The European Union (EU) aims to ensure a high level of environmental protection. This is a key message of primary EU law. This article explores the purpose and meaning of this explicit ambition. It deciphers its influence on case law and on judicial review of legislative and administrative discretion. It argues that the requirement goes beyond window dressing and that its added value lies both in supporting the legitimacy of bold decisions and in preventing a manifest dismissal of the requisites of environmental protection.

Although primarily focused on EU law and on its technicalities, the article may offer helpful insights to other transnational or federal systems. It may help to build a better understanding of some of the challenges facing any environmental law regime confronted with the sensitive issue of ‘ambition’.

There is no definitive approach to assessing the effectiveness of international environmental regimes. In order to explore the regime established by the 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution this article broadly integrates the approach to effectiveness taken by Peter H. Sand in The Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements, and Daniel Bodansky in The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law. The article finds that compliance, institutional, and normative effectiveness can be evaluated relatively confidently. An effectiveness assessment of the long-range transboundary air pollution (LRTAP) regime indicates that, on the whole, it has helped states to reach agreement on contentious issues and achieve results in air pollution reduction. However, it faces significant challenges with regard to participation, implementation procedures, empowerment of domestic stakeholders, and funding. The article provides an in-depth and up-to-date look at the LRTAP regime, including the most recent amendments and its relationship with European Union and international law.

To support carbon markets, regulators must engage in a continuous process of learning. This article explores offsets regulation in the compliance markets of Europe, the United States and China, alongside the Clean Development Mechanism, to identify what has been learnt since offsets were initiated. We argue that offsets regulation must learn to work with demands for commercial viability, environmental sustainability and political legitimacy. We find that the learning here recommends greater control of the shares, sectors, sources and standards of offsets than was initially chosen. The findings provide some cautious optimism about the scope for improvements to such market mechanisms.

The Kyoto Protocol is remarkable among global multilateral environmental agreements for its efforts to depoliticize compliance. However, attempts to create autonomous, arm’s length and rule-based compliance processes with extensive reliance on putatively neutral experts were only partially realized in practice in the first commitment period from 2008 to 2012. In particular, the procedurally constrained facilitative powers vested in the Facilitative Branch were circumvented, and expert review teams (ERTs) assumed pivotal roles in compliance facilitation. The ad hoc diplomatic and facilitative practices engaged in by these small teams of technical experts raise questions about the reliability and consistency of the compliance process. For the future operation of the Kyoto compliance system, it is suggested that ERTs should be confined to more technical and procedural roles, in line with their expertise. There would then be greater scope for the Facilitative Branch to assume a more comprehensive facilitative role, safeguarded by due process guarantees, in accordance with its mandate. However, if – as appears likely – the future compliance trajectories under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change will include a significant role for ERTs without oversight by the Compliance Committee, it is important to develop appropriate procedural safeguards that reflect and shape the various technical and political roles these teams currently play.

Three sets of social institutions deal with catastrophic risk: government regulation through rule making, the market, and civil liability. Climate disasters expose the limitations of all of these social institutions and often result in extensive uncompensated losses, particularly in developing countries. The author proposes the establishment of a fossil fuel-funded Climate Disaster Response Fund to compensate victims for the ‘residual’ risk of climate disasters in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. This Fund, established under the UNFCCC’s Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts, would comprise levies placed on the world’s top 200 fossil fuel companies. This proposal is modelled on various domestic and international funds which have been established to overcome the difficulties posed by tort law and which require companies to pay for the hazardous consequences of their activities and products. Precedents include funds to compensate for the damage caused by toxic chemicals, oil pollution spills, asbestos and nuclear accidents.

Meat production and the transport sector contribute almost equally to global warming. However, unlike the transport sector, in terms of climate change policies meat production is relatively unregulated. Many scientists have called for a meat tax as a means of reducing consumption but governments and politicians have not responded. Has the law been an obstacle to the acceptance of a meat tax? To address that question, this article analyzes three examples of European Union (EU) taxes that could be imposed on the consumption of domestic and imported meat, and examines them in relation to the international climate change regime, human rights law, and the legal regimes of the World Trade Organization and the EU. It shows that, if carefully designed, an EU meat tax is consistent with these bodies of law. To address adequately the industrial sectors that give rise to global warming, governments will need to overcome the taboo relating to the concept of a meat tax.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) judgment in Whaling in the Antarctic, a dispute brought by Australia against Japan, found that Japan had violated the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) moratoria on all commercial whaling and the use of factory ships to process whales, and also the prohibition on whaling in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary. In the course of analyzing whether special permits issued by Japan qualified for the scientific whaling exemption under Article VIII ICRW, the Court benefited from a more robust scientific fact-finding process than at times in the past. The judgment emphasized the mutual obligations of this multilateral agreement by taking the view that the provisions of the ICRW’s scientific whaling exemptions are neither self-judging nor subject to a ‘margin of appreciation’ in favour of a state party claiming the exemption. The case was driven by conflicting attitudes towards commercial whaling, and also towards global common spaces. The ICJ’s decision and Japan’s response indicate the limits of the ICRW in resolving those differences.