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[Vitoria’s commentary on the Summa includes an elaborate discussion of the duty of almsgiving (on II-II, 32, 5). It is in many ways of great interest, but is too long and sometimes too intricate to encourage detailed translation here. I give in brief paraphrase the main steps of the reasoning, neglect some bypaths of argument, and translate in full one particularly vigorous passage. Actual quotations are given in inverted commas. I have thought it best throughout to render extrema nécessitas by ‘desperate need’. The term is technical, and is used of a state where without immediate help the sufferer is likely to die; gravis necessitas (‘serious need’) is something short of this, and may cover cases which common parlance would call ‘extreme’ *]
§1. St. Thomas maintains these four positions, (a) Some almsgiving is of precept, (b) Almsgiving from one’s superfluity is sometimes of precept, (c) In desperate need, almsgiving is of precept. (d) In other cases, almsgiving is of counsel.
§2. Further points are much disputed. In particular there are two questions, (a) In a case of desperate need, is a man bound to give from what is necessary for his status? For instance, his status requires him to ride. If the poor are starving and he can relieve them only by selling his horses, is he bound to do so and go about on foot? (b) If a man has superfluity (i.e., more than he needs for livelihood and status), is he bound to give alms from this, not in desperate need only (on which there is no dispute) but in serious need also?
1 Text (a far from critical text) in Comentarios a la Secunda Secundae de Santo Tomás, Tomo 2 (Salamanca, 1932), pp. 168–191.Google Scholar
2 i.e. He must have lost charity, and therefore must be in mortal sin.
3 In the examples considered here, Scriptural texts are again discussed. But they are texts of a wider character, not concerned explicitly with almsgiving. Both parties accept their general validity; their application to the matter in hand is made in the light of reason or mere good sense. There are further arguments, here omitted, which turn on the natural law and the law of nations.
4 I Jn. 3: 18.
5 Cf. Jn. 17 and I Cor. 12.
6 Matt. 19: 23—26.
7 I Tim. 6: 9.
8 Matt. 11: 12.
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