Today, numerous constitutions provide for a rights-based approach to environmental protection. Based as they are on an instrumentalist rationality that seeks to promote human entitlements to nature, the majority of these rights remain anthropocentric. Although there are growing calls within academic and activist circles to reorient rights alongside an ecocentric ontology, only one country to date has taken the bold step to bestow rights on nature in its constitution. The Ecuadorian Constitution of 2008 announces the transition from a juridical anthropocentric orientation to an ecocentric position by recognizing enforceable rights of nature. This article critically reflects on the legal significance of granting rights to nature, with specific reference to Ecuador’s constitutional experiment. It first provides a contextual description of rights in an attempt to illustrate their anthropogenic genesis, and then explores the notion of environmental rights. The following part traces the discourse that has developed over the years in relation to the rights of nature by revealing aspects of an ecocentric counter-narrative. The final part focuses specifically on the Ecuadorian constitutional regime and provides (i) a historical-contextual discussion of the events that led to the adoption of the rights of nature; (ii) an analysis of the constitutional provisions directly and indirectly related to the rights of nature; and (iii) a critical appraisal of whether those provisions, so far, measure up to the rhetoric of constitutional ecocentric rights of nature in that country.

While 148 of the 196 national constitutions in effect today manifest some form of environmental constitutionalism, the fact that some states have not adopted such provisions suggests that their spread is not inexorable. This article investigates the factors which affect whether a state adopts environmental constitutionalism. By undertaking a historical analysis of those countries which have so amended their constitutions, it identifies the context in which the constitutional change takes place as a significant consideration. The context of constitutional change influences the amendment process, which is then opened up to a range of other factors, both external (learning/persuasion, acculturation/emulation) and internal (political leadership, public and sectoral engagement, constitutional ideology, national environmental damage), all of which are considered by examining previous efforts to enshrine environmental constitutionalism. The article concludes by highlighting four specific responses that are key to successful amendment processes, namely: capitalizing on crisis situations; ensuring that economic concerns are adequately addressed; leveraging the support of the public and politicians; and linking environmental protection to national values.

International wildlife law is concerned with the conservation of sentient species, but generally ignores the welfare of individual animals. It therefore does not reflect a recognition of the moral worth of animals and perpetuates the dichotomy between conservation and welfare. It is the primary goal of this article to ascertain how welfare concerns may be incorporated into international wildlife law in order to ensure that it takes cognizance of the moral worth of animals. The article advocates an injection of ethics, via a welfare-centric approach, into wildlife law in order to escape the dichotomy between conservation and welfare in relation to wild animals, and so to advance the progressive development of law that is conducive to wildlife protection rather than merely to its conservation.

Examples abound of national and international legal developments that indicate growing concern and respect for animals. However, a key barrier remains: animals are not recognized as legal persons and therefore do not have standing to pursue independent legal action. This significantly limits the scope for legal redress when animals’ interests are harmed. This article examines recent attempts in the United States and Europe to establish standing for animals via strategic litigation and the barriers that have so far undermined this project. The article argues that, despite their lack of success to date, cases that seek to establish standing for animals should continue to be pursued. Societal views about the value of animals’ lives are continually evolving such that these cases may soon be successful. Furthermore, even if unsuccessful, these cases help in creating the socio-cultural space required to redefine the human–animal divide and potentially transform animals into rights bearers.

This article analyzes the potential for legal transplant theory to strengthen the legal regimes that guarantee the right of access to environmental information in England and China. Guaranteed by the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, the right has a substantial impact on how individuals can act as environmental stewards. However, despite the framework provided by the Aarhus Convention, there are shortcomings in how these states guarantee the right when compared with the obligations set by the provisions of the Convention. The article applies Alan Watson’s legal transplant theory to the environmental information regimes in England and China and considers the likelihood of each jurisdiction sourcing legal reforms from the other. It also seeks to identify common trends shared by each jurisdiction and the impact of the Aarhus Convention on such transplants.

The proper division of responsibility for environmental protection between national and state governments has long been the subject of fierce debate. During the 1970s the United States Congress decided to shift the most important environmental responsibilities from state governments to the federal government. The main reason for this decision was to prevent a ‘race to the bottom’ in that states competing for industries could otherwise be lax in implementing and enforcing federal environmental standards. Yet, some scholars have argued that there could just as easily be a ‘race to the top’ among states as they compete to attract people and businesses concerned with environmental protection. China, in turn, is plagued with severe air and water pollution and soil contamination, which is attributed largely to ineffective enforcement of its national environmental laws. This article investigates whether China’s experience confirms the race-to-the-bottom theory. It demonstrates that devolution of responsibility for environmental protection to lower levels of government tends to result in lax implementation and enforcement of national environmental laws, particularly where national governments also create strong incentives for economic growth. It concludes that China’s highly devolved system of environmental governance is consistent with this theory, even if it does not provide conclusive evidence of its correctness.