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Authors' reply

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2018

P. A. Garety
Affiliation:
Box PO77, Institute of Psychiatry, King's College London, De Crespigny Park, London SE5 8AF, UK. Email: [email protected]
D. Freeman
Affiliation:
Department of Psychiatry, University of Oxford, Warneford Hospital, Oxford, UK
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Abstract

Type
Columns
Copyright
Copyright © Royal College of Psychiatrists, 2014 

We differ in our approach from that taken by Shepherd, in that we are advocating an empirical approach which posits hypotheses that can be and are tested. Our review of over 200 studies demonstrates how much has been learned by testing hypotheses, amassing evidence and replicating findings. Reference Garety and Freeman1 Thus there is now strong and consistent evidence that delusions are associated with biases in reasoning, such as are assessed by experimental tasks and reliable interviews. These findings are important and provide an explanation of the failure to take on board all the evidence - or a failure of reality testing, as Shepherd puts it. We now therefore have secure knowledge of specific reasoning processes which may be targeted in treatment. Reference Waller, Freeman, Jolley, Dunn and Garety2

We do not agree that world beliefs are fundamentally rearranged in people with delusions. Rather, the person’s delusions can be shown to build on the pre-existing thoughts about self and world, and are actually typically preceded by periods of anxious worry. Reference Freeman and Garety3 Traditional views of sudden dramatic changes are not in general supported by the evidence. Although we show that there is clear evidence of the importance of emotional processes - and in some cases this can be linked to childhood trauma - we do not conclude that the delusion represents a defence. The psychoanalytic defence accounts are not supported by the evidence. Rather, anxiety and depression - and negative views of self and others - are risk factors for and commonly expressed by patients with delusions. Reference Freeman, Dunn, Fowler, Bebbington, Kuipers and Emsley4 We consider that these research findings render delusions explicable, and may have implications for the way all clinicians engage with people with delusions.

We advocate that there is now enough certainty in the evidence base for concerted efforts to translate them into targeted treatments for delusions. It is through further trials, drawing on the evidence base which identifies mechanisms underpinning delusions, and with change in delusions as the primary outcome, that we will make progress towards alleviating the distress at the heart of delusional experience.

References

1 Garety, P A, Freeman, D. The past and future of delusions research: from the inexplicable to the treatable. Br J Psychiatry 2013; 203: 327–33.Google Scholar
2 Waller, H, Freeman, D, Jolley, S, Dunn, G, Garety, P. Targeting reasoning biases in delusions: a pilot study of the Maudsley Review Training Programme for individuals with persistent, high conviction delusions. J Behav Ther Exp Psychiatry 2011; 42: 414–21.Google Scholar
3 Freeman, D, Garety, A. Connecting neurosis and psychosis: the direct influence of emotion on delusions and hallucinations. Behav Res Ther 2003;41: 923–47.Google Scholar
4 Freeman, D, Dunn, G, Fowler, D, Bebbington, P, Kuipers, E, Emsley, R, et al. Current paranoid thinking in patients with delusions: the presence of cognitive-affective biases. Schizophr Bull 2013; 39: 1281–7.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
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