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Defending Limits on the Sacrifices We Ought To Make For Others

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 2008

VIOLETTA IGNESKI
VIOLETTA IGNESKI*
Affiliation:
McMaster [email protected]
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Abstract

How much are we morally required to do to aid others? After articulating some of the main contributions to this debate, I defend the position that we are sometimes morally permitted to spend our time and resources satisfying our own interests and needs rather than using them to aid others who are in desperate need. I argue that the duty to aid the needy should not always take priority over every other end we have. Whatever else we value, we most highly value the ability and opportunity to live our lives on our own terms; this grounds both our obligation to aid others and places limits on how far these obligations ought to extend. Persons ought to respect others and fulfill their moral obligations but they must also be given the moral space to set ends and pursue those ends just because they are theirs.

Type
Research Article
Information
Utilitas , Volume 20 , Issue 4 , December 2008 , pp. 424 - 446
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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References

1 Larry Temkin takes an interesting approach in ‘Thinking about the Needy, Justice and International Organizations’, The Journal of Ethics 8.4 (January 2005), pp. 349–95, where he adopts a combination of consequentialism, deontology and virtue ethics to ground the duty to aid.

2 I borrow the terms ‘moderate’ and ‘extremist’ from Kagan, Shelly's The Limits of Morality (Oxford, 1989)Google Scholar.

3 For an excellent discussion of a Kantian justification, see Herman, Barbara, ‘Mutual Aid and Respect for Persons’, The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 45–72Google Scholar. For a consequentialist justification of the distinction between basic needs (or urgent needs) and preferences see Scanlon, Thomas in ‘Preference and Urgency’, Journal of Philosophy 72.19 (1975), pp. 655–69Google Scholar. Thomas Nagel appeals to the same idea in his famous example of climbing Kilimanjaro, Mount (The View from Nowhere (Oxford, 1986), ch. 8)Google Scholar. Martha Nussbaum argues that there are certain necessary functionings or capabilities for functionings that we must have to live a decent human life in ‘Aristotelian Social Democracy’, Liberalism and the Good, ed. R. Bruce Douglass, Gerald M. Mara and Henry S. Richardson (New York, 1990). In Spheres of Justice, Michael Walzer argues that there is a baseline level at which persons are enabled to be equal democratic citizens or have full membership in society.

4 See Igneski, , ‘Perfect and Imperfect Duties to Aid’, Social Theory and Practice 32.3 (July 2006), pp. 439–66CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5 Singer, Peter, ‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (Spring 1972), pp. 229–43Google Scholar. Not all have found it compelling. For vigorous arguments against Singer, see Garrett Hardin, ‘Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor’, Psychology Today (September 1974); Narveson, Jan ‘Welfare and Wealth, Poverty and Justice in Today's World’, The Journal of Ethics 8.4 (January 2005), pp. 305–48Google Scholar; and Kekes, John, The Illusions of Egalitarianism (Ithaca, 2003)Google Scholar.

6 Pogge ought to be distinguished from the rest as his argument does not depend on a successful argument for the existence of a positive duty to aid but rather turns on his claim that the duty to aid can be captured as a negative duty of justice because of our responsibility for the need in the world which is a direct consequence of the unjust global economic order. For his argument to that effect, see ‘“Assisting” the Global Poor’, The Ethics of Assistance, ed. D. Chatterjee (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 260–88. The moderate responses are too many to list. Among those that have influenced me the most, I include Onora O'Neill, Thomas Nagel, Samuel Scheffler and Liam Murphy. For an excellent and sustained attack against all of these approaches see Shelly Kagan, The Limits of Morality.

7 Singer, ‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’, p. 231.

8 Singer, ‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’, p. 234.

9 Though not the only way if giving up everything I have helps several people; my desperate need is not comparable to helping several people recover from a similar situation.

10 Peter Unger forcefully challenges our common intuitions on these matters in Living High & Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence (New York, 1996).

11 McGinn, Colin, ‘Our Duties to Animals and the Poor’, Singer and his Critics, ed. Jamieson, D. (Oxford, 1999), pp. 150–61Google Scholar.

12 McGinn, ‘Our Duties’, p. 158.

13 This point has been made in different ways. A good anthology to look at is Consequentialism and its Critics, ed. Samuel Scheffler (Oxford, 1998). The following are some examples: Bernard Williams argues that it is an attack on our personal integrity (pp. 20–50); Thomas Nagel argues that it does not recognize the agent-relative point of view (pp. 142–72); Peter Railton argues that it may end up being self-defeating and alienating (pp. 93–133); Samuel Scheffler argues that it does not take account of the agent-centered prerogative (pp. 243–60).

14 McGinn, ‘Our Duties’, p. 155.

15 McGinn, ‘Our Duties’.

16 There is an obvious disanalogy between helping the gambler kick his harmful and addictive habit and providing someone with the basic necessities of life. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to consider his argument.

17 Herman, ‘Mutual Aid’, p. 67.

18 Hill, Thomas Jr., Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory (Ithaca, 1992), p. 149Google Scholar.

19 Hill, Dignity, p. 157.

20 Scheffler, Nagel, Murphy and McGinn are among many who make this claim. Libertarians, such as Jan Narveson, reject the duty altogether because they claim that aid is not something we owe to others and so there is no moral obligation to sacrifice any of our interests for the sake of others. See Narveson, , ‘Welfare and Wealth, Poverty and Justice in Today's World’ and ‘We Don't Owe Them a Thing’, The Monist 86 (2003), pp. 419–33CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

21 Cullity, Garrett, ‘Asking Too Much’, The Monist 86 (2003), pp. 402–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Once I fill out my position further, it will become obvious that there are many similarities between Cullity's argument against the ‘severe demand’ and my argument for a more moderate understanding of the duty to aid.

22 Cullity, ‘Asking Too Much’, p. 404.

23 Cullity, ‘Asking Too Much’, p. 404.

24 Cullity, ‘Asking Too Much’, p. 404.

25 Singer, himself, responds to arguments made by Urmson and Sidgwick that our moral code should not be too far beyond the capacities of an ordinary man because there would be a general breakdown of compliance with the moral code (‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’, p. 237). Other forceful responses to the ‘moderate’ position are made by Peter Unger, Shelly Kagan and Richard Arneson.

26 O'Neill, Onora, ‘The Moral Perplexities of Famine and World Hunger’, Matters of Life and Death: New Introductory Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed. Regan, Tom (New York, 1986), p. 330Google Scholar. As I mentioned earlier, there is much disagreement among Kantians as to the how demanding the duty is.

27 O'Neill, ‘Moral Perplexities’, p. 330.

28 For a more in-depth description of their services see their website, www.redcross.org.

29 I take it that this interpretation of the maxim and has the widest support in the literature amongst Kantian scholars. See Thomas Hill Jr., Onora O'Neill, Barbara Herman, Christine Korsgaard, Marcia Baron, Daniel Statman, among others.

30 Herman, ‘Mutual Aid’, pp. 65–8.

31 Singer, Peter, ‘Rich and Poor’, Practical Ethics (Cambridge, 1979), pp. 218–46Google Scholar.

32 I take this as the best way of interpreting imperfect duties. Contrary to some interpretations, imperfect duties are not necessarily positive duties nor are they necessarily lax or optional. I will not be arguing for this here. The Kantians I have cited throughout this article adopt a similar approach.

33 Herman gives a non-quantitative account in which the amount or frequency of your contributions is not relevant. She concludes that ‘we might hope that the cumulative effects of past helpings would have moral weight in determining who among several helpers should be the one to give help, but the argument for mutual aid does not show that this is so’ (‘Mutual Aid’, p. 68).

34 Richard Miller pursues a different strategy for defending the limits of sacrifice. He develops a moderate principle of beneficence based on a ‘principle of sympathy’ which views fellow citizenship as a special relationship to whom ‘equal respect’ is owed. This account is moderate because it does not prohibit us from accumulating luxuries. For a full discussion see ‘Beneficence, Duty and Distance’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 32.4 (Fall 2004), pp. 357–83.

35 In ‘Thinking About the Needy, Justice and International Organizations’ Larry Temkin claims that ‘fulfilling our positive duties to others will almost certainly require most of us to address the easily preventable deaths of innocents, before contributing to the arts, scenic improvements – or dare I say it – higher education!’ (p. 358).

36 Unger, Living High, p. 134.

37 Unger, Living High, p. 150.

38 Unger, Living High, p. 151.

39 Unger, Living High, p. 151.

40 But this is not all that Unger thinks we must do. The truly serious losses we may be morally required to impose on ourselves are losses like that of ‘life or limb’ (p. 152). Unger notes that this should be taken as a theoretical implication of his view, since most of us are only required to give money to save lives and not to sacrifice life and limb to save lives. But nevertheless, this is an implication he accepts.

41 Unger does not draw the distinction I draw between the duty of beneficence and the duty to aid, so on his account I suspect we may do the right thing if we bring up the welfare of 100 wealthy people (which counts for 200 utiles) instead of saving the life of one (which counts for 100 utiles). I defend this distinction in ‘Perfect and Imperfect Duties’.

42 One need not accept that we have duties to ourselves to accept my more general claim that we are permitted to give our own lives priority or that we are permitted to protect those projects and commitments most important to us.

43 See Williams, Bernard, ‘Persons, Character and Morality’, Moral Luck (Cambridge, 1981), pp. 1–21CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

44 Of course there are other moral obligations the agent has, both positive and negative. A full account of our obligations would show how they all fit together. This is beyond the scope of this article.

45 Certainly the needy person does not care about the value of the project or interest I must give up – this only matters to me. The needy person just cares about receiving the aid.

46 I should note that it is very unlikely that the duty would require that you do nothing more. There is always more you could do to help the needy and even if we determine your share, you must give your share each year – so there is more you must do next year. My point is that as long as you are doing your part and are thus contributing to the fulfillment of your duty, you can also pursue other projects and ends. This one end does not consume your whole life.

47 See Murphy, Liam ‘The Demands of Beneficence’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 22.4 (Fall 1993), pp. 267–92Google Scholar, for a strong argument for the compliance condition. Robert Goodin also sees this as a collective action problem, one that can only be addressed collectively: see Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy (Cambridge, 1995).

48 Feinberg, Joel, ‘The Moral and Legal Responsibility of the Bad Samaritan’, Freedom and Fulfillment (Princeton, 1992), pp. 175–96Google Scholar.

49 Feinberg, ‘Bad Samaritan’, p. 193.

50 Arneson, Richard, ‘Moral Limits on the Demands of Beneficence’, The Ethics of Assistance, ed. Chatterjee, D. (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 33–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

51 Even Unger, in the last chapter of Living High and Letting Die, claims that, in practice, we may not be required adhere to his demanding theoretical dictates. Similarly, in the final chapter of his book If You're An Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich? (Cambridge, 2000), G. A. Cohen provides a rationale to explain why it is acceptable for us not to sacrifice everything. Many of us are in a better position to do more good for others by maintaining our current lifestyles than we would be if we were to give up all of our projects and commitments. Whether or not this is true is an empirical question; one certainly Singer would answer differently.

52 Arneson, ‘Moral Limits’, pp. 51–6.

53 I would like to thank Arthur Ripstein for his guidance in an earlier version of this argument. And I would like to thank Samantha Brennan for her helpful suggestions.