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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 November 2021
The inception speeches delivered by graduating masters of theology during the thirteenth century are of paramount interest for the study of the history of theology. Much like the introductions to philosophy written within the Faculty of Arts at Paris during the same period, the so-called principia articulated the image that theology entertained of itself at that time. Interestingly enough, some graduating masters took the opportunity to present a detailed discussion of the relation between philosophy and theology in an attempt to demonstrate the preeminence of the latter. Thus, they reflected not only upon the epistemological status of theology, but also — and sometimes in considerable detail — upon that of the secular sciences. One very eloquent example of such a comparative inception speech is the principium by Stephen of Bensançon (1286), who later became Master General of the Dominican Order. In this article, I focus on Stephen's discussion of the relationship between philosophy and theology, and show that the epistemological criteria he applied to both were drawn directly from one of the most important introductions to philosophy of the thirteenth century, that is, Robert Kilwardby's De ortu scientiarum. Stephen's case yields further evidence, therefore, of the interconnectedness of both genres, that is, philosophical introductions and theological inception speeches, and confirms the productive intellectual exchanges between philosophical and theological discourse at the University of Paris during the thirteenth century.
I am grateful to Robert D. Hughes (Prague) for his comments on this paper.
1 For essential scholarship on the principia, see, among others, Gilbert Dahan, “Les prologues des commentaires bibliques (XIIe–XIVe siècle),” in Les prologues médiévaux: Actes du colloque international organisé par l'Academia Belgica et l'Ecole française de Rome avec le concours de la FIDEM, 26 –28 mars 1998, ed. Jacqueline Hamesse (Turnhout, 2000), 427–70; Spatz's Principia; and Andrew (Athanasius) Sulavik, “Principia and introitus in Thirteenth-Century Christian Biblical Exegesis, with Related Texts,” in La Bibbia del XIII secolo. Storia del testo, storia dell'esegesi, ed. Giuseppe Cremascoli and Francesco Santi (Florence, 2004), 269–321.
2 This notwithstanding, many principia still remain unpublished. Sulavik, “Principia and introitus,” 269, counts more than one hundred and fifty principia that have survived in manuscript sources, of which at present some ten percent have been edited. References to the editions can be found in Sulavik, “Principia and introitus,” 270–72. More recently, Benson has argued that Bonaventure's De reductione artium ad theologiam should also be counted among the principa. See, for example, Benson, Joshua C., “Identifying the Literary Genre of the De reductione artium ad theologiam: Bonaventure's Inaugural Lecture at Paris,” Franciscan Studies 67 (2009): 149–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
3 See Thomas Prügl, “Medieval Biblical Principia as Reflections on the Nature of Theology,” in What is ‘Theology’ in the Middle Ages? Religious Cultures of Europe (11th –15th Centuries) as Reflected in their Self-Understanding, ed. Mikołaj Olszewski (Münster i. W., 2007), 253–75, at 255.
4 For the definition of comparative principia, see Prügl, “Medieval Biblical Principia,” 257–60.
5 See Claude Lafleur, Quatre Introductions à la philosophie au XIIIe siècle: Textes critiques et étude historique (Montréal/Paris, 1988). See also Ruedi Imbach, “Einführungen in die Philosophie aus dem XIII. Jahrhundert: Marginalien, Materialien und Hinweise im Zusammenhang mit einer Studie von Claude Lafleur,” Freiburger Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Theologie 38 (1991): 471–93.
6 Gilbert Dahan has pointed out this parallelism in “La classificazione delle scienze e l'insegnamento universitario nel XIII secolo,” in Le Università dell'Europa: Le scuole e i maestri, 2, Il Medioevo, ed. Gian Paolo Brizzi and Jacques Verger (Milan, 1994), 19–43, at 29.
7 For Stephen's dependence on Hugh, see Jean Leclercq, “Un témoignage du XIIIe siècle sur la nature de la théologie,” Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge 15–17 (1940–42): 301–21, at 303; and Spatz, Nancy, “A Newly Identified Text: The Inception Speech of Galdericus, First Cluniac Regent Master of Theology at the University of Paris,” Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge 61 (1994): 133–47Google Scholar, at 141–42 and 145. For his familiarity with contemporary divisions of philosophy, see Fidora, Alexander, “The Inception Speech of Galdericus as an Introduction to Thirteenth-Century Theology and Philosophy,” Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge 87 (2020): 43–58Google Scholar.
8 See, for instance, Peter of Scala, who preferred to stick closely to Hugh of Saint Victor's Didascalicon: Andrew (Athanasius) Sulavik, “An Unedited Principium Biblicum Attributed to Petrus de Scala, O.P.,” Angelicum 79 (2002): 87–126, esp. 112–14.
9 For Stephen of Besançon's life, see, among others, Principia, 127.
10 For Stephen as an early Thomist, see Andrea A. Robiglio, La sopravvivenza e la gloria: Appunti sulla formazione della prima scuola tomista (sec. XIV) (Bologna, 2008), esp. 31. For his works, see the detailed list in Thomas Kaeppeli, Scriptores ordinis praedicatorum medii aevi (Rome, 1980), 3:352–54; and also idem, “Ein unbeachtetes Principium des Stephanus de Bisuntio O.P. († 1294),” Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 3 (1933): 185–87.
11 For the principium in aula, see Principia, 218–72. Fragments of the resumptio have been transcribed in Spatz, “A Newly Identified Text,” 136. Meanwhile, Andrew Sulavik has prepared a preliminary transcription of the entire text, which he has kindly shared with me.
12 Hereford Cathedral Library, ms P. 3. III, fol. 113r, quoted and translated in Spatz, “A Newly Identified Text,” 136, n. 13: “In principio scientiae vel libri circa duo versari solet doctorum intentio. Solent primo scientiam commendare ut habeant auditores benevolos. Solent etiam causas tangere et generalem divisionem praemittere ut reddant eos dociles et attentos. Heri ex verbo proposito sacram scripturam commendabilem ostendimus, et omnes alias praecellentem. Modo causae tangendae sunt et librorum divisio.”
13 Principia, 244.
14 Principia, 246–47: “In quo quattuor ad commendationem sacrae scripturae in quibus omnes alias scientias antecellit. Aliquando enim una scientia praefertur alii ratione formae vel modi procedendi in ea secundum certitudinem, quia tradit certius et clarius veritatem, et aliquando ratione materiae propter cuius altitudinem scientia super alias obtinet dignitatem . . . Tertio praefertur scientia alteri ratione finis quia directius ordinatur ad humanae vitae rectitudinem et honestatem, et sic habet maiorem utilitatem: sicut moralis, cuius finis est ut boni fiamus, secundo Ethicorum . . . Quarto praeeligitur una [scil. scientia] alii non quia certior, dignior, vel melior, sed secundum eligentis aptitudinem, vel quia aliae non conveniunt secundum propriam capacitatem.”
15 See Galdericus's account in Leclercq, “Un témoignage du XIIIe siècle” (n. 7 above), 308: “Quia igitur theologia considerando Deum et divina ad modum rotae utitur motu girativo, ideo sola inter omnes scientias potest dicere Giro celi etc . . . in quo notatur eius praeeminentia vel dignitas non solum in modo eius proprio, verum etiam in materia respectu cuiuslibet facultatis. Modum eius proprium innuit Circuivi, sed subiectum vel materiam eminentem dat intelligere Girum celi. In giro enim celi est perpetuitas, pulchritudo, nobilitas et utilitas; perpetuitatem habet ex remotione a contrarietate, plenitudinem [leg. pulchritudinem] in dispositione stellarum et ordine, nobilitatem in formali continentia et situs altitudine, sed utilitatem multiplicem in efficacia et virtute.”
16 Principia, 248: “Dico ergo quod una scientia alii antefertur propter eius certitudinem sicut mathematicae. Unde Ptolomaeus in principio Almagesti: ‘O quam bonum fuit quod Aristoteles divisit theoricam cum eam in tria prima genera distribuit in naturale, doctrinale, theologicum,’ VIo Metaphysicae. Et post ‘dico quod duo genera divisionis theoreticae sola aestimatione cognoscuntur et non scientiae veritate comprehenduntur: theologicum quidem quia nunquam videtur neque comprehenditur; naturale vero propter motionem materiae, et levitatem sui cursus et velocitatem suae alterationis.’”
17 Principia, 248–49: “Inter ergo omnes humanas scientias mathematicae certiores sunt quia utuntur medio demonstrativo determinato ad unum et necessario. Sacra autem scriptura habet unum medium efficacissimum, scilicet, mediatorem Dei et hominum dominum Iesum Christum, cuius comprehensio sufficit ad omne verum certitudinaliter et indubitanter cognoscendum.”
18 Robiglio, La sopravvivenza e la gloria (n. 10 above), 70. Robiglio also refers to similar expressions in other authors, such as Peter of John Olivi.
19 See Principia, 250–53.
20 Principia, 258: “Sicut videmus in speculativis quod illa scientia quae considerat altissima et simpliciter prima dirigit alias, et eis principia administrat.”
21 Principia, 258–59: “Et in practicis ita est quod quae supremum et ultimum finem considerat, inferioribus ponit modum, sicut politica militari, et militaris frenifactivae.” I have corrected the misleading punctuation of the edition, which fails to make reference to the opening paragraphs of the Nicomachean Ethics as the source of this passage.
22 See n. 24, below.
23 Principia, 258: “Haec autem quoad utrumque suprema est quia considerat Iesum Christum qui est primum omnium principium et ultimus finis . . . Et ideo haec dirigit omnem scientiam speculativam in contemplatione veri, quia Iesus Christus est veritas; et omnem practicam in operatione boni, quia Iesus Christus est vita.”
24 Principia, 261: “Licet enim inter humanas scientias mathematicae sint certiores; licet metaphysica nobilior; tamen moralis melior quia directius docet vitae rectitudinem, habet maiorem utilitatem.”
25 Principia, 263: “Si Seneca praefert philosophiam moralem et sermocinales scientias parvipendit quia viam ad veritatem non sternunt, haec sapientia quae Christus est et de Christo ‘sobrietatem docet,’ temperantiam ‘et iustitiam et virtutem quibus nihil utilius in vita hominibus,’ Wisdom 7:7. Si tota utilitas earum in recte loquendo, haec rectissime docet loqui.”
26 Principia, 268–69: “Unde et Aristoteles, tertio Metaphysicae [1000a9–11], dicit quod Elyodus et omnes quicumque theologi solum ad ipsos persuasionem curaverunt, nos autem neglexerunt. Et prope finem secundi Metaphysicae [994b23–995a15] tractat idem quomodo diversi secundum diversas complexiones vel consuetudines diversa recipiunt; vel propter hoc in civitatibus ordinabatur antiquitus qui et quas scientias et quantum discerent, ut tangitur primo Ethicorum [1094a29–1094b3].”
27 Principia, 269: “Sed sacra scriptura sine exceptione omnibus est communis et secundum singulorum capacitatem omnibus se coaptat . . . Non quin idem proponeret hiis et aliis, scilicet Christum?”
28 Principia, 272: “Sacra scriptura est ergo omnium certissima, quia Christus est lux et veritas. Est omnium dignissima, quia Christus omnium causa, ‘omnia enim per ipsum facta sunt’ (John 1:3). Est omnium optima, quia Christus est salus et vita. Est omnibus communissima, ut sicut scribitur 1 Pet. 4:11: ‘in omnibus honorificietur Deus per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum cui est gloria et imperium in saecula saeculorum, amen.’”
29 Principia, 208: “Although Stephen alludes to the theoretical or speculative philosophy of Aristotle, and to the disciplines that comprise the seven liberal arts, he does not present a systematic division of the sciences, as Galdericus does.”
30 This shift may be explained by the fact that during the second half of the thirteenth century the division of philosophy had become less controversial, to the point that many authors even accommodated competing schemes, such as that proposed by Aristotle and the one specifying liberal arts. See, for instance, Thomas Aquinas in his commentary on Boethius's De trinitate, q. V, a. 1.
31 See Albert G. Judy's introduction in De ortu, XIV–XVI.
32 See José Filipe Silva, “Robert Kilwardby,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, online at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/robert-kilwardby/ (accessed 9 June 2021).
33 See Hugh of St. Victor, Didascalicon de studio legendi 3.2, ed. and trans. Thilo Offergeld (Freiburg i. Br., 1995), 217–28. See also José Filipe Silva, “Hugh of St. Victor and Robert Kilwardby on Science,” in La compilación del saber en la Edad Media, ed. María José Muñoz, Patricia Cañizares, and Cristina Martín (Porto, 2013), 515–31, at 524.
34 De ortu, 214: “Sed nec multum de hoc curandum sicut nec de nominibus inventorum, quia haec duo plus habent curiositatis quam utilitatis.”
35 De ortu, 214: “Ordo vero naturalis earum multum alius est, et iste triplex est. Potest enim ordo considerari in illis penes subiecta vel fines vel formam.” José Filipe Silva, “Robert Kilwardby,” is mistaken when he describes only the first of these criteria, that is, the subject matter, as pertaining to the natural order. For Kilwardby, all three criteria, that is, the subject matter, the end or purpose, and the form, constitute the natural order of the sciences.
36 De ortu, 215: “Ordo vero penes subiecta idem est quod ordo subiectorum. Et ideo sicut res divinae de quibus sunt scientiae speculativae priores sunt rebus humanis, sic in hoc genere ordinis priores sunt scientiae speculativae practicis et sermocinalibus. Ordo autem speculativarum est penes subiectorum simplicitatem et penes prioritatem naturae in illis, propter quam quaedam sunt maioris abstractionis quam aliae, et ideo ibi quanto abstractiores tanto priores sunt ratione subiecti.”
37 De ortu, 216–17: “Penes fines autem alius est ordo, et loquor de finibus propriis penes quos supra assignatae sunt singularum definitiones sicut et penes subiecta. Quia autem, ut dicit Averroes super III Metaphysicae, ‘illud quod disponitur per bonum est causa finalis,’ ideo ordo scientiarum penes fines attendendus est penes bonitatem finium. Quia igitur bonum spirituale simpliciter melius est corporali, et mechanicae finis est bonum corporale, aliarum vero aliquod bonum spirituale, simpliciter meliores sunt aliae scientiae quam mechanicae, et ideo in hoc ordine priores. Et quia de spiritualibus bonis melior est virtus scientia, quarum ethica virtutem intendit et aliae scientiam, melior est aliis ethica, et hoc ordine prior.”
38 De ortu, 218–19: “Penes formam autem, quam voco certitudinem in modo ostendendi, alius est in eis ordo a praedictis. Cum enim quaedam certis demonstrationibus utantur et quaedam coniecturis et quibusdam probabilibus rationibus, illae in hoc ordine priores sunt quae demonstrant, et illae posteriores quae dialectice vel rhetorice ostendunt. Et sic rationabiliter priores sunt speculativae quam activae, et inter speculativas illae priores quae maioris sunt abstractionis et de rebus immutabilioribus ostendunt.”
39 See Dominicus Gundissalinus, De divisione philosophiae – Über die Einteilung der Philosophie, ed. and trans. Alexander Fidora and Dorothée Werner (Freiburg i. Br., 2007).
40 De ortu, 219: “Mihi autem videtur magis sensibilibus hominibus hanc viam ultimam esse tenendam, multum autem vigentibus secundum intellectum viam primam, multum autem vigentibus secundum imaginationem viam mediam.”
41 De ortu, 219: “Obtusi enim et inepti ad artes liberales primo addiscant mechanicas et in illarum usu permaneant, et unusquisque talium tali primo detur mechanicae cui secundum ingenium et usum corporis aptior est. Deinde ad alias, si valet, proficiat.”
42 Principia, 248–49: “Ptolomaeus in principio Almagesti: ‘O quam bonum fuit quod Aristoteles divisit theoricam cum eam in tria prima genera distribuit in naturale, doctrinale, theologicum,’ VIo Metaphysicae. Et post ‘dico quod duo genera divisionis theoreticae sola aestimatione cognoscuntur et non scientiae veritate comprehenduntur: theologicum quidem quia numquam videtur neque comprehenditur; naturale vero propter motionem materiae, et levitatem sui cursus et velocitatem suae alterationis.’ Et loquitur de theologia quae est inventa ab hominibus, non de illa quae est divinitus inspirata. Inter ergo omnes humanas scientias mathematicae certiores sunt quia utuntur medio demonstrativo determinato ad unum et necessario.”
43 Charles Burnett has analyzed the Latin translation(s) of the introduction to the Almagest, paying particular attention to the concept of theologia, which, in Latin, he sees as being closer to theology in the proper sense than to metaphysics. With regard to Stephen, however, there can be no doubt that he understood theologia in the sense of metaphsyics, as did Ptolemy. See Charles Burnett, “‘Ptolemaeus in Almagesto dixit’: The Transformation of Ptolemy's Almagest in its Transmission via Arabic into Latin,” in Transformationen antiker Wissenschaften, ed. Georg Toepfer and Hartmut Böhme (Berlin and New York, 2010), 115–40.
44 De ortu, 218: “In hoc autem ordine cum absque dubio physica sit posterior metaphysica et mathematica, aliquis tamen diceret mathematicam esse priorem metaphysica propter certissimas demonstrationes quae sunt in mathematica. Aliquis forte diceret e converso eo quod metaphysica est suprema philosophiae pars, et ideo eius principia oportet esse per se notissima et aliorum communium principiorum specialium scientiarum explanativa. Et forte utrumque verum est, scilicet quod mathematica est certior et prior in demonstrando, sed metaphysica certior et prior in explanando et alias declarando.” The same question was discussed some twenty years earlier by Richard Rufus in his Memoriale quaestionum in Metaphysica Aristotelis, dating from 1231–35: “An metaphysica sit scientia certissima. De tertio: videtur enim esse certissima, cum sit de causis certissimis; est enim de causa omnium prima quae certissima est. Contrarium videtur — certior est scientia quae procedit ex principiis quam quae est ad principia; haec autem est ad principia — nisi quod hic solvit prior distinctio,” ed. Rega Wood and Neil Lewis (2013) online at https://rrp.standford.edu/MMet.shtml (accessed 11 June 2021).
45 Aquinas, Thomas, Expositio super librum Boethii De trinitate, ed. Decker, Bruno (Leiden, 1965), 209CrossRefGoogle Scholar: “Est etiam processus mathematicae certior quam processus scientiae divinae, quia ea, de quibus est scientia divina, sunt magis a sensibilibus remota, a quibus nostra cognitio initium sumit . . . Mathematica autem ipsa in sensu cadunt et imaginationi subiacent, ut figura, linea et numerus et huiusmodi. Et ideo intellectus humanus a phantasmatibus accipiens facilius capit horum cognitionem et certius quam intelligentiae alicuius vel etiam quam quiditatem substantiae et actum et potentiam et alia huiusmodi. Et sic patet quod mathematica consideratio est facilior et certior quam naturalis et theologica, et multo plus quam scientiae aliae operativae, et ideo ipsa maxime dicitur disciplinaliter procedere. Et hoc est quod Ptolemaeus dicit in principio Almagesti: ‘Alia duo genera theorici potius quis opinionem quam conceptionem scientialem dicat: theologicum quidem propter inapparens ipsius et incomprehensibile, physicum vero propter materiae instabile et immanifestum. Solum autem mathematicum inquisitionis firmam stabilemque fidem intendentibus dabit, velut utique demonstratione per indubitabiles vias facta,’” trans. Armand Maurer, in Thomas Aquinas, The Division and Methods of the Sciences. Questions V and VI of his Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius, 4th ed. (Toronto, 1986), 68–69.
46 The passage from the introduction of Ptolemy's Almagest is referred to several times in Aquinas's commentary, for example, q. 5, a. 1, s.c. 3; q. 5, a. 3, arg. 8; q. 5, a. 3, ad 8; and q. 6, a. 1, s.c. 11. It also appears in the philosophical introductions, for example, in the Accessus philosophorum (ca. 1230). See Lafleur, Quatre Introductions à la philosophie (n. 5 above), 184, as well as 152, n. 113, where Lafleur observes that the introductory chapter of the Almagest was widely read at the university (in contrast to the rest of the work).
47 Principia, 258; and Robiglio, La sopravvivenza e la gloria (n. 10 above), 31.
48 See the introduction in Aquinas, Thomas, Kommentar zum Trinitätstraktat des Boethius II, ed. and trans. Hoffmann, Peter and Schrödter, Hermann (Freiburg i. Br., 2007), 7–12Google Scholar.
49 See Gilbert Dahan, “Une introduction à l’étude de la philosophie: Ut ait Tullius,” in L'enseignement de la philosophie au XIIIe siècle: Autour du ‘Guide de l’Étudiant’ du ms. Ripoll 109, ed. Claude Lafleur (Turnhout, 1997), 3–58, at 5–6. See also Claude Lafleur, “Une figure métissée du platonisme médiéval: Jean le Page et le Prologue de son Commentaire (vers 1231–1240) sur l’Isagoge de Porphyre,” in Une philosophie dans l'histoire: Hommages à Raymond Klibansky, ed. Bjarne Melkevik and Jean-Marc Narbonne (Québec, 2000), 105–60, at 110–11, and n. 1.