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Looking to Livestock: Gauging the Evolution of the EU's Agri-Climate Law and Policy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 October 2024

Rebecca Williams*
Affiliation:
School of Law, University of Glasgow, Glasgow (United Kingdom)
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Abstract

Awareness of agricultural climate impacts is growing. In the European Union (EU), the agricultural sector is responsible for significant greenhouse gas emissions while continuing to receive considerable EU budgetary support. A large share of agricultural emissions is linked to livestock husbandry, a sector the direct and indirect climate impacts of which the EU's ‘green’ agricultural policies have historically ignored. This blind spot extends to the sizeable global deforestation footprint from EU livestock feed imports that remains unaddressed, despite the EU's aspired status as a global climate leader and major global agricultural market player. This article benchmarks the evolution of EU agri-climate legal and policy developments, using livestock emissions as a case study to highlight the importance of learning from the successes and failures of the EU experience, to realize future attempts to tackle global agricultural emissions.

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Creative Commons
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This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press

1. Introduction

As the global climate crisis progresses, the role of agriculture in driving environmental degradation is increasingly recognized. Historically, climate criticism has often focused on highly polluting industries, such as the fossil fuel or transport sectors. However, popular attention has been drawn to the role of agriculture, and particularly livestock, in driving global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions,Footnote 1 with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reporting that food emissions contribute between 21% and 37% of total global GHG emissions.Footnote 2 Moreover, agriculture has been cited as a leading driver in ecosystem degradation in forest settings,Footnote 3 water sources,Footnote 4 and beyond.

The European Union's (EU) agricultural sector is no exception, despite the EU's reputation for general leadership in international climate governance.Footnote 5 One report suggests that agriculture is responsible for 10.3% of the EU's GHG emissions, with nearly 70% of those emissions coming from the livestock sector.Footnote 6 These numbers relate only to ‘direct’ emissions, not indirect emissions such as those related to the impact of imported animal foodstuff.Footnote 7 It is reported that about 70% of all the livestock feed protein used in the EU is imported, and only 1.8% of domestic arable land is dedicated to its domestic production.Footnote 8 These agricultural imports, such as soybean for EU livestock feed, cause deforestation impacts globally.Footnote 9 Overall, a significant amount of the emissions produced from deforestation and land use and land-use change (LULUCF) stemming from the EU's agricultural sector are produced beyond EU borders. While specific data on the global climate impact of the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is not easily quantifiable, Cuypers and co-authors suggest that for the period from 1990 to 2008, the EU-27 imported almost 36% of all deforestation impacts embodied in crop and livestock products traded between regions.Footnote 10

Despite this significant impact, even beyond EU borders the EU agricultural sector has arguably lagged in its agri-climate governance.Footnote 11 Moreover, legal scholarship on the development of the EU livestock-specific climate governance has been surprisingly sparse.Footnote 12 This article intends to fill this gap, providing a commentary on the development of this agri-climate governance to date, and the extent to which recent developments mark a turning point in the EU approach to agricultural emissions. Because of the predominant impact (though at times, contested)Footnote 13 of livestock production on agricultural emissionsFootnote 14 and disproportionate support historically offered to livestock farming in the EU,Footnote 15 the livestock sector will be used as an example to demonstrate the development of the EU approach over time to governing the climate impacts of its agricultural sector.

This article also provides a case study of one approach to sustainable food systems transformation in rapidly developing and developing regions after their respective ‘livestock revolutions’ (where meat consumption increases following growth in average household incomes and a growing middle classFootnote 16).Footnote 17 Some reports suggest that meat consumption is expected to increase by up to 60% by 2050 from a 2010 baseline.Footnote 18 Despite this, climate solutions promoted for the livestock sector are often predominantly technical,Footnote 19 focusing on the climate efficiency of developing country livestock production rather than taking a full food system approach, which also recognizes demand-side drivers of livestock consumption that are relevant in tackling the path dependency of historical meat production.Footnote 20 Increasingly, scientific studies report a need for these demand-side strategies, such as dietary change, to be introduced in addition to technical solutions to achieve the necessary mitigation levels for the global agricultural sector.Footnote 21 EU law and policy in this area can provide a case study from which other ‘post-livestock revolution’ agricultural sectors can take positive and negative lessons, in a similar vein to other global learning experiences from EU climate innovation in the past, such as emissions trading schemes.Footnote 22 This is particularly important against identified structural difficulties in reducing emissions from the agri-food sector.Footnote 23

The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the bases for the EU climate mandate and responsibility for its livestock sector, making reference to both endogenous and exogenous factors driving action for the sector. Section 3 maps the gradual greening evolution in EU agri-climate governance, making specific reference to reforms of the CAPFootnote 24 over time, and newer developments such as the Farm to Fork StrategyFootnote 25 and the EU's new Forest and Ecosystem Risk Commodities (FERCs) Due Diligence Regulation. Section 4 will then benchmark these evolutions against general global efforts in the area, making reference to submitted national climate plans as required by the 2015 Paris Agreement,Footnote 26 in addition to international climate negotiations. Section 5 concludes by summarizing key arguments made and placing the relevance of EU efforts in agri-climate governance in the global food system's landscape for climate change mitigation, and expressing words of caution on the future of EU livestock governance.

2. Establishing the Basis for EU Agri-Climate Action

Before benchmarking and mapping the development of the EU's approach to livestock emissions to date, it is necessary to establish the basis for its mandate to undertake agri-climate governance generally, and any responsibility to enhance the ambition or scope of these efforts, both internally and externally. For the purpose of this article, these bases will be categorized into (i) endogenous bases, and (ii) exogenous bases.

Endogenous bases for EU agri-climate action are first identified in references to core EU legal provisions mandating climate action, including the agricultural sector. Beyond this, EU Member State (MS) preferences to address the climate crisis will also be discussed to highlight the range of endogenous drivers for agri-climate action in the EU. In terms of exogenous bases, international climate obligations and principles will be discussed, including the Paris Agreement and key burden-sharing principles such as the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in the light of different national circumstances (CBDR-RC). Establishing an exact scientific proportioning of the EU's responsibility to reduce its livestock emissions is not the goal of this article.

2.1. Endogenous Bases for EU Agri-Climate Governance

Generally, the EU has a strong internal mandate to address climate change. Following the enactment of the 1986 Single European Act,Footnote 27 common environmental policy was placed within the core competencies of the EU (at the time called the European Community (EC)), with the aims of preserving the quality of the environment, protecting human health, and ensuring rational use of natural resources.Footnote 28 Article 191 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU)Footnote 29 also required the pursuit of Union measures at the international level to address regional or worldwide environmental problems, in particular combating climate change.Footnote 30 Since then, the EU has aimed to be a ‘leader’ in international climate politics,Footnote 31 with increasing creation and mainstreaming of climate policies over the years.

The EU was the first major economy to submit its national climate plan under the Paris Agreement, and its submission was seen to be one of the most ambitious of all developed country parties.Footnote 32 The EU was on track to meet its 2020 target of a 20% reduction in GHG emissions from 1990 levels, and further commitments have been made as part of the recent European Green Deal (EGD).Footnote 33 Under the EGD, the EU plans to be the first climate-neutral region by 2050, and foresees reducing emissions by at least 55% from 1990 levels, enacting a series of climate action initiatives, including a European Climate Law (to enshrine the 2050 neutrality goal),Footnote 34 a European Climate Pact (to engage society in climate action),Footnote 35 and a 2030 Climate Target Plan (to enshrine the EGD reduction goals).Footnote 36

The EU's current main climate framework for 2030 revolves around three main instruments, some of which are directly relevant for agricultural emissions. Firstly, the 2003 Emissions Trading System (ETS) DirectiveFootnote 37 has created a mandatory cap-and-trade system for prescribed industries in the EU, including the power sector, heavy industry, and domestic aviation (though, notably, excluding the agricultural sector).Footnote 38 The Directive limits emissions by setting EU-wide limits (currently in its 4th Phase, which aligns with the EGD targetsFootnote 39), and companies or ‘installations’ can buy or receive emissions allowances depending on the level of their emissions. The Effort Sharing Regulation (ESR)Footnote 40 is a key part of this climate framework, regulating emissions from sectors not covered by the ETS Directive or from the LULUCF Regulation,Footnote 41 this time including the agricultural sector. Different Annual Emissions Allocations exist for MS depending on their national circumstances, but they all aspire towards overall EU climate goals, including the targets of the EGD.Footnote 42 Lastly, the LULUCF Regulation creates a ‘no debit’ rule for forests, where MS must ensure that emissions from LULUCF are ‘entirely compensated’ by an equivalent removal of carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere from some form of action in the sector.Footnote 43 National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) and national Long Term Strategies (nLTS) are created by MS in line with these policies, as mandated under the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action Regulation.Footnote 44 From this legislative framework, a comprehensive internal mandate for climate action is formed at both EU and MS levels. However, as mentioned, certain components, such as the ETS, exclude emissions from the agricultural sector, such as those from livestock production. As a result, it is necessary to delineate the relevant provisions for climate action in broader EU agricultural policy, namely the CAP.Footnote 45

The CAP was first created after the Second World War to prevent future food shortages and instances of hunger and starvation primarily through price support (with financial support still forming a central part of the CAP today).Footnote 46 In the current TFEU provisions outlining the CAPFootnote 47 there are no specific references to balancing agriculture with broader environmental goals, such as climate change.Footnote 48 The CAP has undergone significant reform over the years, particularly with the 1992 MacSharry reforms, following international recognition of the worldwide trade-distorting impacts of productivistFootnote 49 agricultural policies in the EU on global agricultural commodity prices through its internal minimum price guarantees for farmers.Footnote 50 The most trade-distorting internal supports were gradually reduced through further reform, with increased ‘greening’ of the CAP from 2003 and further reforms in 2013, again seeking to increase its sustainability focus, including addressing climate change.Footnote 51 Nevertheless, the EU agricultural policy continues to be characterized by ‘industrially driven and expansionist agriculture with state support’.Footnote 52

The 2014–20 CAP implementation period was similarly criticized for under-delivering on the EU Commission's arguably ‘post-productivist’Footnote 53 climate aspirations for reform.Footnote 54 The newest CAP reform (with implementation ongoing from January 2023) again sought to increase ‘green ambition’, introducing new architecture and measures, which include obliging each EU MS to demonstrate non-retrogression in its environment and climate action in its national CAP strategic plan.Footnote 55 The intention has been to link measures under the CAP with achieving the EGDFootnote 56 and the new Farm to Fork Strategy.Footnote 57 Most notably, 40% of the new CAP budget must be climate-relevant.Footnote 58 Some concerns have already been reported in a Staff Working Document surrounding the actual climate benefits the new CAP will entail,Footnote 59 in addition to the Commission raising concerns about published draft CAP strategic plans ignoring methane emissions from livestock.Footnote 60 Notwithstanding these reservations, recent reforms of the CAP indicate an increased basis and motivation for addressing climate change and livestock in its agricultural policies, particularly given its productivist history.

A final component of the endogenous basis for EU agri-climate governance is individual MS motivation. The Eurobarometer Special Report on Climate Change in 2021 reported that 93% of EU citizens see climate change as a ‘serious problem’, with 78% seeing it as a ‘very serious problem’.Footnote 61 90% of respondents and at least three quarters from each MS agreed that ‘[GHG] emissions should be reduced to a minimum while offsetting the remaining emissions, in order to make the EU economy climate-neutral by 2050’.Footnote 62 Moreover, 57% of respondents said that the EU is responsible for tackling climate change within the region.Footnote 63

With regard to livestock emissions, 31% of respondents reported buying and eating less meat to help in contributing to action against climate change.Footnote 64 However, national attitudes to addressing livestock emissions are more varied. The Commission suggests that:

[most proposed MS CAP strategic plans] ignore the importance of actions to reduce methane emissions from livestock and those with high intensive livestock production do not tackle these emissions at all, which is also reflected in the fact that only 9 out of 28 [plans] set the relevant climate targets for the livestock sector.Footnote 65

By comparison, when the Amazon fires broke out in 2019 (attributed to slash and burn deforestation techniquesFootnote 66), MS were more forthright in their stance against the Brazilian government and its trade relationship with the EU. For example, Austria, France, and Ireland threatened to block the EU-Mercosur AgreementFootnote 67 in the Council of Ministers on account of of Brazil's backstepping in forest protection, particularly with regard to the high-profile fire outbreaks.Footnote 68 These instances highlight that MS motivations are also a relevant factor in considering the internal, endogenous drivers of EU action on livestock emissions. Further exogenous legal bases for EU agri-climate action are discussed in the section below.

2.2. Exogenous Bases for EU Agri-Climate Governance

External factors also provide a basis for the EU's responsibility to address agricultural emissions, including those from livestock. These include (i) international climate change law obligations, and (ii) the EU's moral responsibility to address climate change.

The EU's international climate change obligations

The EU is party to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)Footnote 69 and its additional instruments, including the 2015 Paris Agreement.Footnote 70 The core aim of the Paris Agreement is:

[to hold] the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursu[e] efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change.Footnote 71

To meet this target, parties aim to peak global emissions by 2050 (Article 4(1)).Footnote 72 Country signatories self-determine their own nationally determined contributions (NDCs) in the light of the Agreement's legal framework.Footnote 73

Whilst agricultural emissions mitigation is not explicitly mandated by the Paris Agreement,Footnote 74 there is reference to vulnerability of food production and agriculture in the UNFCCC.Footnote 75 While the content of each NDC is self-determined and designed to have some in-built flexibilities for parties,Footnote 76 there is precedent for parties, such as the EU, to include the emissions inventory of their agricultural sector in their NDC.Footnote 77 Moreover, the agricultural sector has increasingly been considered in conference of the parties (COP) decisions, most recently in the Sharm El Sheikh Joint work on the implementation of climate action on agriculture and food securityFootnote 78 at COP-27 in Egypt, as well as its predecessor, the Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture.Footnote 79 As a result, it can be said that the EU has a legal obligation to consider the viability of food production in its national climate plans, with increasing likelihood of soft or hard legal obligations to address its livestock emissions following subsequent COP negotiation rounds.

The EU's moral responsibility for agri-climate governance

Beyond this, some see a moral duty for the EU to reduce its global environmental footprint. For example, Durán and Scott derive a moral responsibility for the importation by the EU of forest and ecosystem risk commodities (such as livestock-related commodities, like soy for feed), outlining EU ‘complicity’ in global forest degradation if it remains inactive in addressing the environmental impact of its agricultural consumption.Footnote 80 Similarly, Scott has derived both ‘first-order’ and ‘second-order’ climate responsibilities for the EU, utilizing Caney's work.Footnote 81 First-order responsibilities address the EU's ‘fair-share’ of the burden in addressing climate change, given their historical and current contribution to global climate impacts.Footnote 82 Second-order responsibilities for the EU go beyond this initial ‘fair-share’, utilizing their relative global market power to induce other actors to comply with their first-order responsibilities and prevent the potential harm of these actors’ inaction.Footnote 83 I have argued elsewhere that the morality-based environmental law principle of CBDR-RC (also enshrined in Article 2(2) of the Paris Agreement) also justifies the EU's need to better govern livestock emissions.Footnote 84 However, the purpose of this section was not to outline these moral arguments in depth, but to flag up further rationales that support the general need for the EU to address the agri-climate impacts of its livestock sector through legal avenues. These moral arguments support the EU in addressing its domestic livestock production and complicity in agriculture-driven environmental degradation beyond its borders, such as deforestation of land for feedstock crops in South America.Footnote 85

3. The Evolution of EU Agri-Climate Governance

Having provided bases for EU-level law and policymaking on agri-climate issues, this section will outline the evolution of the EU's agri-climate law and policies and the extent to which the EU is currently addressing its climate responsibilities for this sector. It will do so by discussing the EU CAP and its reform, in addition to the EU's Farm to Fork Strategy. The EU's new Due Diligence Regulation will also be discussed to address EU complicity in agricultural-driven deforestation beyond its borders.Footnote 86

3.1. The CAP Reforms

As mentioned, since 1992 the CAP has increasingly been ‘greened’ and has attempted to address the environmental impact of EU agricultural production (and issues with overproduction stemming from its historical productivist model).Footnote 87 Following the Agenda 2000 reforms, CAP payments were provided in a Two Pillar format: one for direct income support for farmers (Pillar 1), and the second for voluntary rural development measures that were co-financed by MS (Pillar 2).Footnote 88

Following further reforms in 2003, direct farm payments were largely decoupled from production.Footnote 89 In 2013, reforms of direct income support to farmers became conditional on meeting compulsory ‘greening measures’,Footnote 90 such as measures relating to crop diversification requirements, ecological focus areas, and permanent grassland maintenance, in addition to cross-compliance rules, including statutory management requirements (SMR), such as complianceFootnote 91 with the 1991 Nitrates Directive.Footnote 92

None of these compulsory greening measures addressed the main driver of agricultural emissions in the EU: enteric fermentation (the digestive process of certain livestock that produces methane gas). Moreover, sizeable livestock farmer pay-outs existed under the CAP, including voluntary coupled support – or, in other words, payments that are linked to baselines of protection for the specific production of agricultural products.Footnote 93 Generally, these payments have gradually reduced in number as the CAP has been reformed. However, even after this further supposed ‘green’ reform in 2013, payments for animal products were still sizeable.Footnote 94 The impact of this support on levels of livestock production has been criticized, with one study in 2014 suggesting that the removal of this coupled support for the cattle sector would have reduced production in the beef sector by 2.5% and by 0.7% in the dairy sector.Footnote 95

Similarly, voluntary agri-environment-climate ‘rural development measures’Footnote 96 under Pillar 2, designed to support commitments beyond minimum mandatory CAP standards, were found to fall short in their climate ambition.Footnote 97 Rural development programmes that existed for livestock production frequently focused on improving animal welfare, or modernizing farms to improve efficiency, whereas programmes targeting reducing livestock emissions were minimal.Footnote 98 Moreover, there was no obligation for farmers to undertake rural development climate measures, and, in fact, it is reported that only 17% of funding taken up under these rural development programmes from 2014 to 2020 were for ‘agri-environment-climate’ measures, specifically.Footnote 99

Overall, it is perhaps unsurprising that reported emissions removals during this CAP implementation period were underwhelming.Footnote 100 Against a backdrop of post-War agricultural productivism in the EU, the minimal integration of climate concerns into the CAP was not sufficient in reversing the path dependency of EU support for emissions-intensive agricultural commodities, such as livestock. In fact, a 2017 study for the EU Agri-Committee reported that dairy farmers were dependent on CAP payments for about 70% of their income, while for beef farms this share was more than 100%.Footnote 101 Beyond the core provisions of the CAP, financial support was provided for the EU livestock sector on an ongoing basis to ensure its viability, including a number of exceptional aid packages in 2015 to 2016, which were largely implemented to insulate the EU dairy sector from global milk price drops.Footnote 102

While farmer livelihood protection is a core objective of the CAP,Footnote 103 the minimal climate improvements of previous CAP reforms arguably led to an increased prioritization of climate action in the most recent CAP reform negotiations.

As part of the most recent CAP reform, a ‘new Green Architecture’ for the CAP was introduced.Footnote 104 This new framework contains a number of elements intended to contribute towards better livestock emissions reduction in the EU. Firstly, a new ‘delivery mode’ for environmental commitments under the CAP began in 2023, with a greater shift towards ‘results-orientation’ than was previously the case under the CAP.Footnote 105 In CAP ‘Strategic Plans’ (CSPs), MS are required to plan and implement all chosen CAP interventions according to their national/regional needs and aligned to the nine CAP specific objectives. The first round of draft CSPs has now been published, and the Commission has sent observation letters on their contents where necessary.Footnote 106

A number of the new CAP specific objectives cover environmental and climate issues. These include, notably, ‘contribut[ing] to climate change mitigation and adaptation … as well as to promote sustainable energy’.Footnote 107 Additionally, a condition of the new CAP Strategic Planning approach is the requirement for MS to demonstrate a higher level of ambition for the environment and climate under the CAP 2021–27 period than is currently set.Footnote 108

A new Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (PMEF) was created to assess how the CSPs are contributing to the CAP general and specific objectives and the overall performance of the policy.Footnote 109 Under this PMEF, an annual review process takes place between the MS managing authority and the Commission. The Commission has to approve the CSP on the basis that the plan meets all EU requirements and is in line with the provisions of the relevant CAP regulations.Footnote 110 Under this process, managing authorities must also submit an annual performance report to the Commission on the implementation of their CSP.Footnote 111 A monitoring committee consisting of national stakeholders is also made responsible for MS implementation of CSPs, including the attainment of targets set out in their plans.Footnote 112 CAP objectives, including those related to the environment and climate, are also accompanied by a common output, result and impact indicators that are intended to be used to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the CSPs, including reductions in livestock emissions.Footnote 113

A key new feature of the new Green Architecture that is expected to be included in CSPs is the eco-scheme concept. This is a new opt-in instrument designed to reward farmers who choose to go ‘one step further’ in terms of environmental care and climate action – in other words, beyond the new enhanced conditionality requirements included in Annex 3 of the CAP Strategic Plans Regulation.Footnote 114 Eco-schemes are voluntary in nature and do not replace these enhanced conditionality requirements or agri-environment-climate measures under Pillar 2 of the CAP.

Eco-schemes are fully financed by the EU (under Pillar 1) and therefore do not necessitate match funding from MS (unlike Pillar 2 rural development measures, which require national or regional co-financing).Footnote 115 To be supported by eco-schemes, agricultural practices should (i) cover activities related to climate, environment, animal welfare, and antimicrobial resistance; (ii) be defined on the basis of the needs and priorities identified at national/regional levels in their CSPs; and (iii) their level of ambition has to go beyond the requirements and obligations set by ‘new, enhanced conditionality’ to contribute towards reaching the EGD targets.Footnote 116

In a guidance document from the Commission about potential types of action or programme that could be funded as an eco-scheme, measures to mitigate emissions from enteric fermentation were included – the first explicit reference to the potential role of reducing emissions for enteric fermentation to achieve livestock emissions reductions in CAP documents.Footnote 117

However, as mentioned, some concerns have already been raised by the Commission with regard to the published draft CSPs. For example, variance has been noted across the draft reports and, still, the livestock sector appears to dominate the use of voluntary coupled support, as in previous CAP periods.Footnote 118 Most worryingly, the Commission highlights that the proposed plans largely ignore the importance of reducing methane emissions from livestock, despite the intended focus of the reform to address climate change.Footnote 119 These are only draft plans, and there is the opportunity (and, indeed, obligation) for MS to revise them in the light of the Commission's comments.Footnote 120 Despite the stated climate ambitions of the reform, historical path dependencies of past CAP periods characterized by protection of the livestock sector remain visible.Footnote 121

3.2. The Farm to Fork Strategy

The EU's Farm to Fork Strategy aims to make EU food systems ‘fair, healthy and environmentally friendly’.Footnote 122 The Strategy is a new integrated and comprehensive approach to EU food systems, covering broad areas of EU policy relevant to food systems, such as agricultural policy, environmental policy, and consumer protection.

The Strategy is in its early stages of implementation,Footnote 123 but some plans related to production or supply side improvements in livestock production have been articulated in the Strategy. For example, the Commission states it will:

facilitate the placing on the market of sustainable and innovative feed additives … [and] examine EU rules to reduce dependency on critical feed materials (e.g. soya grown on deforested land) by fostering EU-grown plant proteins as well as alternative feed materials such as insects, marine feed stocks (e.g. algae) and by-products from the bio-economy (e.g. fish waste).Footnote 124

These plans pick up on some of the shortcomings identified in analysis and critique of the previous CAP iteration, such as a lack of incentives to grow sustainable feedstock domestically.Footnote 125 A number of preliminary developments have been made in this respect, including the EU's first approval of a feed additive to reduce the methane emissions produced by cattle,Footnote 126 and the new Due Diligence RegulationFootnote 127 analyzed in Section 3.3 below.

Emissions reduction strategies under the Farm to Fork Strategy also focus on integrating public health concerns and the concept of ‘sustainable diets’ with emissions mitigation. For example, the Strategy references the role of ‘sustainable diets’ in achieving climate goals in the EU.Footnote 128 It highlights that the average intake of red meat in the EU exceeds recommendations, and consumption of healthy alternatives are below the level they should be.Footnote 129 Obesity rates in the EU are emphasized, and a more plant-based diet with less red and processed meat is highlighted as not only capable of reducing risks of life-threatening diseases (such as cardiovascular disease and cancer), but also having environmental benefits.Footnote 130

The Strategy suggests a number of pathways for achieving this sustainable and healthy diet synergy, including through the provision of clear information to make it easier for consumers to choose healthy and sustainable diets that will benefit health and quality of life.Footnote 131 The Commission will propose harmonized mandatory front-of-pack nutrition labelling,Footnote 132 and will consider proposing the extension of compulsory origin indications for certain products.Footnote 133 The Commission will also seek to harmonize voluntary green claims in the food sector and to create a sustainable labelling framework that covers the nutritional, climate, environmental, and social characteristics of food products.Footnote 134 Other measures relating to more sustainable public procurement, and reviewing the sustainability of EU school schemes,Footnote 135 are also provided for.Footnote 136 Lastly, the Commission proposes to use tax incentives to make food systems more sustainable and encourage consumers to choose sustainable and healthy diets.Footnote 137 So far, the European Parliament has voted in favour of enabling MS to introduce a 0% value added tax (VAT) rate for healthy and sustainable food, such as fruits and vegetables.Footnote 138 It also highlights that EU taxes should aim to ensure that the prices of different foods reflect their true costs, including environmental externalities such as GHG emissions.Footnote 139

While already facing some criticism and concern,Footnote 140 the Farm to Fork strategy provides details on the types of agri-environmental policy to be monitored in internal policymaking in the coming years to target the emissions impact of both livestock production and consumption in the EU. In addition to this package of measures, external policies are also being introduced to address the EU's responsibility for its forestry footprint for agriculture globally, for example, through the EU Due Diligence Regulation.Footnote 141

3.3. The EU Due Diligence Regulation

A new Regulation has been introduced in the EU mandating due diligence requirements for FERC traders placing these goods on the EU market.Footnote 142 The content of the Regulation has the potential to mitigate the EU's external forest footprint, as its scope includes soy for feedstock imported into the EU market, in addition to other FERCs, such as cattle.Footnote 143

Drawing inspirationFootnote 144 from the timber-focused Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Regulation,Footnote 145 the new Due Diligence Regulation requires all companies selling FERCs (including soy and beef) on the EU market to complete due diligence to demonstrate that these goods have not been illegally grown or harvested, or caused any forest degradation or deforestation.Footnote 146 Companies must complete varying levels of due diligence depending on the risk rating attached to different producer countries, based on deforestation data verified through satellite monitoring,Footnote 147 producer country legal frameworks, countries’ deforestation pledges, and bilateral agreements between the EU and third countries.Footnote 148 Existing certification or other third-party verified schemes can be used as a source of information in only the risk assessment procedure and cannot be used as a substitute for the operator's responsibility to conduct due diligence, with sanctions existing for companies that are found to be selling illegal or forest-degrading products.Footnote 149

As with other proposals and strategies outlined in this article, the success of the Regulation will depend on its implementation.Footnote 150 Nonetheless, it is encouraging that the regulatory gap surrounding agricultural imports under the CAP and the EU's broader agri-environmental regime has attempted to be addressed so directly by EU policymakers. Moreover, the EU's full responsibility for climate change is better addressed through this recognition and action being taken on forest-related emissions stemming from its agricultural consumption beyond its borders.

Having provided numerous examples of where the EU has sought to make its agricultural policies more climate-friendly, the following section benchmarks this agri-climate governance evolution – highlighting the disconnect between EU policies on paper and the practical reality of fundamentally restructuring EU food systems.

4. Benchmarking EU Agri-Climate Governance

Despite the inefficiencies noted above, the EU approach to addressing livestock emissions may be argued to be comparatively innovative with regard to (i) technical solutions, and (ii) taking a food system approach. The EU position will be benchmarked against that of other global actors by relying on existing studies, such as that from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO),Footnote 151 while noting the methodological limitations of these studies.Footnote 152

4.1. Technical Solutions

Technical livestock solutions are measures to reduce the emissions intensity of production on the supply side, including altering feedstock composition to reduce emissions from enteric fermentation or using more efficient dual-utilization cattle breeds. For the purpose of this benchmarking exercise, looking to international-level commitments for the agricultural sector provides useful insight into the general level of livestock-focused climate solutions pledged at the global level.Footnote 153 The UNFCCC regime utilizes production-based emissions accounting,Footnote 154 meaning that the implementation of technical livestock solutions in a producer state could contribute to its climate change mitigation targets.

Previous analysis of submitted NDCs indicates that generally livestock-focused climate commitments are sparse, particularly from developed country parties to the UNFCCC.Footnote 155 In the first round of NDCs submitted after the Paris Agreement's entry into force, the FAO reports that 148 of the 165 Paris parties included agriculture in their mitigation contributionsFootnote 156 under their initial NDCs (71%, 88%, and 98% of developing countries, economies in transition, and developed countries, respectively).Footnote 157 Of the 69 NDCs that mentioned livestock, 19 highlighted concrete measures referring to ‘feed management’ (10 parties) and ‘breeding management’ (5 parties); while 15 parties referred to ‘manure management’.Footnote 158 The FAO states that 54% of parties did not expand beyond simply including agriculture in their economy-wide emissions target to create more targeted mitigation policies, such as those for national livestock sectors.Footnote 159 Moreover, no developed country party was reported to refer to livestock in their first NDC and none of the largest global agricultural emitters included agricultural sector-specific contributions in their first submitted pledges.Footnote 160

The coverage of the livestock sector in NDCs has arguably improved as awareness and political interest in addressing the impact of the livestock sector on the climate has increased. The World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) analyzed updated NDCs following a similar methodology to the FAO,Footnote 161 reporting that 63 updated NDCs have mitigation measures that explicitly consider livestock, a 133% increase from 27 on previous NDCs.Footnote 162 This increase is promising, though other areas of agri-environmental governance are still gaining more traction – despite the disproportionate impact of livestock on the production of GHG emissions. For example, the WWF reports that 101 updated NDCs include adaptation measures for agriculture – over 60% more than those that have mitigation measures that explicitly consider livestock in their NDCs.Footnote 163

With regard to technical livestock solutions, the EU has made promising developments compared with developed economies with similar productivist agricultural models. For example, the provision of measures relating to enteric fermentation in the Commission's guidance for creating eco-schemes in the new CAP implementation period demonstrates an avenue for the intensity of production of livestock emissions to be addressed.Footnote 164 Moreover, the EU Commission has linked the EU's overall methane strategy with the CAP and Farm to Fork.Footnote 165 The Commission states it will also encourage MS to include methane reduction schemes in their strategic plans for the CAP.Footnote 166 It has highlighted effective ways of reducing the intensity of emissions from enteric fermentation, such as improving the health and fertility of the herds, improving animal diets (mix of feed materials), using feed additives, and improving feeding techniques.Footnote 167 The methane strategy also exemplifies the Farm to Fork Strategy's ‘novel approaches to feeding’ as an avenue to reducing methane emissions, such as fostering EU-grown plant proteins as well as alternative feed materials such as insects, marine feedstocks (for example, algae), and by-products from the bio-economy (for example, fish waste).Footnote 168

These fledgling policies in the EU relating to technical livestock solutions are still under development and their impact is therefore not yet secured. Nevertheless, the evolution of existing EU agricultural policies (such as the CAP) in addition to newer developments in agri-climate governance (such as Farm to Fork) demonstrates the EU's ongoing drive to meet its technical climate responsibilities for the livestock sector – particularly against a historical backdrop of inaction for the sector highlighted in the FAO analysis of NDCs.

4.2. Food Systems Approach

The EU's ambition to address its climate responsibilities related to the livestock sector is particularly clear in its recognition of the need for a ‘food systems approach’ to tackling livestock emissions. A food systems approach refers to an approach that ‘analyses the relationships between the different parts of the food system and the outcomes of activities within the system in socio-economic and environmental/climate terms’.Footnote 169 The concept of a ‘food system’ has rapidly evolved away from simplistic consideration of producers and consumers. A newer and more ‘holistic’ concept of a food system is one that:

integrates all the elements (environment, people, inputs, processes, infrastructures, institutions, etc.) and activities that relate to the production, processing, distribution, preparation and consumption of food, and the output of these activities, including socio-economic and environmental outcomes.Footnote 170

In relation to the livestock sector, a food systems approach extends beyond technical solutions to livestock emissions (such as feed additives) to include broader socio-economic drivers of these emissions (such as diet or food waste).Footnote 171 In particular, this approach includes healthiness and sustainability, thereby promoting less resource-intensive (and more nutritious) consumption in the EU.Footnote 172

EU policies such as Farm to Fork or its new Due Diligence Regulation are particularly focused on the demand-side of EU agricultural consumption – whether that be related to diet or EU imports. The EU's Farm to Fork Strategy incorporates this food system approach, making reference to food sustainability labelling schemes, rethinking biases in CAP pay-out programmes for more resource-intensive dietary components, and reducing tax on healthy dietary components.Footnote 173 With regard to recognizing the role of EU consumption of agricultural goods in driving emissions from deforestation in third countries, the EU's new Due Diligence Regulation for FERCs begins to address the sustainability of EU agricultural supply chains and consumption of livestock goods, such as soy for feedstock.Footnote 174

This food systems approach to tackling sustainable diets in these ways is a particular aspect of EU agri-climate governance that benchmarks it as a more ambitious future global actor for livestock emissions mitigation. At COP-27, during the negotiation of the Sharm El Sheikh joint work on implementation of climate action on agriculture and food security,Footnote 175 the EU pushed for a food systems approach to the Decision.Footnote 176 Carbon Brief noted that taking this ‘whole food systems approach’ was a key dividing element between countries that already have language around food systems in their domestic policies, such as the EU's Farm to Fork Strategy, against countries that were either unclear or reluctant to talk about aspects such as consumption and diets. This divisiveness was attributed to tensions around the implied reductions in meat consumption required from this approach, in addition to a ‘lack of clarity’ surrounding food systems language.Footnote 177 Some developing regions also viewed the inclusion of ‘whole food systems’ language as an implied curtailing of domestic agricultural expansion in the Decision's mandate.Footnote 178 In the end, the food systems approach language was deleted from the text.Footnote 179 However, the EU negotiating stance demonstrates its aspiration for global alignment with its own policies, such as Farm to Fork, that take a fuller food systems approach to tackling livestock emissions.

Beyond this, looking to NDCs and their inclusion of strategies such as dietary change as a benchmark for EU agri-climate governance, the EU can, once again, be seen to be ambitious in addressing dietary change in an innovative food systems approach to livestock emissions. The WWF analysis of updated NDC submissions saw a general increase in consideration of post-harvest demand-side mitigation policies, such as reducing food waste. For example, 36 updated NDCs consider post-harvest food measures; a 71% increase compared with 21 previous NDCs was reported.Footnote 180 Nineteen updated NDCs consider food waste reduction, compared with only three parties in their previous NDCs.Footnote 181 This being said, according to the WWF analysis, only five NDCs made reference to dietary change as a potential post-harvest emissions solution – largely from developing countries using diet as an adaptation strategy, rather than developed countries that typically consume more meat per capita.Footnote 182

The COP negotiations surrounding dietary change for the Sharm el Sheikh decision demonstrate the contentious nature of these types of policy. Unsurprisingly, few countries are keen to address the ‘hot potato’ of dietary change in their national strategies for fear of political backlash.Footnote 183 While it is beyond the scope of this article to delve into the depths of all states’ climate and diet-related policies, the EU's active creation and promotion of a full food systems approach that includes dietary change demonstrates the exceptional nature of the EU's intended approach to agri-climate governance.

5. Conclusion: Possibilities and Caution

This article has demonstrated the development of the EU approach over time to governing the climate impacts of its agricultural sector, using the livestock sector as a case study on account of its historical financial support from the EU and its climate impact. Firstly, the bases for the EU's climate responsibility were outlined. This included endogenous bases, such as the EU's internal climate mandate and the desire of EU MS to address climate issues, in addition to exogenous bases, such as international climate law obligations and broader moral arguments relating to the EU's climate responsibility. The recent evolutions in EU agri-climate governance were then outlined, including the increasing inclusion of climate considerations in the CAP, the development of the Farm to Fork Strategy, and the introduction of the new EU Due Diligence Regulation, which could tackle the sustainability of the EU's agricultural supply chains from deforestation risk areas. The EU's agri-climate governance for its livestock sector was then benchmarked against other global actors, making references to analysis of international climate plans and negotiations. From this analysis, it was determined that the EU was somewhat ‘ahead of the curve’ in terms of its design of newer agri-climate policies, such as the CAP, the Farm to Fork Strategy, and the new Due Diligence Regulation. This was the case for the EU mandating technical livestock solutions in these policies, in addition to more innovative and comprehensive food systems approaches to tackling livestock emissions to address its climate responsibility for the sector. However, this benchmarking exercise of the EU's agri-climate governance of its livestock sector is complicated by the fact that the majority of these policies are still under development. Potential risks include, firstly, that CAP plans from MS are falling short of the Commission's expectations for national livestock sectors, and progress on Farm to Fork promises has been slow.Footnote 184 Secondly, the accessibility of reliable due diligence over long supply chains can be difficult to secure, particularly in regions such as South America where domestic environmental forms of protection have been eroded under past administrations.Footnote 185

This points at general issues with trying to recalibrate food systems, both at the domestic level and globally.Footnote 186 Agricultural sectors are important mainstays in the EU and particularly in developing regions.Footnote 187 Moreover, dietary change is an issue that trickles down to the kitchen table, constrained by cultural and economic barriers to change.Footnote 188 Against a backdrop of strong agricultural tradition in the EU and powerful agricultural lobbies both in the EU and in hotspot regions for livestock production,Footnote 189 there are broader factors that complicate the implementation of these systematic changes.Footnote 190 Throughout the evolution of EU agri-climate governance, the structural path dependency of EU financial support for its livestock sector has been longstanding, and hampering efforts for EU agri-climate reform. Recent farmer protests throughout Europe only highlight the contention and resistance that structural shifts in EU agricultural policy will meet.Footnote 191 The significant concessions since made by the Commission in response to these protests yet again show the willingness of EU policy makers to weaken environmental ambition to maintain the agricultural status quo.Footnote 192

Nevertheless, with anticipated slightly downward trends of meat consumption by European citizensFootnote 193 and concerns for climate change on the rise, there is arguably no better time for EU agri-environmental policies to broach the transition towards a global sustainable diet head-on with concurrent public health benefits. As a shift in EU rhetoric and climate responsibility surrounding the agricultural sector is being witnessed, increased attention should be paid to the EU and its positionality in global agri-climate policy-making trends.

This article suggests that EU efforts such as the Due Diligence Regulation can provide an example of the wide range of rulemaking for environmentally damaging commodities that exists in policymakers’ ‘toolkits’ for addressing livestock emissions. In this sense, policymaking attempts by the EU in this area provide case studies of policies for the global agricultural economies to learn from – whether positively or negatively – in a similar vein to the global learning experience of emissions trading schemes.Footnote 194 Moreover, the EU as a developed region, with comparatively higher levels of consumption of ‘luxury’ dietary components such as meat, provides a useful case study of how more sustainable food systems could be approached globally when rapidly industrializing countries undergo the livestock revolution. Increasingly, high consumption of emissions-intensive components is likely to form the greatest challenges in reducing agricultural emissions in the future, because of the complex need to restructure food systems. As a result, despite its fledgling status, EU policymaking in this area is a valuable focus of study to monitor in the future – both for its successes and failures – against the backdrop of its productivist history.

Acknowledgements

Many thanks to Joanne Scott, Maria Lee, Neha Jain, and Jolene Lin for their previous comments on a broader chapter from my PhD thesis, which formed the basis for this article. Thank you also to the anonymous TEL peer reviewers for their constructive feedback.

Funding statement

Not applicable.

Competing interests

The author declares none.

References

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14 H. Steinfeld et al., Livestock's Long Shadow: Environmental Issues and Options (FAO, 2006).

15 Livestock farming pay-outs, taking into account CAP payments based on farm size and payments that support livestock production, are reported to be between €22.5 billion and €32.6 billion, i.e. between 18 and 20% of the EU's total annual budget; see Greenpeace, Feeding the Problem: The Dangerous Intensification of Animal Farming in Europe (Greenpeace, 2019), p. 15. One 2017 study from Wageningen University & Research for the European Parliament Agri-Committee reported that dairy farmers are reliant on CAP payments for about 70% of their income, while for beef farms this share is even more than 100%; see R. Ihle et al., Research for Agri Committee: The EU Cattle Sector: Challenges and Opportunities – Milk and Meat: Study (European Union, 2017), p. 22.

16 See more in K.F. Davis et al., ‘Meeting Future Food Demand with Current Agricultural Resources’ (2016) 39 Global Environmental Change, pp. 125–32.

17 Though noting that an emulation or translation of this approach will need to be adapted to specific regional or national contexts. For one attempt to demonstrate the contextualization of sustainable food system transformation see C. Leeuwis, B.K. Boogaard & K. Atta-Krah, ‘How Food Systems Change (Or Not): Governance Implications for System Transformation Processes’ (2021) 13 Food Security, pp. 761–80.

18 B. Revell, ‘Meat and Milk Consumption 2050: The Potential for Demand-Side Solutions to Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction’ (2015) 14(3) EuroChoices, pp. 4–11.

19 E.g., using more efficient herd breeds or dual utilization breeds so that fewer cattle are needed to produce the same or more beef and dairy products; altering cattle feed composition so that less methane is produced by the cattle's digestive process, including adding feed additives to reduce emissions and more effective manure storage to minimize the amount of methane produced while manure is being stored.

20 For more on the historically Anglocentric nature of meat consumption, and how this has translated into global consumption patterns of livestock products see R. Williams, Climate Change, Cattle and the International Legal Order (Hart, 2024), pp. 17–23.

21 Davis et al., n. 16 above; E. Wollenberg et al., ‘Reducing Emissions from Agriculture to Meet the 2°C Target’ (2016) 22(12) Global Change Biology, pp. 3859–64. For more on sustainable diet modelling see FAO and World Health Organization (WHO), ‘Sustainable Healthy Diets: Guiding Principles’ (FAO & WHO, 2019).

22 See, e.g., how global actors learned from the mistakes of the EU emissions trading experience, stating the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) model as ‘non-aspirational’ to the United States (US) experience, but nonetheless learned from issues with the scheme, such as over-allocation in the first ETS period; see K. Biedenkopf, ‘Emissions Trading: A Transatlantic Journey for an Idea?’, KFG Working Paper No. 45, Sept. 2012), available at: https://userpage.fu-berlin.de/kfgeu/kfgwp/wpseries/WorkingPaperKFG_45.pdf.

23 For a comprehensive overview of some of these difficulties see S.J. Vermeulen et al., ‘Changing Diets and the Transformation of the Global Food System’ (2020) 1478(1) Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, pp. 3–17.

24 As established in Arts 38–44 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Lisbon (Portugal), 13 Dec. 2007, in force 1 Dec. 2009, [2012] OJ C 326/01, available at: http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:326:FULL:EN:PDF.

25 European Commission, Communication, ‘A Farm to Fork Strategy for a Fair, Healthy and Environmentally-Friendly Food System’, COM(2020) 381, 20 May 2020 (Farm to Fork Strategy).

26 Paris (France), 12 Dec. 2015, in force 4 Nov. 2016, available at: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf.

27 Luxembourg (Luxembourg), 17 Feb. 1986, and The Hague (The Netherlands), 28 Feb. 1986, in force 1 July 1987, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:11986U/TXT&from=EN.

28 Now consolidated in Art. 191 TFEU, n. 24 above.

29 N. 24 above.

30 See J. Gutpa & M.J. Grubb, ‘Leadership’, in J. Gupta & M.J. Grubb (eds), Climate Change and European Leadership: A Sustainable Role for Europe? (Kluwer, 2000), pp. 10–2.

31 C.F. Parker, C. Karlsson & M. Hjerpe, ‘Climate Change Leaders and Followers: Leadership Recognition and Selection in the UNFCCC Negotiations’ (2015) 29(4) International Relations, pp. 434–54.

32 For general discussion of the negotiations and nationally determined contributions (NDCs) see L. Rajamani, ‘Ambition and Differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement: Interpretative Possibilities and Underlying Politics’ (2016) 65(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, pp. 493–514.

33 European Commission, Communication, ‘The European Green Deal’, COM(2019) 640, 11 Dec. 2019 (EGD Communication).

34 Ibid., para. 2.1.1.

35 Ibid., para. 4.

36 Ibid., para. 2.1.1. Within this, the revised Directive (EU) 2023/2413 amending Directive (EU) 2018/2001, Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 and Directive 98/70/EC as regards the Promotion of Energy from Renewable Sources, and repealing Council Directive (EU) 2015/652 [2023] OJ L 2023/2413 (Renewable Energy Directive) mandates a renewable energy target of at least 42.5% binding at EU level by 2030 – but aiming for 45%. The Directive strengthens the bioenergy sustainability criteria from its predecessor, Directive (EU) 2018/2001 on the Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable Sources [2018] OJ L 328/82. This has relevance for agricultural crops being used for bioenergy, but because of the focus of livestock feed crops of this article is not explored in depth here.

37 Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a System for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading within the Union and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC [2003] OJ L 275/32.

38 For more on the ETS and its relationship to agriculture see A. Matthews, ‘Trade Policy Approaches to Avoid Carbon Leakage in the Agri-Food Sector’ (The Left in the European Parliament, 2022).

39 EGD Communication, n. 33 above, para. 2.1.1.

40 Regulation (EU) 2018/842 on Binding Annual Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions by Member States from 2021 to 2030 Contributing to Climate Action to Meet Commitments under the Paris Agreement and amending Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 [2018] OJ L 156/26.

41 Regulation (EU) 2023/839 amending Regulation (EU) 2018/841 as regards the Scope, Simplifying the Reporting and Compliance Rules, and Setting Out the Targets of the Member States for 2030, and Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 as regards Improvement in Monitoring, Reporting, Tracking of Progress and Review [2021] OJ L 107/1.

42 EGD Communication, n. 33 above, para 2.1.1.

43 Regulation (EU) 2023/839, n. 41 above.

44 Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action, amending Regulations (EC) No 663/2009 and (EC) No 715/2009, Directives 94/22/EC, 98/70/EC, 2009/31/EC, 2009/73/EC, 2010/31/EU, 2012/27/EU and 2013/30/EU, Directives 2009/119/EC and (EU) 2015/652 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 [2018] OJ L 328/1 (Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action Regulation).

45 Though this does not undermine the potential relevance of other EU legislation that can have an impact on agricultural emissions, such as Directive 91/676/EEC concerning the Protection of Waters against Pollution Caused by Nitrates from Agricultural Sources [1991] OJ L 375/1 (Nitrates Directive). See further G. Velthof et al., ‘The Impact of the Nitrates Directive on Nitrogen Emissions from Agriculture in the EU-27 during 2000–2008’ (2014) 468–469 Science of the Total Environment, pp. 1225–33.

46 H. Zobbe, ‘The Economic and Historical Foundation of the Common Agricultural Policy in Europe’, Unit of Economics Working Papers 2001/12, Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University, Food and Resource Economic Institute, Sept. 2001, p. 10.

47 Arts 38–44 TFEU, n. 24 above.

48 Though, arguably, environmental integration is encouraged across all policy areas under Art. 11 TFEU, n. 24 above. For more on environmental integration in EU agricultural policy see G. Alons, ‘Environmental Policy Integration in the EU's Common Agricultural Policy: Greening or Greenwashing?’ (2017) 24(11) Journal of European Public Policy, pp. 1604–22. More generally on environmental integration see B. Sjåfjell, ‘The Environmental Integration Principle: A Necessary Step towards Policy Coherence for Sustainability’, in F. Ippolito, M.E. Bartoloni & M. Condinanzi (eds), The EU and the Proliferation of Integration Principles under the Lisbon Treaty (Routledge, 2014), pp. 105–22. Other broader socio-economic or development goals, such as farmer livelihoods, are referenced; see, e.g., Art. 39 TFEU, n. 24 above.

49 See G.A. Wilson & R.J.F. Burton, ‘“Neo-Productivist” Agriculture: Spatio-Temporal versus Structuralist Perspectives’ (2015) 38 Journal of Rural Studies, pp. 52–64, at, e.g., 52 and 55.

50 Muller and Bautze, n. 9 above, p. 11.

51 Ibid., pp. 12–8.

52 G. Wilson, ‘From Productivism to Post-Productivism … and Back Again? Exploring the (Un)Changed Natural and Mental Landscapes of European Agriculture’ (2001) 26(1) Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, pp. 77–102, at 77–8.

53 Wilson & Burton, n. 49 above, at, e.g., p. 55, and discussions of European farming multifunctionality and neo-productivism from p. 57.

54 See, e.g., D. Mottershead et al., Evaluation Study of the Impact of the CAP on Climate Change and Greenhouse Gas Emissions (European Union, 2018). This study makes note of limitations of the previous CAP implementation on account of factors such as the CAP design not mandating climate action, a lack of emissions impact assessment of voluntary coupled support for livestock, and the need for better support and guidance for MS.

55 For a summary of current national CAP strategic plans see European Commission, ‘Approved 28 CAP Strategic Plans (2023–2027)’, June 2023, available at: https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-06/approved-28-cap-strategic-plans-2023-27.pdf http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:11986U/TXT&from=EN .

56 European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document: Analysis of Links between CAP Reform and Green Deal’, 20 May 2020, SWD(2020) 93, e.g., p. 9.

57 N. 25 above.

58 See Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 establishing Rules on Support for Strategic Plans to be Drawn up by Member States under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and Financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013 [2021] OJ L 435/1 (CAP Strategic Plans Regulation), Recital 94.

59 N. 56 above, p. 17.

60 European Commission, ‘Proposed CAP Strategic Plans and Commission Observations: Summary Overview of 27 Member States’, June 2022, p. 23.

61 European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 513: Climate Change (European Union, 2021), p. 7.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid.

65 European Commission, n. 60 above, p. 23.

66 N. Andela et al., ‘Tracking and Classifying Amazon Fire Events in Near Real Time’ (2022) 8(3) Science Advances, article eabd2713.

68 J. Stone, ‘Emmanuel Macron Says He Will Block EU Trade Deal with Brazil over Amazon Forest Fires’, The Independent, 23 Aug. 2019, available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/macron-amazon-forest-fires-veto-mercosur-eu-trade-deal-brazil-a9076181.html; G. Fahy & G. Baczynska, ‘EU Piles Pressure on Brazil over Amazon Fires’, Reuters, 23 Aug. 2019, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-mercosur-ireland/eu-piles-pressure-on-brazil-over-amazon-fires-idUSKCN1VD0PJ.

69 New York, NY (US), 9 May 1992, in force 21 Mar. 1994, available at: https://unfccc.int.

70 N. 26 above.

71 Ibid., Art. 2.

72 Ibid., Art. 4(1).

73 Rajamani, n. 32 above, p. 501.

74 See more generally in A. Zahar, ‘Agricultural Exceptionalism in the Climate Change Treaties’ (2023) 12(1) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 42–70.

75 N. 69 above, Art. 2. Agriculture is only considered a ‘relevant sector’ under Art. 4(c) and (e) in reference to technology transfer and adaptation, not mitigation. For more on the inclusion of agriculture in the international climate regime see also Williams, n. 20 above, pp. 39–57.

76 For more on self-differentiation under the Paris Agreement see Rajamani, n. 32 above.

78 UNFCCC COP Decision 4/CP.23, ‘Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture’, 17 Nov. 2017, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2017/11/Add.1.

79 UNFCCC COP Decision 3.CP/27, ‘Sharm El-Sheikh Joint Work on Implementation of Climate Action on Agriculture and Food Security’, 6 Nov. 2022, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2022/10/Add.1.

80 G. Durán & J. Scott, ‘Regulating Trade in Forest-Risk Commodities: Two Cheers for the European Union’ (2022) 34(2) Journal of Environmental Law, pp. 245–67, at 257–61.

81 See J. Scott, ‘The Geographical Scope of the EU's Climate Responsibilities’ (2015) 17 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, pp. 92–120, at 97 (referring to S. Caney, ‘Two Kinds of Climate Justice: Avoiding Harm and Sharing Burdens’ (2014) 22(2) Journal of Political Philosophy, pp. 125–49).

82 Scott, ibid., from p. 97.

83 Ibid.

84 See more in Williams, n. 20 above, pp. 154–76.

85 Muller & Bautze, n. 9 above, pp. 19–33.

86 Regulation (EU) 2023/1115 on the Making Available on the Union Market and the Export from the Union of Certain Commodities and Products Associated with Deforestation and Forest Degradation and repealing Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 [2023] OJ L 150/206 (Due Diligence Regulation).

87 For an account see generally B. O'Connor, ‘The Food Crisis and the Role of the EC's Common Agricultural Policy’, in B. Karapinar & C. Haberli (eds), Food Crises and the WTO (Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 187–219.

88 See European Commission, ‘Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union’, COM(97) 2000 final, 15 July 1997, from p. 22.

89 As opposed to payments incentivized by levels of production, as was the case with the previous CAP – thereby leading to distortion in global market price; for more see A. Cunha & A. Swinbank, An Inside View of the CAP Reform Process: Explaining the MacSharry, Agenda 2000 and Fischler Reforms (Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 68–101, although voluntary coupled support still exists; for more detail see Wilson & Burton, n. 49 above.

90 For a comprehensive overview see Alons, n. 48 above.

91 Though voluntary cross compliance was an option from as early as 1992, as part of the MacSharry reforms, with further options for voluntary cross compliance made possible following the Agenda 2000 reform of the CAP. The formal requirements for cross-compliance were introduced as part of the 2003 reforms of the CAP. For more on this see M. Farmer & V. Swales, ‘The Development and Implementation of Cross Compliance in the EU: An Analysis’, Institute for European Environmental Policy, Dec. 2004.

92 N. 45 above. See Recitals 41–44 of Regulation (EU) No 1307/2013 establishing Rules for Direct Payments to Farmers under Support Schemes within the Framework of the Common Agricultural Policy and repealing Regulations (EC) No 637/2008 and (EC) No 73/2009 [2013] OJ L 347/608.

93 For more on coupled agricultural subsidies see T. Jansson et al., ‘Coupled Agricultural Subsidies in the EU Undermine Climate Efforts’ (2020) 43(4) Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, pp. 1503–19.

94 The latest available data states that in 2018 a total of €3.99 billion was paid in coupled support in that year, of which around 40% supported beef production and around 21% supported milk production: European Commission, ‘Summary Report on the Implementation of Direct Payments (Except Greening): Claim Year 2020’, Dec. 2022, p. 25.

95 Mottershead et al., n. 54 above, p. 49.

96 As laid down in Regulation (EU) No 1305/2013 on Support for Rural Development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 [2013] OJ L 347/487, Art. 28, Measure 10 (M10) (‘aims to preserve and promote the necessary changes to agricultural practices that make a positive contribution to the environment and climate’).

97 See, generally, European Court of Auditors (ECA), Greening: A More Complex Income Support Scheme, Not Yet Environmentally Effective (European Union, 2017).

98 Though some examples arguably do exist, such as a programme seeking to create green energy from pig manure: EU CAP Network, ‘Producing Green Energy from Pig Manure’, undated, available at: https://eu-cap-network.ec.europa.eu/good-practice/producing-green-energy-pig-manure_en.

99 European Parliament, ‘Second Pillar of the CAP: Rural Development Policy’, Fact Sheets on the European Union, 2022, p. 4.

100 E.g., one study's simulation of emissions reductions suggests that emissions could have been 26.2 million tonnes higher without the impact of those CAP measures for those which they simulated a quantified result. Of the avoided emissions, 20.2 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent (Mt CO2 eq) are covered under LULUCF reporting and attributable to cropland and grazing land management, with the remaining 6 Mt CO2 eq accounted for by reductions in emissions of N2O and CH4: Mottershead et al., n. 54 above, p. 93.

101 Ihle et al., n. 15 above.

102 See, e.g., European Commission, ‘European Commission Activates Exceptional Measures to Further Support European Farmers in Crisis’, Press Release IP/16/806, 14 Mar. 2016.

103 See, e.g., Art. 39 TFEU, n. 24 above.

104 CAP Strategic Plans Regulation, n. 58 above, Art. 109(2).

105 N. Lamplin et al., ‘Using Eco-Schemes in the New CAP: A Guide for Managing Authorities’, IFOAM EU Group et al., 2020.

106 The new CAP catalogue to view all CAP interventions is available at: https://agridata.ec.europa.eu/extensions/DashboardCapPlan/catalogue_interventions.html.

107 CAP Strategic Plans Regulation, n. 58 above, Art. 6(1)(d).

108 See Ibid., Art. 105, for more on the ‘no backsliding’ requirement.

109 Ibid., Title VII.

110 Ibid., e.g., Art. 118.

111 Ibid., Art. 134.

112 Ibid., Art. 124.

113 Ibid., e.g., Art 7 and Annex 1. Result indicator R.13, in Annex I, monitors the share of livestock units in a MS that are supported under commitments to reduce emissions of GHG and/or ammonia, including manure – as potentially monitored by output indicator O.8 ‘numbers of hectares or of livestock units benefitting from eco-schemes’.

114 Ibid., Annex 3. These include enhanced SMRs and good agricultural and environmental conditions (GAECs); see H. Guyomard et al., ‘How the Green Architecture of the 2023–2027 Common Agricultural Policy Could Have Been Greener’ (2023) 52 Ambio, pp. 1327–38.

115 For more on payments for eco-schemes see CAP Strategic Plans Regulation, n. 58 above, Art. 31(7).

116 Ibid., Art. 31(4).

117 European Commission, ‘Sustainable Agricultural Practices and Methods: List of Potential Agricultural Practices that Eco-Schemes Could Support’, available at: https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/sustainability/environmental-sustainability/sustainable-agricultural-practices-and-methods_en.

118 European Commission, n. 60 above, p. 9.

119 Ibid., p. 23.

120 CAP Strategic Plans Regulation, n. 58 above, Art. 118(3).

121 See European Commission, n. 60 above, p. 5 (where the Commission generally also highlights the incompleteness of some MS submissions – noting that many MS failed to reflect and address certain specific country challenges in their plans).

122 Farm to Fork Strategy, n. 25 above.

123 For more on its deficiencies to date see H. Schebesta, ‘How to Save the Farm to Fork Strategy: A Two-Phased Approach’ (2023) 18(4) European Food and Feed Law Review, pp. 231–8.

124 Farm to Fork Strategy, n. 25 above, p. 7.

125 For more on protein crop growth in the EU see European Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Development of Plant Proteins in the European Union’, COM(2018) 757 final, 22 Nov. 2018 (e.g., it is stated that the EU only has 5% self-sufficiency for soya crops: ibid., p. 2).

126 G. Fortuna, ‘From “Burp” to Fork: EU Approves First Methane-Busting Feed Additive for Cattle’, Euractiv, 23 Feb. 2022, available at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/news/from-burp-to-fork-eu-approves-first-methane-busting-feed-additive-for-cattle.

127 N. 86 above.

128 Farm to Fork Strategy, n. 25 above, from p. 13.

129 Ibid.

130 Ibid. This is in line with broader literature on sustainable diet modelling; see W. Willett et al., ‘Food in the Anthropocene: The EAT–Lancet Commission on Healthy Diets from Sustainable Food Systems’ (2019) 393(10170) The Lancet, pp. 447–92.

131 Farm to Fork Strategy, n. 25 above, e.g., p. 13.

132 The Commission is preparing a proposal to revise Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011 on the Provision of Food Information to Consumers [2011] OJ L 304/18. Status and details of the Commission proposal are available at: https://food.ec.europa.eu/safety/labelling-and-nutrition/food-information-consumers-legislation/proposal-revision-regulation-fic_en. Some have called for the Commission to use the Nutri-Score nutrition label in this revision; see, e.g., ‘Harmonised and Mandatory Nutrition Labelling in the EU’, Priority Question for Written Answer P-000783/2023 to the Commission by Member of European Parliament (MEP) Antonius Manders, 8 Mar. 2023, available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-9-2023-000783_EN.html; and the written answer thereto by Commissioner Stella Kyriakides, 20 Apr. 2023, available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-9-2023-000783-ASW_EN.html. More information on Nutri-Score is available at: https://nutriscore-europe.com.

133 Farm to Fork Strategy, n. 25 above, p. 13.

134 Ibid.

135 This includes the EU School Milk Programme, which subsidizes the costs of milk for children, though with no preference given to sustainably produced, high quality, or local dairy; see Art. 26 of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 establishing a Common Organisation of the Markets in Agricultural Products and repealing Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007 [2013] OJ L 347/671.

136 Farm to Fork Strategy, n. 25 above, p. 14.

137 Ibid.

139 Farm to Fork Strategy, n. 25 above, p. 14.

140 Schebesta, n. 123 above; C. Boix-Fayos & J. de Vente, ‘Challenges and Potential Pathways towards Sustainable Agriculture within the European Green Deal’ (2023) 207(Apr) Agricultural Systems, article 103634; H. Schebesta et al., ‘Tour de Table: Farm to Fork Law Update’ (2022) 17(3) European Food and Feed Law Review, pp. 208–18.

141 N. 86 above.

142 Ibid.

143 See a full list of these commodities in the Due Diligence Regulation, n. 86 above, Art. 1.

144 Though still remaining a separate piece of legislation, because of its focus on timber rather than FERCs more broadly, including livestock goods.

145 For a positive analysis of the FLEGT+ regime see J. Zeitlin & C. Overdevest, ‘Experimentalist Interactions: Joining up the Transnational Timber Legality Regime’ (2020) 15(3) Regulation & Governance, pp. 686–708. For a more critical assessment see R. Myers et al., ‘Imposing Legality: Hegemony and Resistance under the EU FLEGT+ Initiative’ (2020) 27(1) Journal of Political Ecology, pp. 125–49.

146 Due Diligence Regulation, n. 86 above, Art. 3.

147 It is worth noting that concerns have been raised that the proposal would not consider human rights violations that often occur alongside deforestation in vulnerable forest areas; see more in Durán & Scott, n. 80 above, e.g., p. 257.

148 Due Diligence Regulation, n. 86 above, Art. 8 outlines what due diligence entails under the Regulation.

149 Ibid., Recital 52.

150 See generally Durán & Scott, n. 80 above.

151 R. Strohmaier et al., The Agriculture Sectors in the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions: Analysis, Environment and Natural Resources Management Working Paper 62 (FAO, 2016), p. 5.

152 E.g., while NDCs provide useful insight into national climate priorities (thereby necessitating their inclusion in pre-COP NDC synthesis reports), NDCs do vary in length and content.

153 Though it is worth noting that NDCs do not always indicate the extent of livestock action being taken at the national level as the content of NDCs does not necessarily include all action being taken nationally in relation to specific sectors. This being said, NDCs play a valuable role in showcasing, stocktaking, and peer review of a state's progress in meeting its climate commitments.

154 For more on production against consumption-based accounting method usage in relation to the UNFCCC see G. Peters, ‘From Production-Based to Consumption-Based National Emissions Inventories’ (2008) 65(1) Ecological Economics, pp. 13–23.

155 E.g., see Strohmaier et al., n. 151 above.

156 More on the methodology used in the FAO report can be found in Strohmaier et al., n. 151 above, Section 1.2. For the study, each intended NDC was studied in full text to ensure a comprehensive assessment of the coverage of the agriculture sectors in this report. Original text was extracted into a database, which facilitates the replication and re-examination of the screening process. The data was cross-checked using a keyword search in English, French, and Spanish.

157 Strohmaier et al., n. 151 above, p. 5.

158 Ibid., p. 14.

159 Ibid., p. 13.

160 Ibid., p. 14.

161 A keyword search was undertaken across the 134 updated NDCs, with further details of the keyword assessment detailed in Annex 2; see WWF, Unlocking and Scaling Climate Solutions in Food Systems: An Assessment of Nationally Determined Contributions (WWF, 2022).

162 Ibid., pp. 5–6.

163 Ibid.

164 European Commission, ‘Commission Publishes List of Potential Eco-Schemes’, 14 Jan. 2021, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/news/commission-publishes-list-potential-eco-schemes-2021-jan-14_en.

165 European Commission, Communication, ‘An EU Strategy to Reduce Methane Emissions’, COM(2020) 663 final, 14 Oct. 2020, e.g., pp. 12–3.

166 Ibid., p. 13.

167 ibid., p. 12.

168 Ibid.

169 For more on the food systems approach see S. van Berkum, J. Dengerink & R. Ruben, ‘The Food Systems Approach: Sustainable Solutions for a Sufficient Supply of Healthy Food’, Wageningen Economic Research, June 2018.

170 For a comprehensive literature review of food systems research see C. Béné et al., ‘Understanding Food Systems Drivers: A Critical Review of the Literature’ (2019) 23(Dec) Global Food Security, pp. 149–59.

171 For more on these types of strategy see S. Caleffi, C. Hawkes & S. Walton, ‘45 Actions to Orient Food Systems towards Environmental Sustainability: Co-Benefits and Trade-Offs’, Centre for Food Policy, Feb. 2023.

172 The FAO outlines what this healthy and sustainable diet could entail – largely greater volumes of plant-based proteins, wholegrains, and fruits and vegetables, with less consumption of red and processed meats: C. Gonzalez Fischer & T. Garnett, Plates, Pyramids, Planet: Developments in National Healthy and Sustainable Dietary Guidelines: A State of Play Assessment (FAO, 2016), e.g., p. 15.

173 See previous discussions in this article, in addition to Farm to Fork Strategy, n. 25 above, pp. 12–3.

174 See previous discussions in this article, in addition to Fern, ‘Landmark EU Anti-Deforestation Law Proposal Could Clean Up Supply Chains: Could It Also Reduce Global Deforestation?’, 17 Nov. 2021, available at: https://www.fern.org/de/publications-insight/landmark-eu-anti-deforestation-law-proposal-could-clean-up-supply-chains-could-it-also-reduce-global-deforestation-2431.

175 Decision 3.CP/27, n. 79 above.

176 Carbon Brief, ‘COP27: Key Outcomes for Food, Forests, Land and Nature at the UN Climate Talks in Egypt’, Carbon Brief, 24 Nov. 2022, available at: https://www.carbonbrief.org/cop27-key-outcomes-for-food-forests-land-and-nature-at-the-un-climate-talks-in-egypt.

177 Ibid.

178 Ibid.

179 Ibid.

180 WWF, n. 161 above, pp. 5–6.

181 Ibid.

182 Ibid.

183 For an example of the contention around plant-based eating see Garcia, D., Daume, V. Galaz & S., ‘EATLancet vs Yes2meat: The Digital Backlash to the Planetary Health Diet’ (2019) 394(10215) The Lancet, pp. 2153–4CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

184 Schebesta, n. 123 above; N. Foote, ‘Leaked Commission Agenda Sounds Death Knell for Missing Farm to Fork Files’, Euractiv, 16 Oct. 2023, available at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/news/leaked-commission-agenda-sounds-death-knell-for-missing-farm-to-fork-files.

185 See ClientEarth's consultation submission on EU illegal logging rules for a useful parallel of the issues arising with trying to alter long-scale supply chains in the forestry sector: ClientEarth, ‘Position Paper Regarding EU Rules on Illegal Logging’, Nov. 2020, available at: https://www.clientearth.org/media/iljoaqaf/position-paper-eutr-flegt-consultation.pdf.

186 For more on the identified trade-offs of food system transformation solutions see Caleffi, Hawkes & Walton, n. 171 above.

187 FAO (ed.), The State of Food and Agriculture: Livestock in the Balance (FAO, 2009), pp. 32–52.

188 For more on this see Williams, n. 20 above, e.g., pp. 17–20.

189 See, e.g., D. De Lorenzo & R. Sherrington, ‘Mapped: The Network of Powerful Agribusiness Groups Lobbying to Water Down the EU's Sustainable Farming Targets’, DeSmog, 9 Dec. 2021, available at: https://www.desmog.com/2021/12/09/network-agribusiness-chemicals-pesticides-lobbying-eu-sustainable-climate-farming.

190 E.g., see more on EU promotional funds supporting meat and dairy, despite CAP reforms, in S. Eräjää, ‘Marketing Meat: How EU Promotional Funds Favour Meat and Dairy’, Greenpeace, Apr. 2021, p. 1, available at: https://www.greenpeace.org/static/planet4-eu-unit-stateless/2021/04/20210408-Greenpeace-report-Marketing-Meat.pdf.

191 J. Henley, ‘Why Are Farmers Protesting across the EU and What Can the Bloc Do about It?’, The Guardian, 2 Feb. 2024, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2024/feb/02/why-are-farmers-protesting-across-the-eu-and-what-can-the-bloc-do-about-it.

192 This included postponing a land set-aside requirement of the CAP conditionality standards, and making this voluntary rather than mandatory; see more in European Commission, ‘Commission Proposes Targeted Review of Common Agricultural Policy to Support EU Farmers’, Press Release IP/24/1493, 15 Mar. 2024. Other concessions include scrapping the EU pesticide reduction plan; see more in J. Henley, S. Jones & L. Tondo, ‘“Symbol of Polarisation”: EU Scraps Plans to Halve Use of Pesticides’, The Guardian, 6 Feb. 2024, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2024/feb/06/symbol-of-polarisation-eu-scraps-plans-to-halve-use-of-pesticides.

193 European Commission, ‘EU Agricultural Outlook 2021–31: Consumer Behaviour to Influence Meat and Dairy Markets', 9 Dec. 2021, p. 5, available at: https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-agricultural-outlook-2021-31-consumer-behaviour-influence-meat-and-dairy-markets-2021-12-09_en.

194 Biedenkopf, n. 22 above.