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Dead and Gone? Reply to Jenkins

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 December 2013

KARL EKENDAHL  and
JENS JOHANSSON
KARL EKENDAHL
Affiliation:
Uppsala University, [email protected]
JENS JOHANSSON
Affiliation:
Uppsala University, [email protected]
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Abstract

In a recent article, Joyce L. Jenkins challenges the common belief that desire satisfactionists are committed to the view that a person's welfare can be affected by posthumous events. Jenkins argues that desire satisfactionists can and should say that posthumous events only play an epistemic role: though such events cannot harm me, they can reveal that I have already been harmed by something else. In this response, however, we show that Jenkins's approach collapses into the view she aims to avoid.

Type
Debate
Information
Utilitas , Volume 26 , Issue 2 , June 2014 , pp. 218 - 220
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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References

1 Jenkins, Joyce L., ‘Dead and Gone’, Utilitas 23 (2011), pp. 228–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 229.

2 Jenkins, ‘Dead and Gone’, p. 228.

3 Parfit, Derek, Reasons and Persons (Oxford, 1984), p. 495Google Scholar.

4 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 495.

5 Jenkins, ‘Dead and Gone’, p. 233.

6 Jenkins, ‘Dead and Gone’, p. 234.

7 Jenkins, ‘Dead and Gone’, p. 234.

8 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments.