Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-2brh9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-27T11:31:43.376Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Inconsistency and the Theoretical Commitments of Hooker's Rule-Consequentialism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 2007

ROBERT F. CARD
ROBERT F. CARD*
Affiliation:
State University of New York–[email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Rule-consequentialism is frequently regarded as problematic since it faces the following powerful dilemma: either rule-consequentialism collapses into act-consequentialism or rule-consequentialism is inconsistent. Recent defenders of this theory such as Brad Hooker provide a careful response to this objection. By explicating the nature and theoretical commitments of rule-consequentialism, I contend that these maneuvers are not successful by offering a new way of viewing the dilemma which retains its force even in light of these recent discussions. The central idea is that even the most well-developed contemporary form of the view is ensnared in the following dilemma: as an agent-neutral consequentialist theory, rule-consequentialism is either inconsistent or it is desperately unmotivated as a form of consequentialism since it is committed to a non-consequentialist form of ultimate moral value.

Type
Research Article
Information
Utilitas , Volume 19 , Issue 2 , June 2007 , pp. 243 - 258
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Smart, J. J. C. and Williams, B., Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge, 1973), p. 10Google Scholar.

2 An action that is suboptimal is not necessarily a bad action, but is simply an action that is less than the best one possible.

3 Brad, Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World (Oxford, 2000)Google Scholar; ‘Rule-Consequentialism’, Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, ed. Hugh LaFollette (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1999); ‘Ross-style Pluralism versus Rule-Consequentialism’, Mind 105 (1996); ‘Rule-Consequentialism, Incoherence, Fairness’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95 (1995); Frances Howard-Snyder, ‘Rule Consequentialism is a Rubber Duck’, American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (1993).

4 I use the term ‘ultimate’ value to refer to non-instrumental (or ‘intrinsic’) value. The claim is framed in terms of ultimate value since even the most diehard consequentialist can unproblematically accept a commitment to instrumental forms of non-consequentialist value.

5 Hooker, ‘Pluralism’, pp. 537; Hooker, Code, pp. 32, 131.

6 It is important to note that there may be consequentialist reasons for one not actually to follow through with the action of killing the innocent person. For instance, it may be that a judicial official with the best sort of character in consequentialist terms cannot bring himself or herself knowingly to cause the death of an innocent person in the rare instances in which this would be best overall. This point is not itself crucial to my discussion, since I wish to focus on the moral assessment of the associated action: whether it is morally required or right.

7 A standard formulation of act-consequentialism is the following: an action is right if and only if it produces overall results at least as good as any available alternative for everyone affected by that action.

8 ‘Rule-Consequentialism’, pp. 8–10.

9 Hooker does state that rule-consequentialists will allow exceptions to the rules in cases where following the rules would cause disaster. Hooker does not explain precisely how this exception is compatible with his overall rule-consequentialist framework, however. (I will discuss this matter further in sect. III.) See Hooker, Code, pp. 98, 109 n. 22; Hooker, ‘Incoherence’, pp. 24–7.

10 Hooker, Code, p. 101; Hooker, ‘Pluralism’, p. 29; Hooker, ‘Incoherence’, p. 538 n. 12.

11 Hooker, ‘Pluralism’, p. 29; emphasis added.

12 Peter, Railton, ‘Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality’, repr. in Consequentialism and its Critics (Oxford, 1988), pp. 32–3Google Scholar.

13 Railton, ‘Alienation’, pp. 111–12.

14 Differing views have been offered regarding the nature of the change in this disposition. The counterfactual condition and the sophisticated consequentialist approach to maximizing the good are discussed in Card, Robert F., ‘Consequentialism, Teleology, and the New Friendship Critique’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2004)Google Scholar.

15 Cocking, D. and Oakley, J., ‘Indirect Consequentialism, Friendship, and the Problem of Alienation’, Ethics 106 (1995), pp. 89 n. 7; 103 n. 23Google Scholar.

16 On this, see Derek, Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford, 1984), pp. 32–3Google Scholar.

17 Hooker, ‘Pluralism’, p. 539 (emphasis added); Hooker, Code, p. 102.

18 This is true at least of a moral code within one generation: I will discuss this matter below.

19 Code, p. 32.

20 Code, p. 112.

21 Code, p. 121.

22 Code, p. 98.

23 Code, p. 98.

24 Code, p. 165.

25 Code ch. 8.

26 Code, p. 164.

27 Code, ch. 8.

28 Code, p. 166.

29 Code, p. 188.

30 On Hooker's rule-consequentialism, this would occur when the action of not killing the one person had very bad results but not disastrous results, since Hooker allows exceptions to rules when adhering to them would cause a disaster (see n. 9 above). As Hooker argues, as previously discussed, RC and AC have different implications for action. By contrast, a sophisticated act-consequentialist such as Peter Railton would not judge the action as morally right if, in a particular instance, acting this way produces suboptimal results. While the rule-consequentialist would judge that the act is morally right because it accords with a rule from the best moral code, the sophisticated act-consequentialist ‘continues to believe that an act may stem from the disposition it would be best to have, and yet be wrong (because it would produce worse consequences than other acts available to the agent in the circumstances)’ (Railton, ‘Alienation’, p. 119).

31 ‘Pluralism’, p. 538.

32 Hooker, ‘Pluralism’, p. 537.

33 Code, p. 101.

34 Code, p. 4 ff.; 81; 88, 188; Hooker, ‘Reflective Equilibrium and Rule Consequentialism’, Morality, Rules, and Consequences, ed. B. Hooker, E. Mason and D. Miller (Edinburgh, 2000), pp. 229 ff.

35 John, Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, 1971), p. 49Google Scholar.

36 See Hooker, Code, pp. 81, 173.

37 One might object that Hooker's reliance upon intuitions cannot add value to an action, since ‘reflective equilibrium’ is a method of assessing moral theories, not a theory of moral value. Hence, this attempt is wrong-headed. If this is the case, then this simply adds further support to my argument above that this attempt to rescue RC fails. I would add, however, that Hooker's appeal to ‘considered convictions’ as a tie-breaker between moral codes that possess an equal amount of expected value at least suggests that conformity with intuitions possesses some degree of moral value.

38 Code, p. 32.

39 Code, p. 3.

40 Henry, Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (Hackett, 1907), pp. 489–90Google Scholar.

41 Kurt, Baier, The Moral Point of View (Cornell University Press, 1958), p. 158Google Scholar; Rawls, Justice, p. 133.

42 Code, p. 85; my emphasis in last two instances.

43 Code, p. 90.

44 Code, pp. 90–1.

45 In several places, Hooker emphasizes that one can (and perhaps ought) to prefer a moral theory for reasons that are not consequentialist (e.g. one that coheres with (or is in ‘reflective equilibrium’ with) our considered convictions). My arguments above acknowledge this point. My main contention is that coherence with intuitions adds no consequentialist value to the associated acts. See Hooker, Code, pp. 4, 81, 88, 101, 173, 188; Brad, Hooker, ‘Reflective Equilibrium and Rule Consequentialism’, ed. Hooker, Brad, Mason, Elinor and Miller, Dale, Morality, Rules, and Consequences (Edinburgh, 2000)Google Scholar.

46 Code, pp. 101, 103.

47 Code, p. 111.

48 Richard, Brandt, Morality, Utilitarianism, and Rights (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 1, 113Google Scholar.

49 Justice, p. 24.

50 Code, p. 102; Hooker, ‘Pluralism’, p. 539.

51 Howard-Snyder, ‘Rubber Duck’, p. 274.

52 Howard-Snyder, ‘Rubber Duck’, p. 271.

53 It is commonly held that one of the central commitments of agent-neutral consequentialism is that it ascribes sole intrinsic moral value to states of affairs. (See Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against.) Critics such as Elizabeth Anderson claim that this is problematic by arguing that since states of affairs possess only extrinsic value, consequentialism is incoherent since it attempts to globally maximize extrinsic value. This charge is addressed in Card, Robert F., ‘Consequentialist Teleology and the Valuation of States of Affairs’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (2004)Google Scholar.

54 Samuel, Scheffler, Human Morality (Oxford, 1992), p. 107Google Scholar.

55 Howard-Snyder, ‘Rubber Duck’, p. 271.

56 Howard-Snyder, ‘Rubber Duck’, p. 271.

57 Brandt, Richard, Morality, Utilitarianism, and Rights (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 155–6Google Scholar.

58 Brandt, Morality, p. 156.

59 This point is mentioned by Howard-Snyder, ‘Rubber Duck’, p. 276.

60 Samuel, Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism (Oxford, 1982)Google Scholar.

61 See Hooker, Code, p. 114.

62 Code, p. 110.

63 Code, p. 110.

64 Code, pp. 110–11.

65 Code, p. 110.

66 Code, p. 111.

67 A version of this article was presented at the meeting of the International Society for Utilitarian Studies, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, August 2005. I thank the audience and other participants for helpful remarks on that paper.