, Autonomy and Adaptive Preferences, Utilitas, 23.1 (2011), 52–71CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an account that adaptive preferences are both incompatible with objective values and arise from bad circumstances, see Khader, Serene J., Adaptive Preferences and Women's Empowerment (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an example that adaptive preferences are problematic because they both undermine our autonomy and arise from bad circumstances, see Terlazzo, Rosa, Conceptualizing Adaptive Preferences Respectfully: An Indirectly Substantive Account, Journal of Political Philosophy, 24.2 (2016), 206–26CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 See n. 1.

5 Dorsey, pp. 470–71, pp. 472–73, and pp. 477–79, respectively.

6 See Zimmerman, David, Sour Grapes, Self-Abnegation and Character Building, The Monist, 86.2 (2003), 220–41, at pp. 222–23CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7 This point speaks against the idea that the “adaptive preference intuition” – the fact that a preference is adaptive is reason to believe it problematic – ought to be the appropriate starting point for either conceptualizing about adaptive preferences or theorizing about their role in normative theory. See Dorsey, pp. 468, 482.

8 See Bovens, Luc, Sour Grapes and Character Planning, Journal of Philosophy, 89.2 (1992), 57–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9 See Davidson, Donald, How is Weakness of the Will Possible?, in Essays on Actions and Events (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 21–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10 Bovens, p. 72.

11 Bovens, pp. 74–76.

12 Elster describes problematic adaptive preferences as involving a retroactive change of weights in the “attributes of options.” He does at one point mention the “formulation of new attributes,” but he does not develop this point. See Sour Grapes, pp. 119–21. I discuss the problem with retroactively altering the weight attached to different criterial judgments more fully in n. 16.

13 Though Bovens does not employ the term “criterial judgments” in a way that captures these sorts of considerations, he may insist that these considerations are simply additional criteria for evaluating different options. The point here is only that an AJ is not based only on comparisons of the inherent qualitative properties of the objects or actions in questions. Davidson's purpose in devising his account of practical reasoning was to explain how something like weakness of the will is possible. My desire to cheat on my diet by indulging in some dessert may be supported by every criterial judgment, yet it is precisely independent considerations, such as my long-term plan and my view of myself as a disciplined individual, that form the basis of my AJ to maintain my diet.

14 This is not to say that the infeasibility of an option ought always to play an overriding role in the formation of an individual's AJ. It is one consideration that must be balanced with others, and it is difficult, if not undesirable, to specify in the abstract how much weight individuals ought to attach to the infeasibility of an option in their practical deliberation. Some may continue to pursue an infeasible option because they may feel that any departure would betray their most cherished values and their sense of identity.

15 See also Bruckner, Donald, In Defense of Adaptive Preferences, Philosophical Studies, 142.3 (2009), 307–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

16 My account can be extended in a similar fashion to cases where individuals adjust the weight attached to different criterial judgments rather than their content (I thank both reviewers for urging me to address this possibility). Whether I am choosing which of two automobiles to purchase or which of two careers to pursue, the manner in which I rank different criterial judgments is not arbitrary. I have reasons, or at least will be able to offer reasons when asked, for why I rank one criterial judgment over another. A vehicle's fuel efficiency may be a more important consideration for me compared to another vehicle's more elegant interior design if I have a long commute to work every day. Now the unavailability of purchasing the first vehicle with greater fuel efficiency does not provide me with any reason for adjusting the weight attached to either of these two criterial judgments, for nothing else in my life has changed to justify such an adjustment. I still have a long commute to work every day, and that was my reason for ranking fuel efficiency above interior design.

Just as there is no reason to think that the unavailability of an option should alter its qualitative properties, there is no reason to think that the unavailability of an option should alter the ranking of my criterial judgments, when there have been no changes to the relevant considerations that established that ranking in the first place. Both cases demonstrate the same sort of error in reasoning: the unavailability of an option causes changes – either to the semantic content or the ranking – of considerations that are entirely unrelated and logically distinct. The unavailability of an option is not the right sort of reason (in a logical sense) for altering the semantic content or the ranking of criterial judgments, for all the considerations and reasons that explain both remain exactly the same. Though the same error in reasoning applies to both cases, in the main text I will continue to refer generally only to alterations to the semantic content of criterial judgments as that is the paradigmatic case and doing so allows me to avoid more cumbersome formulations.

17 See n. 3.

18 Khader, pp. 11–12, 55–56.

19 It may also be the case that oppressed women internalize feelings of inferiority and disvalue an education for that reason. But as Khader points out, such attributions are complex and difficult to make as these women often engage in other forms of peer comparison that demonstrate a clear sense of self-worth (pp. 107–27).

20 Khader, pp. 57–58.

21 See Dorsey, pp. 477–79.

22 See also Elster, Sour Grapes, p. 111.

23 I am grateful to Kurt Blankschaen, Andrew J. Cohen, Ann Cudd, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful feedback.