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Wittgenstein and the problem of consciousness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 July 2009

Oswald Hanfling
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Abstract

You have a rich inner life of conscious experiences. For example, you have pains and other sensations. And you have sensory experiences, such as that produced by chewing on something bitter. Scientists are currently puzzling over how to explain this inner life in scientific terms. Can we, for example, ‘explain’ consciousness by appealing to certain facts about our brains?

Here, Oswald Hanfling explains why he believes the scientific ‘problem’ of ‘explaining’ consciousness is ultimately a pseudo-problem. There is no problem!

Type
Research Article
Information
Think , Volume 1 , Issue 3 , Spring 2003 , pp. 99 - 106
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2003

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References

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