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The Political Economy of Privatisation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2023

Bob Rowthorn  and
Ha-Joon Chang
Bob Rowthorn
Affiliation:
Cambridge University
Ha-Joon Chang
Affiliation:
Cambridge University
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Abstract

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This paper examines some of the main arguments relating to the effect of privatisation on efficiency. It is concerned with both narrow economic issues and wider political issues. After a critical examination of some theories, which assert that private ownership is intrinsically more efficient than public ownership, it is argued that for large scale enterprise there are no strong economic reasons for believing in the superiority of private enterprise. As long as the government in question has the will and the power to make a public enterprise function in a socially efficient fashion, the public enterprise may be just as efficient as private enterprise whilst offering additional economic and social advantages.

Type
Symposium: An International Perspective on Privatisation
Information
The Economic and Labour Relations Review , Volume 3 , Issue 2 , December 1992 , pp. 1 - 17
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 1992

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