The Realistic Conceptualism of William Ockham

Philotheus Böhner O.F.M.

doi:10.1017/S0362152900015567

The Realistic Conceptualism of William Ockham

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 July 2017

Philotheus Böhner O.F.M.

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Philotheus Böhner O.F.M.*: Affiliation:
Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, N. Y.

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Students of medieval scholasticism are accustomed to apply the name ‘conceptualism’ to Ockham's doctrine concerning the nature and scope of universals. This seems to be an apt designation, provided that its meaning is not burdened with idealistic connotations. Unfortunately, quite a number of neo-scholastics qualify conceptualism as a doctrine which severs the bond between thought and reality, and is therefore essentially idealistic. Small wonder, then, that such a conceptualism imputed to William Ockham falls an easy prey to their violent, and to a large extent justified, attack against idealism in general. However, as far as Ockham's conceptualism is concerned, their victory in this regard is an illusion, for the simple reason that his alleged idealistic conceptualism does not exist. Hence it appears to us that Ockham's genuine conceptualism enjoys, for the time being, a relative security from neo-scholastic criticism.

Type: Articles
Information: Traditio , Volume 4 , 1946 , pp. 307 - 335

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0362152900015567 [Opens in a new window]
Copyright: Copyright © 1946 by Cosmopolitan Science & Art Service Co., Inc.

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References

¹ Bittle, C. N., Cap, O.M., Reality and the Mind, Epistemology (New York 1938) 237. Cfr. also Gredt, J. O.S.B., Elementa philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomistica (7th ed. Freiburg i. Br. 1937) I, 94: ‘Conceptualistae (veteres Stoici, Conceptualistae saeculi XIV et XV: Guilelmus Ockham …, tandem Kant … et Kantiani) admittunt quidem conceptus universales, quos tamen merum mentis figmentum esse docent, cui nihil in rerum natura respondeat.’ Google Scholar

² Cfr. in the text edited below, N and Y.Google Scholar

³ Cfr. Ockham's extensive criticism of any kind of such a realism in Ordinatio (I Sent. d. 2, qq. 4–7; especially q. 7 S: ‘Ideo aliter dico ad quaestionem, quod nulla res extra animam nec per se nec per aliquod additum reale vel rationis, nec qualitercumque consideretur vel intelligatur, est universalis; ita quod tanta est impossibilitas, quod aliqua res extra animam sit quocumque modo universalis, nisi forte per institutionem voluntariam, quomodo ista vox: Homo, quae est vox singularis, est universalis, quanta impossibilitas est, quod homo per quamcumque considerationem vel secundum quodcumque esse sit asinus’ (Revised text).Google Scholar

⁴ Reportatio II, q. 15 EE; ed. Traditio 1 (1943) 263.Google Scholar

⁵ Cfr. ibid. G-M; ed. cit. 250–253.Google Scholar

⁶ Cfr. the text edited below, E. Note that ‘confused cognition’ has a technical meaning, since it refers to universal concepts, which are ‘common’ and capable of ‘confused’ supposition. The universals are not confused cognitions in the modern sense of the word. Cfr. the unedited Expositio super libros Physicorum, lib. I, ad textum 4: ‘Et ideo, cum universalia sint simplicia, sicut alias ostendi, proprie non cognoscuntur confuse, et ita proprie non sunt confusa. …’ Google Scholar

⁷ Cfr. Ordinatio d. 2, q. 7 CC: ‘Ad septimum dico, quod natura occulte operatur in universalibus, non quod producat ipsa universalia extra animam tamquam aliqua realia. sed quia producendo cognitionem suam in anima quasi occulte saltern mediate (vel immediate [addition of the second redaction]) producit illa universalia illo modo, quo nata sunt produci. Et ideo omnis communitas isto modo est naturalis et a singularitate procedit; nec oportet illud, quod isto modo fit a natura, esse extra animam, sed potest esse in anima’ (Revised text).Google Scholar

⁸ Ockham has given some indications of this transition on the basis of the fictum-theory in Reportatio II, q. 250 (this question is missing in some manuscripts, but seems to be authentic) : ‘Ad aliud dico, quod universalia et intentiones secundae causantur naturaliter sine omni activitate intellectus et voluntatis a notitiis incomplexis terminorum per istam viam: Quia primo cognosco aliqua singularia in particulari intuitive vel abstractive; et hoc causatur ab obiecto vel habitu derelicto ex primo actu; et habita notitia statim ad eius praesentiam, si non sit impedimentum, sequitur naturaliter alius actus distinctus a primo terminatus ad aliquid tale esse obiectivum, quale prius vidit in esse subiectivo; et ille actus secundus producit universalia et intentiones secundas et non praesupponit eas. Exemplum: Aliquis videns albedinem intuitive vel duas albedines abstrahit ab eis albedinem in communi ut est species, et non est aliud nisi illae duae notitiae incomplexae terminatae ad albedinem in singulari, sive intuitivae sive abstractivae, causantur naturaliter, sicut ignis calorem, unam tertiam notitiam distinctam ab illis, quae producit talem albedinem in esse obiectivo, qualis prius fuit visa in esse subiectivo, sine omni activitate intellectus vel voluntatis, quia talia naturaliter causantur.’ As to the intellectio-theory cfr. the text edited below, E. This same text is found with significant variants in Quaestiones super libros Physicorum (unedited) q. 7 where we read: ‘Respondeo, iste est modus ponendi: Intellectus apprehendens intuitive (intentionem?) rem singularem elicit unam cognitionem intuitivam in se, quae est tantum cognitio illius rei singularis. …’ For a more detailed explanation of this process ad mentem Ockham, see in Biel, Gabriel, Collectorium I, d. 3, q. 5 B (Tübingen 1501).Google Scholar

⁹ The immediacy of intuitive and abstractive cognition with the exclusion of any ‘medium’ between the cognition and its object is strongly emphasized by Ockham in Ordinatio d. 27, q. 3 J. Here he affirms such an immediacy as probable also for the universal abstractive cognition (that is, for a concept). It seems that he affirmed it as certain in his later period. This should dispose of all objections raised against Ockham's theory of cognition which are based on the causal relation between object and cognition. For the cognition of the object is immediately caused; but the cognition is not the effect from which or by which a cognition of the object is obtained. There are not two or even three cognitions necessary in order to know the object; there is only one cognition, viz. immediate cognition of reality. For this reason Ockham could not place on the same level the natural signs which are concepts and the natural signs found in nature or instituted by man. Cfr. note 16.Google Scholar

¹⁰ This is certainly the case according to the intellectio-theory as regards concepts. According to the fictum-theory the dissimilitude between concept and reality is even greater. Nevertheless Ockham affirms the similitude between concept and reality, also, and even more—for obvious reasons—on the basis of the fictum-theory. Cfr. my edition of Ordinatio d. 2, q. 8 E: ‘The Text Tradition of Ockham's Ordinatio,’ The New Scholasticism 16 (1942) 227. Cfr. also in the text edited below, L. As to the dissimilarity between a universal concept and reality Ockham says, expressing at the same time also the similarity, in Ordinatio d. 2, q. 8 J (ed. cit. 234): ‘Ad secundum dico, quod talia ficta non sunt realiter similia, sed magis dissimilantur et distant quam accidentia, tamen sunt talia in esse obiectivo, qualia sunt alia in esse subiectivo. …’ Realiter similia here means something which is similar in the manner of a real being. However, ficta are no real beings. Consequently the intellectio-theory, according to which universals are real beings (that is real accidents of the mind), grants more similarity between concept and reality, as is expressly stated by Ockham. Cfr. M in the text edited below.Google Scholar

¹¹ Summa logicae I, 17: ‘Sed magis proprie loquendo debet concedi, quod universale exprimit vel explicat essentiam substantiae, hoc est naturam quae est substantia. … Unde omnes auctoritates, quae sonat, universalia esse de essentia substantiarum vel esse in substantiis vel esse partes ipsarum, debent sic intelligi, quod auctoritates non aliud intendunt, nisi quod talia universalia declarant, exprimunt, explicant, important et significant substantias rerum.’ Google Scholar

¹² Hochstetter, E., Studien zur Metaphysik und Erkenntnislehre Wilhelms von Ockham (Berlin-Leipzig 1927).Google Scholar

¹³ Op. cit. 103: ‘Sieht man Ockham grob-realistisch immer wieder die similitudo von Ding und Begriff hervorheben, so hat man zunächst den Eindruck, dass er sich ihr gegenüber niemals in der bekannten kritischen “Verlegenheit wegen der Art, wie ich a priori hieŕvon etwas wissen könne” (Kant, Kr. d. r. Vern. Vorrede S. XVII) befunden hat.’ Google Scholar

¹⁴ Op. cit. 44; cfr. here the reference to Reportatio II, q. 15 S, T.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Op. cit. 104: ‘Einmal geht er, wie wir oben sahen (S. 48), schliesslich so weit zu sagen, dass bei einem Erkenntnisakt (der ja für ihn gleichfalls stets similitudo rei ist [here Hochstetter adds a note referring the reader to Sent. I, d. 27, q. 3 X; Sent. II, q. 15 EE]), das Objekt uns nicht mehr gegeben sei als Caesar (den wir nie sahen) durch sein Bild.’ Google Scholar

¹⁶ Summa logicae I, 1: ‘Propter tamen protervos est sciendum, quod signum accipitur dupliciter: Uno modo pro omni illo quod apprehensum aliquid aliud in cognitionem facit venire, quamvis non faciat mentem venire in primam cognitionem [that is, only in secundam vel recordativam] eius, sicut alibi est ostensum, sed in actualem post habitualem eius. … Aliter accipitur signum pro illo quod aliquid facit in cognitionem venire et natum est pro illo supponere vel addi in propositione. …’ I shall deal with Ockham's semantics in a forthcoming article in Franciscan Studies .Google Scholar

¹⁷ That this is Hochstetter's intention is confirmed by the words immediately following (Op. cit. 105): ‘Die Übereinstimmung mit dem Grundgedanken des Bildgleichnisses in der Kritik der Speziestheorie (S.o.S. 44) ist unverkennbar. Ebenso ist die Erweiterung des Repräsentationsbegriffs. Dort fusst der Einwand ausschliesslich auf dem Gedanken der Abbildrepräsentation, an anderen Stellen ruht die representative Zuordnung auf der Kausalrelation.’ And now it comes: ‘Hier ist die cognitio ausdrücklich aus beiden Gruppen herausgenommen und als eine Sonderart hingestellt, die sowohl von der genannten Kritik nicht mehr getroffen wird, wie auch unabhängig vomKausalproblem ist. Ueber das “Wie” und die Möglichkeit dieser Repräsentation schweigt Ockham.’ Google Scholar

¹⁸ It is not without satisfaction that we draw the attention of medievalists to the outstanding study on scholastic semantics by Oesterle, John A.: ‘Another Approach to the Problem of Meaning,’ The Thomist 7 (1944) 233–63, which briefly discusses the notion of repraesentare according to the Thomistic tradition in John of St. Thomas, on page 241f. We read on page 242: ‘Repraesentare—which concerns everything by which something is made present to the knowing power—embraces three of the causes, the objective, formal and instrumental.’ These three causes are found in the three meanings assigned by Ockham to the term repraesentare. Google Scholar

¹⁹ Cfr. note 10, above.Google Scholar

²⁰ As to the meaning of these terms, see the text edited below; for the convention-theory, cfr. Ordinatio d. 2, q. 8 E: ‘Quarta posset esse opinio, quod nihil est universale ex natura sua, sed tantum ex institutione, illo modo quo vox est universalis, quia nulla res habet ex natura sua supponere pro alia re, nec vere praedicari de alia re sicut nec vox, sed tantum ex institutione voluntaria. Et ideo sicut voces sunt universales per institutionem et praedicabiles de rebus, ita omnia universalia.’ Google Scholar

²¹ Op. cit. 4: ‘Zum mindesten die ersten Quästionen über das Problem des Begriffes scheinen erst von späterer Hand zusammengestellt zu sein.’ Baudry, L. (‘Sur Trois Manuscrits Occamistes,’ Archives, d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age 11 [1936] 148) remarks: ‘Ces questions sont certainement de Guillaume d'Occam.’ Google Scholar

^{page 320 note 1} ibi : Et quemadmodum add. E Google Scholar

^{page 320 note 2} eorum quae proferuntur vel add. E Google Scholar

^{page 320 note 3} quasi sint] ita quod sunt E; quae sunt L; sed quod aliquae sunt O Google Scholar

^{page 320 note 4} multae … nomina] multa nomina E; nota quod voces L Google Scholar

^{page 320 note 5} impositionis O Google Scholar

^{page 320 note 6} ergo F Google Scholar

^{page 320 note 7} postea E; secundario F Google Scholar

^{page 320 note 8} passiones EL Google Scholar

^{page 320 note 9} scilicet add. LO Google Scholar

^{page 320 note 10} et E; om. L; statim … sua om. O Google Scholar

^{page 320 note 11} eo … institutione om. EL Google Scholar

^{page 320 note 12} manifestum E Google Scholar

^{page 320 note 13} vocem … instituere hanc om. E Google Scholar

^{page 320 note 14} et add. F Google Scholar

^{page 320 note 15} om. EF Google Scholar

^{page 320 note 16} eo ipso] et ipsa ELO Google Scholar

^{page 320 note 17} dictio scripta om. E Google Scholar

^{page 320 note 18} de novo om. E Google Scholar

^{page 320 note 19} qui … rem] patet tunc, quod scriptura non significat vocem aut econverso, sed significai eandem rem quae significatur per vocem prolatam E Google Scholar

^{page 320 note 20} ita … dictio scripta om. LO Google Scholar

^{page 320 note 21} hunc add. F Google Scholar

^{page 321 note 1} animae add. EO Google Scholar

^{page 321 note 2} dicendum F0 Google Scholar

^{page 321 note 3} accipitur E; sumitur L; sumatur 0 Google Scholar

^{page 321 note 4} quale FO; post sequens praedicabile add. 0 Google Scholar

^{page 321 note 5} animae add. EL; sed L om. sequens an.Google Scholar

^{page 321 note 6} ponuntur E Google Scholar

^{page 321 note 1} int. vel ab om. EF Google Scholar

^{page 321 note 2} quae est obiectum intellectus add. E Google Scholar

^{page 321 note 3} sicut … ipsum om. E; primum obiectum sicut LO Google Scholar

^{page 321 note 4} tria scilicet vel dispositiones sive add. E Google Scholar

^{page 321 note 5} pot. et habitus] habitus et dispositiones vel potentias O Google Scholar

^{page 321 note 6} om. E; vel L Google Scholar

^{page 321 note 7} 3° EFLO; cfr. Eth. Nicom. II, 5 (1105 b 19 s.) Google Scholar

^{page 321 note 8} animae add. EO Google Scholar

^{page 321 note 9} si E; om. F Google Scholar

^{page 321 note 10} in anima om.F.; in … spirituale om.E Google Scholar

^{page 321 note 1} qua F Google Scholar

^{page 322 note 2} huiusmodi LO Google Scholar

^{page 322 note 3} om.E Google Scholar

^{page 322 note 4} ipsa … in anima om.F Google Scholar

^{page 322 note 5} passiones L Google Scholar

^{page 322 note 1} de add. F Google Scholar

^{page 322 note 2} quae … qualitates ipsius om.E Google Scholar

^{page 322 note 3} om.F Google Scholar

^{page 322 note 4} probabilem F Google Scholar

^{page 322 note 5} sic ponere F Google Scholar

^{page 322 note 6} et F Google Scholar

^{page 322 note 7} intentione EF Google Scholar

^{page 322 note 8} tale (quater) O; (bis) L Google Scholar

^{page 322 note 9} intentio EL Google Scholar

^{page 322 note 10} intentiones EF Google Scholar

^{page 322 note 11} ideo … pro Platone om.E Google Scholar

^{page 322 note 12} intentione EF Google Scholar

^{page 322 note 13} significatur E; intelligitur … Plato] intelliget Sortem quam Platonem F Google Scholar

^{page 323 note 14} hominibus add. E; communibus add. L Google Scholar

^{page 323 note 15} rebus … voces om.L Google Scholar

^{page 323 note 16} extra … in anima om. E; extra … voces om. O Google Scholar

^{page 323 note 17} supp. pro rebus (eisdem E) om. LO Google Scholar

^{page 323 note 1} posset E Google Scholar

^{page 323 note 2} dilectum LO FGoogle Scholar

^{page 323 note 3} alio et melius E Google Scholar

^{page 323 note 4} et cognoscerem] omnia animalia, ergo intelligerem E Google Scholar

^{page 323 note 5} om.F; novi … cogitavi] ergo et animalia quae numquam cognovi E Google Scholar

^{page 323 note 6} satis add.E; falsum et add.O Google Scholar

^{page 323 note 7} intentio F Google Scholar

^{page 323 note 8} intentio F et om. sequens se.Google Scholar

^{page 323 note 9} nullus … aut om.L Google Scholar

^{page 323 note 10} homo … intelligitur om.E Google Scholar

^{page 323 note 11} erit (sic correxit L) O Google Scholar

^{page 323 note 12} illi … intelligerentur] sic tali intentione infiniti homines intelligerentur, et ita talis intellectio esset infinita E; illi qui possunt esse homines sunt infiniti, ergo tali intellectione infinita intelliguntur F (sic etiam MS. Quaest. s. Libr. Physicorum, q. 6^a, excepto intelligerentur); illi qui possunt esse homines, igitur tali intellectione infinita, si ista intelligerentur L (sic tali intellectione infinita intelligerentur sic correxit); igitur talis intellectio erit infinita, si ista intelligerentur O Google Scholar

^{page 324 note 13} om.EO; non L Google Scholar

^{page 324 note 14} intelligitur F; intelligerentur L; et add. EO Google Scholar

^{page 324 note 15} vel … aliud] sequitur quod aliquid E Google Scholar

^{page 324 note 16} real, in anima] aliud E Google Scholar

^{page 324 note 17} intentio EF (et in sequenti) Google Scholar

^{page 324 note 18} est E; post sequens: et falsum add. O Google Scholar

^{page 324 note 19} componatur LO Google Scholar

^{page 324 note 20} non add. F Google Scholar

^{page 324 note 21} tantum E; om.L; sequens non om.F Google Scholar

^{page 324 note 22} intelligendo F; actu L Google Scholar

^{page 324 note 23} intentionibus E; intellectibus O Google Scholar

^{page 324 note 24} particularibus EO; partibus L Google Scholar

^{page 324 note 25} partieularis E Google Scholar

^{page 324 note 26} aliqua add. EL Google Scholar

^{page 324 note 27} originis F; orationis O Google Scholar

^{page 324 note 28} illis add. F Google Scholar

^{page 324 note 1} potest … opinionem] respondere potest tenens istam opinionem E; potest responderi quod universaliter tenetur ista opinio L Google Scholar

^{page 324 note 2} om.EO Google Scholar

^{page 324 note 3} similationis F; assignato L Google Scholar

^{page 324 note 4} secundum (om.L) illud] ideo E; ita (sic correxit) O Google Scholar

^{page 325 note 5} impossibile L Google Scholar

^{page 325 note 6} om.E; falsum (?) LO Google Scholar

^{page 325 note 7} possibile F Google Scholar

^{page 325 note 8} quae … continui om.F Google Scholar

^{page 325 note 9} cum … pars continui om.E Google Scholar

^{page 325 note 10} et tunc add.E Google Scholar

^{page 325 note 11} quia infiniti om.F Google Scholar

^{page 325 note 12} igitur posset] etiam potest E Google Scholar

^{page 325 note 1} omnes … intelliguntur om.F Google Scholar

^{page 325 note 2} alius E; om.O Google Scholar

^{page 325 note 3} et unus est] respectu cuiuscumque E; unius cuius (?) L; unius cuiusque 0 Google Scholar

^{page 325 note 4} in propositione om.EF Google Scholar

^{page 325 note 5} nam … voce om.LO Google Scholar

^{page 325 note 6} quia … mente om.E Google Scholar

^{page 325 note 7} in mente om.LO Google Scholar

^{page 325 note 8} in quo add.E Google Scholar

^{page 325 note 9} distinguuntur E(L?); tales add.E Google Scholar

^{page 325 note 10} potest E Google Scholar

^{page 326 note 11} in mente add.F Google Scholar

^{page 326 note 12} vocali E; termino L; toti O Google Scholar

^{page 326 note 13} qui est tamquam pars propositionis add.E Google Scholar

^{page 326 note 1} vel … Platonis om.E Google Scholar

^{page 326 note 2} intentio F Google Scholar

^{page 326 note 3} ex intellectione E; intentioni O Google Scholar

^{page 326 note 4} vel … correspondere om.E Google Scholar

^{page 326 note 5} respectu … habeat] habet E Google Scholar

^{page 326 note 6} idem add.F Google Scholar

^{page 326 note 7} abhinc L repetit unam columnam et plus quam dimidiam praecedentis textus, sed cancellat signo va- cat.Google Scholar

^{page 326 note 8} multa E Google Scholar

^{page 326 note 9} quo E Google Scholar

^{page 326 note 1} non add.F Google Scholar

^{page 326 note 2} aliquid add.E Google Scholar

^{page 326 note 3} quia F Google Scholar

^{page 326 note 4} ita FGoogle Scholar

^{page 327 note 5} subiective add.F Google Scholar

^{page 327 note 6} ex … copula om.E Google Scholar

^{page 327 note 7} cum est actus E Google Scholar

^{page 327 note 8} intentiones EO Google Scholar

^{page 327 note 9} quia … intelligendi om.LO Google Scholar

^{page 327 note 10} intelligendi add.LO Google Scholar

^{page 327 note 11} intelligendi LO Google Scholar

^{page 327 note 12} vult E Google Scholar

^{page 327 note 13} negare i?Google Scholar

^{page 327 note 14} illam E; aliquam (f)F; istarum add.F Google Scholar

^{page 327 note 15} om.E; diceret O Google Scholar

^{page 327 note 16} consequenter F Google Scholar

^{page 327 note 17} diceret EO Google Scholar

^{page 327 note 18} intellectiones (F?)L Google Scholar

^{page 327 note 19} om.F Google Scholar

^{page 327 note 20} vere FF Google Scholar

^{page 327 note 21} in ens om.ELO Google Scholar

^{page 327 note 22} om.F Google Scholar

^{page 327 note 23} quam si] quasi E; quamvis F Google Scholar

^{page 327 note 1} om.O; et universaliter quod] quae L Google Scholar

^{page 327 note 2} intellectiones F; sive intentiones om.E Google Scholar

^{page 327 note 3} earum E Google Scholar

^{page 327 note 4} cognitio LO; cognitione(?)F; sed cfr. Ordinatio d.2, q.8 F, ubi legitur cognosci.Google Scholar

^{page 328 note 5} potest dici om.E Google Scholar

^{page 328 note 6} om.F; apprehendentis L Google Scholar

^{page 328 note 7} quod O; illud add.F; et singulare om.L Google Scholar

^{page 328 note 8} om.O; vel inhaerens add.E Google Scholar

^{page 328 note 9} om.E; apprehendens add.F Google Scholar

^{page 328 note 10} ibi add.F Google Scholar

^{page 328 note 11} in operatione 2?Google Scholar

^{page 328 note 12} habet add. F; sed … anima om.L Google Scholar

^{page 328 note 13} Et illud sic] sive illud sit L Google Scholar

^{page 328 note 14} aliquid add.LO Google Scholar

^{page 328 note 15} huiusmodi … sciuntur] hoc formamus propositionem vel propositiones quibus aliquid intelligitur et scitur L Google Scholar

^{page 328 note 1} nec … ipsius om.E Google Scholar

^{page 328 note 2} om.LO Google Scholar

^{page 328 note 3} magis L; nulli O Google Scholar

^{page 328 note 4} intentio E; sic etiam duo manuscripta Quaestionum super libros Physicorum; LO haben pro intentione, quae lectio mutat sensu?n essentialiter; intellectio … extra quam om.F restituimus saniorem lectionem intellectio.Google Scholar

^{page 328 note 5} intentio FO (sic etiam duo manuscripta Quaesl. sup. libr. Physic.) Google Scholar

^{page 328 note 6} ea LO Google Scholar

^{page 328 note 7} intentioni E; intellectibus L Google Scholar

^{page 328 note 8} videtur … ponatur] quod videtur superflue poni F Google Scholar

^{page 328 note 9} Similiter … intellectioni om.E Google Scholar

^{page 328 note 10} possunt F Google Scholar

^{page 328 note 11} quid F Google Scholar

^{page 329 note 12} om.F Google Scholar

^{page 329 note 13} om.EL Google Scholar

^{page 329 note 14} om.E; res extra add.F Google Scholar

^{page 329 note 15} om.E Google Scholar

^{page 329 note 1} om.F Google Scholar

^{page 329 note 2} subiecta … conceptae sunt om.L Google Scholar

^{page 329 note 3} om.E; conceptae … propositionum om.O Google Scholar

^{page 329 note 4} alias F Google Scholar

^{page 329 note 5} om.F Google Scholar

^{page 329 note 6} Cfr. I.e. Z, 6 (1031 a 28 ss.)Google Scholar

^{page 329 note 1} Sed alia F Google Scholar

^{page 329 note 2} potest esse] est LO Google Scholar

^{page 329 note 3} mentis existentes om.F Google Scholar

^{page 329 note 4} pro … Metaphysicae] ista opinio videtur esse Commentatoris et sequitur album duarum linearum cum nota marginali: hie solum deficit auctoritas Commentatoris F. Supplevimus istam auctoritatem de textu hie edito, S. Prima pars citationis differenter legitur in editione (apud Juntas, Venetiis 1562, t.IV fal. 82ra):… forma artis dicitur duobus modis, quorum unus est forma, quae est in anima, et alius est ilia, quae est extra animam, et sunt idem; et quod ilia, quae est extra animam, est ab illa, quae est in anima. Reliqua inveniuntur de verbo ad verbum in editione citata Google Scholar

^{page 330 note 5} Et ita F Google Scholar

^{page 330 note 6} secundum Commentatorem] scilicet quod E Google Scholar

^{page 330 note 7} rerum E; eorum LO Google Scholar

^{page 330 note 8} om.L; quod non est universale om.O Google Scholar

^{page 330 note 9} sicut est de voce add.(et del.?) L Google Scholar

^{page 330 note 10} simplex et add.E Google Scholar

^{page 330 note 11} Videtur referre ad 5^m librum Metaphysicae (tract. 5 cap. 1), sicut legitur in Summa Logica Ockham, p. I cap. 14: Et hoc est quod dicit Avicenna 5° Metaphysicae: ‘Una forma apui intellectum est relata ad multitudinem, et secundum hunc respectum est universale, quo niam ipsum est intentio in intellectu, cuius comparatio non variatur ad quodcumque ac ceperis.’ Et sequitur: ‘Haec forma, quamvis in comparatione individuorum sit univer salis, tarnen in comparatione animae singularis in qua imprimi tur est individua; ipsa enin est una ex formis quae sunt in intellectu.’Google Scholar

^{page 330 note 12} qui O Google Scholar

^{page 330 note 13} tenerem E; teneret F Google Scholar

^{page 330 note 14} dicerem E; dicere debet sic correxit lGoogle Scholar

^{page 330 note 15} vel … entia] nihil possunt esse E Google Scholar

^{page 330 note 1} posset E Google Scholar

^{page 330 note 2} nec … rerum natura om.LO Google Scholar

^{page 330 note 3} nullatenus E; nullibi(?)LGoogle Scholar

^{page 330 note 4} Similiter … esse reale om.F Google Scholar

^{page 330 note 5} in … divisione om.E Google Scholar

^{page 331 note 6} sed … sub ente extra animam om.LO Google Scholar

^{page 331 note 7} et … ente] quae est ens E Google Scholar

^{page 331 note 8} quandam F; illam L Google Scholar

^{page 331 note 9} Et … cognoscente om.L Google Scholar

^{page 331 note 10} subiective E Google Scholar

^{page 331 note 11} sicut … subiective] et simul cum hoc est extra realiter et positive 0 Google Scholar

^{page 331 note 12} quod … subiective] realiter et positive et subiective E; quod est tamen extra positive sive subiective F; quod tantum est realiter extra positive et intellective subiective L Google Scholar

^{page 331 note 13} sed … animam om.L Google Scholar

^{page 331 note 14} est … animam] continetur sub illo membro quod dividi tur in decern praedicamenta, et per consequens nihil contineretur sub illo membro alio E Google Scholar

^{page 331 note 15} l.c.; editio citato, (supra nota O, 4) t. IV fol. 72ra Google Scholar

^{page 331 note 1} dicere LO Google Scholar

^{page 331 note 2} om.E; supponat … si om.O Google Scholar

^{page 331 note 3} om.E; sic … materialiter om.L Google Scholar

^{page 331 note 4} intellectio L Google Scholar

^{page 331 note 5} Non … intelligitur om.O Google Scholar

^{page 331 note 6} Vacuum … rationis om.E Google Scholar

^{page 331 note 7} om.F Google Scholar

^{page 332 note 8} simpliciter vel materialiter add.O Google Scholar

^{page 332 note 9} quod … intelligantur om.LO Google Scholar

^{page 332 note 10} Et ideo]sed E Google Scholar

^{page 332 note 11} et … sunt] conceduntur E Google Scholar

^{page 332 note 12} sint F; verae add.O Google Scholar

^{page 332 note 13} personaliter E Google Scholar

^{page 332 note 14} om.EL Google Scholar

^{page 332 note 15} supponere … sufficit quod] pro aliquo supponere est pro ali quo in propositione ver ficari mediante tali verbo, sed ideo dicitur supponere personaliter quia E Google Scholar

^{page 332 note 16} Homo … subiectum] Homo albus est, ly homo albus est subiectum et E Google Scholar

^{page 332 note 17} bene denotatur E; denotatur sic (sic correxit) O Google Scholar

^{page 332 note 18} est res add.F Google Scholar

^{page 332 note 1} intellecta F Google Scholar

^{page 332 note 2} quia … multa om.O Google Scholar

^{page 332 note 3} intellecta F Google Scholar

^{page 332 note 4} tarnen … penitus] non est ibi E Google Scholar

^{page 332 note 5} sicut … proferat] sic fingit voces E Google Scholar

^{page 332 note 6} vocat L (quod expungit O) Google Scholar

^{page 332 note 7} significat L; fingit O Google Scholar

^{page 332 note 8} in re L Google Scholar

^{page 332 note 9} intentiones E; intelligibiles (/) F Google Scholar

^{page 332 note 10} species E Google Scholar

^{page 332 note 11} figmentum … una] plus figmentum E Google Scholar

^{page 332 note 12} om.L; et non O Google Scholar

^{page 332 note 13} sicut … res om.L Google Scholar

^{page 332 note 14} vere F Google Scholar

^{page 332 note 15} vere F Google Scholar

^{page 332 note 16} intentio F, et in sequenti intentiones F Google Scholar

^{page 332 note 17} vel … figmentum om.L Google Scholar

^{page 332 note 18} ali quae EO Google Scholar

^{page 333 note 19} quare L Google Scholar

^{page 333 note 20} nulla E Google Scholar

^{page 333 note 21} non add.O Google Scholar

^{page 333 note 22} non quando] quin E; quando non F; non quin O Google Scholar

^{page 333 note 23} Potest dici] Dicendum E Google Scholar

^{page 333 note 24} tunc add.F Google Scholar

^{page 333 note 25} sed … falsa] et ita sumendo in minori ly chimaera ilia minor est falsa. Et ita si uniformiter accipiatur maior et minor semper altera illarum est falsa, et tunc consequentia est optima. Si autem difformiter, sic consequentia non valet et utraque est vera E Google Scholar

^{page 333 note 26} maior F Google Scholar

^{page 333 note 1} potest dici] dicendum LO Google Scholar

^{page 333 note 2} quae … vel] et talis E; scilicet ars vel L; scilicet quia vocatur ars vel O Google Scholar

^{page 333 note 3} cfr. supra O nota 4Google Scholar

^{page 333 note 4} nominan scientia domus E Google Scholar

^{page 333 note 5} intentionem EO (F?) Google Scholar

^{page 333 note 1} realiter et om.E; vera res et realiter et LGoogle Scholar

^{page 333 note 2} intentio EF Google Scholar

^{page 333 note 3} res … dividitur in om.O Google Scholar

^{page 333 note 4} ens E Google Scholar

^{page 333 note 5} uno … continentur sub om. ELO Google Scholar

^{page 333 note 6} sunt … scilicet] sic ordinantur sicut illae E Google Scholar

^{page 334 note 7} supple … anima om.E Google Scholar

^{page 334 note 8} aut quale aut quantum aut aliquod continuum cum alio E Google Scholar

^{page 334 note 9} cum … stat] tamen non obstat E Google Scholar

^{page 334 note 10} etiam add.F Google Scholar

^{page 334 note 1} om.F Google Scholar

^{page 334 note 2} om.LO Google Scholar

^{page 334 note 3} est spiritus om.E; spiritus correxit in species O Google Scholar

^{page 334 note 4} intentiones EO Google Scholar

^{page 334 note 5} intentiones LO Google Scholar

^{page 334 note 6} om.EO; praedicabiliter(?)LGoogle Scholar

^{page 334 note 7} om.LO Google Scholar

^{page 334 note 1} principalis O Google Scholar

^{page 334 note 2} adduci LO Google Scholar

^{page 334 note 3} supra add.E Google Scholar

^{page 334 note 4} et syllogismi] similiter E Google Scholar

^{page 334 note 5} possent F Google Scholar

^{page 334 note 6} rationis … entia om.L Google Scholar

^{page 334 note 7} aedificabilia E Google Scholar

^{page 334 note 8} civitates add.F Google Scholar

^{page 335 note 1} vult E Google Scholar

^{page 335 note 2} est inconveniens om.L Google Scholar

^{page 335 note 3} quod … similitudinem] aliquod simile E Google Scholar

^{page 335 note 4} om.L Google Scholar

^{page 335 note 5} viso add.F Google Scholar

^{page 335 note 6} visis E Google Scholar

^{page 335 note 7} est E Google Scholar

^{page 335 note 8} explanabitur E; explanatum F Google Scholar

^{page 335 note 9} potest dici] dicendum E Google Scholar

^{page 335 note 10} alia add.L Google Scholar

^{page 335 note 11} sibi E Google Scholar

^{page 335 note 12} realiter … pro re om.L; realiter rei] postea ad E; realiter om.O Google Scholar

^{page 335 note 13} sic EFLOGoogle Scholar

^{page 335 note 14} sic EFLO Google Scholar

^{page 335 note 1} tres E Google Scholar

^{page 335 note 2} probabiliores O Google Scholar

^{page 335 note 3} om.FLO Google Scholar

^{page 335 note 4} om.F Google Scholar

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The Realistic Conceptualism of William Ockham

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