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SELF-INTEREST AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY: A REPLY TO SOME IMPLICATIONS OF JEROME MORAN'S ‘ARISTOTLE ON EUDAIMONIA (“HAPPINESS”)’

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 June 2019

Tim Miles
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Abstract

Moran argues that the ancient Greek philosophers did not really do moral philosophy because they conflated self-regard with other-regard. I argue that on the contrary questions of what is in a person's own interest are moral questions and that self-interest should play a part in moral philosophy.

Type
Research Article
Information
Think , Volume 18 , Issue 52 , Summer 2019 , pp. 87 - 90
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2019 

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References

Notes

1 Moran, Jerome, ‘Aristotle on Eudaimonia (“Happiness”)’, Think 17(48) (2018): 91–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at p. 97.

2 Often wrongly attributed to W. H. Auden, who used it but did not claim it. It was used in a 1923 recording by comedian Vivian Foster – see The W. H. Auden Society website – but could be of earlier origin.

3 Moran, ‘Aristotle on Eudaimonia’, 97–8.

4 Kant, , Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, ch. 2 (The Moral Law, trans. Paton, H. J. (London: Hutchinson, 1948), 86)Google Scholar.

5 Ibid. 95 (Paton).