Colonial subjects caught up supporting colonialism have often been seen as either engaging in an encounter of ambivalence or seen as traitors in post-independence nationalist historiography. Rather than following this established binary of possible subject positions, this article considers the unique biography of a filmmaker known in Indonesia as Dr Huyung. Prior work on Dr Huyung has either considered the pre and post 1945 stages of his life in isolation thus making incomplete assessments of his life and contributions. By bringing these two periods into conversation, a complete biography enables a more complex idea of colonial subjectivity to emerge. Huyung's life provides an alternative history of colonialism and an entry point in which to interrogate the limits and opportunities available in Asia of the 1930s to 1950s.

This article traces the life of Dr Huyung from his birth in Korea as Hoe Yong, his life under Japanese occupation when he became Hinatsu Eitaro and moved to Japan to study film, to Indonesia as a Japanese propaganda officer, and finally to a new identity as Dr Huyung in independent Indonesia. As a trans-national subject operating across multiple subject positions – including colonial subject, colonial agent, and supporter of independence – this article challenges how subjectivity is thought about under colonialism and the historiography of national cinema in Indonesia, and contributes to understand his role in helping define and shape arts and culture in post-colonial Indonesia.

Admirers of ASEAN are impressed with the fact that it continues to exist and that an outright war has never broken out between its members. Also often praised is the value to the region of promoting cooperation through the consensual process known as the ‘ASEAN Way’. If ASEAN is a talk shop, these observers say, talking is at least better than fighting. ASEAN's increasingly numerous and vocal critics reply that by valuing process more than product, consensus over accomplishment, the organization is failing to respond to urgent real-world challenges in Asia. Not least among such challenges is Chinese expansion in the South China Sea (SCS) and the stated intention of incoming US president Donald Trump to pull his country out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Only four ASEAN members have claims in the SCS and only four are in the TPP, but the sea's and the treaty's futures matter for the rest of the region as well. The fact of Chinese advancement and the risk of American disengagement are endangering the autonomy and relevance of ASEAN, not to mention the repercussions of Sino-American escalation. Already weakened by internal dissensus, the group's ability to negotiate as a group with China on maritime security has been blocked by Beijing's insistence on bilateral talks. Chinese material largesse has coopted Cambodia into vetoing any ASEAN agreement to restrain, moderate, or even question China's designs on the heartwater of Southeast Asia. The ASEAN Way is being used against ASEAN itself. Heightened uncertainty as to America's future role in and commitment to the region further heightens security concern. In its 50th anniversary year, Southeast Asians would do well to think outside the increasingly marginalised, internally divided, and procedurally restricted box that ASEAN has become. Three ideas already in circulation illustrate the kind of creativity that ASEAN will need if it is to sustain its acknowledged historical success in fashioning an independent political and economic identity for Southeast Asia.

Since the opening of the Sino-Burmese border trade in 1988, the movement of goods and people from both sides has increased rapidly. In 2011, China became Burma's largest trading partner and over half the total volume of goods was accrued in cross-border trade via Yunnan. However, national figures on import-export volumes are derived solely from legal flows, while contraband is largely overlooked. To date, academic studies on contraband have remained insufficient, partly due to the difficulty accessing Burmese border areas, and partly due to the mere challenges in obtaining information about smuggling from those who engage in such activity. This paper, based on multiple fieldwork sites over several years, examines a particular contraband – the smuggling of Chinese motorcycles to Burma on the ‘new’ Burma Road. This shadow economy thrived between 2000 and 2014. While highlighting its economic rationality beyond state control, I attempt to make diachronic and synchronic comparisons by engaging with dialogues within the historical trading mechanism of the mule convoys in the region and also with theories of shadow economies generated from contemporary case studies in other parts of the world. I argue that the formation of this shadow economy is not haphazard but adheres to the ethos of the mule caravan trade, predicated on local knowledge and social networks.

On 31 December 2015, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) announced the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). In theory, this agreement has produced association-wide economic integration. However, following the announcement and for the foreseeable future, ASEAN member states will continue to have significantly less than full regional economic integration. Why? Some observers believe that the AEC plans involve an overly ambitious timeline and too many ill-thought-out initiatives. Others point to ASEAN's traditional aversion to legally binding agreements. While progress has been made in reducing or eliminating intra-ASEAN trade tariffs, substantial non-tariff barriers to trade persist. However, for most member states, the ASEAN market is relatively small, while external markets, especially China, are growing rapidly. Given this outward orientation for ASEAN trade, is the lack of an unhindered regional market really a problem?

This paper investigates the new and hitherto unstudied boom in cross-border Burmese amber (Burmite) trade between Myanmar and Tengchong, Yunnan province. Based on interviews with amber dealers and local officials, it describes how since 2012–13 the amber trade has become increasingly lucrative for Chinese and Myanmar traders, and has attracted a large number of people to Tengchong, which, within Yunnan, virtually monopolises the trade. After a brief historical introduction, the paper analyses the conditions that, in both countries, have made the Burmite trade boom possible. It further describes the current composition of the amber market in both Myanmar and China, before analysing recent attempts to monitor and regulate the amber trade through the institution of the Tengchong Amber Association by the city's main amber traders in collaboration with local authorities.

With the resignation of President Soeharto in 1998 and subsequent democratization, Indonesia's foreign policy underwent major changes. More stakeholders than under Soeharto's New Order regime are now participating in foreign-policy making. The country seemed to make democracy promotion a hallmark of its foreign policy, especially under the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–2014). This raises the questions of whether and, if so, to what extent Indonesian democratization changed the country's established foreign-policy role conceptions and how much impact Indonesia's democratization had on the democratization of regional governance. The paper seeks to answer these questions by developing a theoretical framework based on a constructivist version of role theory. On the basis of speeches held by Indonesian political leaders in the United Nations General Assembly and major domestic foreign-policy pronouncements, it documents changes in Indonesia's foreign-policy role concepts. It shows that, indeed, in the Era Reformasi, democracy became a major component in the country's foreign-policy role concept, although many elements of the role concept such as development orientation, Third Worldism, peace orientation, and a mediator's role remained constant. However, the litmus test for a democracy-oriented foreign policy, that is, the democratization of regional governance in Southeast Asia, remains ambiguous, and concrete policy initiatives often declaratory.

Although biographical and life history approaches are potentially important tools for historical geographers, biographical methodologies have rarely been used to specifically investigate borderland dynamics. In this article, I argue that biography can be useful for understanding the ways in which borders have been recognised and negotiated historically. As a case study, I examine the life of Chao Sone Bouttarobol, a member of the Champassak Royal House, who was born in 1895 and died in 1979. As his life story illustrates, the emergence of new national borders had a significant impact on Sone, although family ties and relationships allowed him to cross the national administrative borders that now exist between Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia, often with relative ease. Studying one individual makes it possible to explore the ways in which he interacted and negotiated with borders that cut across the Champassak Royal House's traditional space of influence.

The paper explores whether the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has matured from a weak cooperative arrangement in its early days into a functioning security community by 2016. It first introduces a Deutschian and a constructivist understanding of security communities before examining ASEAN's involvement in the security realm since 1967. The paper claims that the regional body is not yet a security community, partly due to residual mistrust among its members, which undermines ASEAN's ability to address a series of ongoing inter-state disputes in Southeast Asia. While it has contributed to conflict avoidance, the Association has so far failed to conduct conflict resolution in spite of the ASEAN Political and Security Community initiative. The paper concludes that the failure to directly address and ultimately resolve sources of conflict in Southeast Asia has undermined the establishment of a security community in the region.

In this article, I argue that to capture ASEAN's importance in the promotion and protection of human rights requires embedding the analysis of what ASEAN says and does into an awareness of the broader human rights space of which it is a part. The Southeast Asian human rights space has four dimensions: ASEAN, domestic institutions, civil society, and the global United Nations system, all of which are increasingly linked together in a complex whole. Revealing this human rights space suggests three conclusions. First, ASEAN is important as an educator, enabler, standard setter, and mobiliser of human rights, often despite its flawed institutional design. This importance is the product of its own activities and how it is used by other actors. Second, ASEAN member states engage with each other on questions of human rights broadly, and not only through ASEAN, which illustrates the limits and resilience of the ‘ASEAN Way’ as a set of procedural norms. Third, ASEAN, despite its growing importance to human rights promotion, has become increasingly de-centred in that field, with serious consequences for its own security agenda.

Private sustainability standards for palm oil – RSPO certification and especially the POIG/No Deforestation standards – show more promise than ASEAN in addressing the political-economic drivers of the fires/haze in Indonesia. ‘Sovereignty-free’ private actors – global NGOs, philanthropic foundations, and social investors – harnessed transnational markets and used consumer product multinationals and Asian palm oil traders/processers as intermediaries to reach oil palm growers previously shielded from private regulation. Exclusion of state actors gave regulatory entrepreneurs a freer hand to institute more stringent standards. This contrasts with ASEAN regional governance where state control of regional governance deflects global and local pressure for change. There are limitations, however, to the reach of voluntary private standards, which cannot address irresponsible cultivation practices in illegal supply chains and those catering to the domestic market, despite NGOs and other private regulatory entrepreneurs acting as ‘functional equivalents’ of state authorities in driving change. Nevertheless, palm oil's economic importance to Indonesia and the global market transformations underway mean that global private standards have a first-mover advantage. However, central state actors have denounced private standards as intrusions on national sovereignty. While private standards have sparked national conversations on sustainability, the political bargaining between state authority, private regulators, and their proponents is only just beginning.

A paradox lies at the heart of the biennial Southeast Asian (SEA) Games. On the one hand, the region's premier sporting event has consistently celebrated themes of regional friendship and cooperation; on the other, the SEA Games are synonymous with controversy and poor sportsmanship, especially over the strategic selection of sports by host nations. Yet the Games go on – every second year – just as they have done since 1959. In introducing sport to existing debates on regional community in Southeast Asia, this article seeks to understand the key features of the sporting community of the Southeast Asian Games, particularly the emergence and development of the institutions and norms that help this event to thrive in the face of national self-interest. Through this analysis, the article argues for a distinctive approach to regional community in Southeast Asia, based not on notions of unity but principles of reciprocity and exchange.

What drives institutional reforms in regional organisations? And what explains the institutional design of ASEAN? Despite many differences, conventional approaches to the institutional design of regional organisations more generally and ASEAN in particular are united in regarding them as either determined by factors endogenous to the region − such as varying state interests or collective norms − or as exogenously driven, most importantly by hegemonic states like the US or China. This article offers a diffusion account of ASEAN's institutional design. Building on a more recent strand in the diffusion literature emphasising that diffusion rarely leads to convergence, the article makes two genuine contributions. First, it argues that members of regional organisations engage in modular adoption: they select institutional templates from a variety of regional as well as international organisations thereby taking advantage of available information on the costs and benefits of alternative institutions. Second, it argues that contextual conditions and cognitive priors influence what templates are chosen. The argument will be illustrated with a case study on ASEAN's adoption of a single market and a dispute settlement mechanism. Finally, and contrary to arguments that institutional borrowing might increase the expectations-deliverance gap within regional organisations, it argues that if conducted consistently, modular adoption can lead to substantial innovation and success.