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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 September 2009
The Council of the Royal Asiatic Society, fully coinciding with the sentiments expressed by its Secretary at the General Meeting held on the 2d of March, has accordingly ordered that the substance of the remarks made by Mr. Haughton should, in justice to Mr. Colebrooke, be printed with Colonel Vans Kennedy's paper, as follows:—
Substance of Mr. (now Sir Graves C.) Haughton's Remarks.
* v. 27.
* Mátrá is a feminine noun in Sanscrit, as materia is in Latin; and both mean the substance of which things ave made.
† Menu, I., v. vii.Google Scholar
* xxiii., 8th, 1st.
† The Council of the R. A. S. is not answerable for the correctness of the Sanscrit quotations, as it is not in possession of the original works from which they are extracted. The quotations are printed verbatim from Colonel Vans Kennedy's MS.
* SirJones, William's Works, vol. I. p. 165.Google Scholar
† Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier, pp. 147, 148.
‡ SirJones, William's Works, vol. I. p. 173Google Scholar.—It will be observed, that these remarks are somewhat inconsistent with those contained in the preceding quotation; in which Sir William Jones more correctly represented the energy of the Supreme Being as the efficient cause of all secondary causes and appearances.
* 
Comment upon the 9th Sútra of the 1st pad of the 2d chapter.
† 
Comment on the 15th Sútra of the same pad and chapter.
‡ I need scarcely remark, that to translate quotations from a prolix commentary literally is quite out of the question; and I have therefore only endeavoured to give the substance and true meaning of the passage quoted.
§ Sancara, however, in general uses other terms than máyá, but all imply the same meaning and convey the same doctrine, namely, that this universe is a mere illusion, and that man, even in this life, may become so enlightened by the acquisition of divine knowledge, as to perceive that there is nothing real except the Supreme Soul, and that he is that soul.
∥ 
3d Sútra, 2d pad, 3d chapter.—Mr. Colebrooke has justly observed, that these Sútras are in the highest degree obscure, and could never have been intelligible without an ample interpretation. But, unfortunately, the commentary of Sancara on the Sútras, and his commentaries on most of the Upanishads, are frequently as obscure as the text itself.
* 
8th sloca, 3d section.
1st chapter. It has not been attempted to translate this sloca literally.
† Sancara explains this to mean that máyá or pracriti is the immediate cause of the existence of all things.
‡ 
4th chapter.
* 
† 
‡ 
This sentence is given at greater length in the 8th section, 8th praputaca of the Chandogya Upanishad, in which Uddalaca thus addresses his son Swétaceta: 
all it which is the soul is real, and thou art it, O Swétaceta.
§ 
∥ 
Comment on 5th sútra, 1st pad, 1st chapter. The words quoted in another place are: 
Comment on 3d sútra, 1st pad, 1st chapter. The similar text in the Aitareya Upanishad is: 
* This translation seems at the same time to be somewhat inconsistent, for it would imply that the universe existed before worlds were created. It appears to me, therefore, that the proper word to be understood and joined to the pronoun would be 
as in the preceding quotation, and that the text should be thus translated: “This one entity (or real substance) was from the first soul only, and nothing else whatever existed.”
* 
4th Chapter.
† 9th sútra, 4th pad, 1st chapter.
‡ For instance, in the concluding sentence of his commentary on the Sútras, the expression is 
but in that on the Upanishad it is 
§ See quotation from the Vedant, page 413.
* Nouveaux Fragmens Philosophiques, p. 86.
* Nouveaux Fragmens Philosophiques, p. 87.
* Tiedemann, 's “Geist der Spekulativen Philosophie,” vol. I. p. 178.Google Scholar
† Mosheim, 's Latin translation of “Cudworth's Intellectual System,” vol. I. p. 600Google Scholar, note, second column.
* Tiedmann, 's “Geist der Spekulativen Philosophie,” vol. I. p. 192.Google Scholar
* Nouveaux Fragmens Philosophiques, p. 72.
* Historia Critica Philosophia, tom II. p. 428.
† Tiedmann, 's Geist der Spekulativen Philosophie, vol. III. p. 429.Google Scholar
* SirJones, William's Works, vol. I. p. 450.Google Scholar
† Scanda Púran Suta Sanhita yadgna Weibhawa khand, the 4th chapter of the Suta Upanishad.
* Scanda Púran Suta Sanhita yadgna Weibhawa khand, the 37th chapter of the Suta Upanishad.
* Principiorum Philosophiæ, Pars Secunda, sect. I.
* The title at length of this work is a most singular one. It is “Advice, clear as the Sun, to the Public, respecting the Real Nature of the Newest Philosophy; an attempt to compel the Reader to Understand. By Iohann Gotlieb Fichte.”
* Page 64, Fourth Lecture.
† Page 69, Fourth Lecture.
* In this work Fichte talks of man being love, and of that love being transfused, melted, and poured into the divine nature, see p. 199. His notions, therefore, respecting the union of the soul with God, seem to be of a mystical nature, rather than to indicate that he had formed any conception of the human soul being actually an undivided part of the Supreme Soul.
† Darlegung des Wahren Verhaltness der Natural Philosophic, &c. p. 15.
‡ Ibid. p. 60.
* Darlegung des Wahren Verhaltness der Natural Philosophic, &c. p. 121.
† Such reasoning as the following displays much metaphysical ingenuity, but is it in the least convincing?—“But (Schelling supposes some one to object) I actually see matter as extended in space, multiform, divisible, and circumscribed. This, I answer, is the fundamental error, namely, the notion that thou seest this. Thou mightest as well assure me that thou seest spots in the sun, for thou merely convertest thy not seeing into seeing. Thou beholdest, whether thou knowest it or wishest it, only the eternal unity of the bounden and the bond, i.e. the bond itself; all the rest thou mayst conceive or imagine, but never in any manner really perceive it. So, from what has been said, plurality is in no manner visible; it can only be seen where it is manifested in unity, i. e. when it is no longer plurality. Thou canst conceive plurality, and as such it exists in thy conception, but otherwise it is neither reality nor what actually is, since that is always one.”—Ibid. p. 62. But unless this supposed identity between God and Nature be a mere mental abstraction, a mere ens rationis, I do not perceive how a system which maintains that this universe positively exists, and that all things proceed from and return unto the divine nature, can be considered to differ from other systems of material pantheism.
* Works, , Vol. 1. p. 166.Google Scholar