Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-r5fsc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-23T19:35:19.204Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

IS AN INFINITE TEMPORAL REGRESS OF EVENTS POSSIBLE?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2012

Get access

Extract

Issues concerning the ultimate origins of the universe have generated huge public interest recently. It began with the publication of The Grand Design by Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow, in which the authors claim that, because there is a law like gravity, the universe can and will create itself from nothing, and thus there is no role for God. This has prompted heated responses from scientists, philosophers, and religious leaders in the media, many of them asking, in effect, ‘where that law came from’. Subsequently, Roger Penrose released his new book Cycles of Time, arguing that what came before the Big Bang was the end of another universe, prompting the question whether there is an infinite temporal regress of universes or not. These discussions make it very timely to examine afresh whether an infinite temporal regress of events is possible.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2012

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Notes

1 Hawking, Stephen and Mlodinow, Leonard, The Grand Design (New York: Bantam Books, 2010), p. 180Google Scholar.

2 Penrose, Roger, Cycles of Time: An Extraordinary New View of the Universe (London: Bodley Head, 2010).Google Scholar

3 Craig, William Lane and Sinclair, James, ‘The Kalam Cosmological Argument’, in Craig, William Lane and Moreland, J.P. (eds), The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology (Chichester, UK; Malden, MA, Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), pp. 102, 190196CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 Ibid, pp. 103–117.

5 Oppy, Graham, Philosophical Perspectives on Infinity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 48CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6 Ibid.

7 Oppy, Graham, ‘Inverse Operations with Transfinite Numbers and the Kalam Cosmological Argument’, International Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 35 (1995), pp. 219221CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 Oppy, Philosophical Perspectives, p. 88.

9 Ibid, pp. 51–53.

10 Ibid, pp. 88–89.

11 Morriston, Wes, ‘Must Metaphysical Time Have a Beginning?Faith and Philosophy, vol. 20 (2003), pp. 296297, 301CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12 Craig and Sinclair, ‘The Kalam Cosmological Argument’, p. 105.

13 I would like to thank Professor Graham Oppy for a very helpful email discussion. I would also like to thank Professors Garry DeWeese, J.P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, Jason Colwell, Charles Blackledge and Mary Lim for very helpful suggestions.