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A Qualitative Theory of Cognitive Attitudes and their Change

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 April 2021

EMILIANO LORINI Open the ORCID record for EMILIANO LORINI [Opens in a new window]
EMILIANO LORINI*
Affiliation:
IRIT-CNRS, Toulouse University, Toulouse, France (e-mail: [email protected])
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We present a general logical framework for reasoning about agents’ cognitive attitudes of both epistemic type and motivational type. We show that it allows us to express a variety of relevant concepts for qualitative decision theory including the concepts of knowledge, belief, strong belief, conditional belief, desire, conditional desire, strong desire, and preference. We also present two extensions of the logic, one by the notion of choice and the other by dynamic operators for belief change and desire change, and we apply the former to the analysis of single-stage games under incomplete information. We provide sound and complete axiomatizations for the basic logic and for its two extensions.

Keywords

knowledge representationnonmonotonic reasoningmodal logiccognitive agents
Type
Original Article
Information
Theory and Practice of Logic Programming , Volume 21 , Issue 4: TPLP Special Issue from the 16th European Conference on Logics in Artificial Intelligence (JELIA 2019) , July 2021 , pp. 428 - 458
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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