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Ius dictum est a iure possidendo: Law and Rights in Decretales, 5.40.12

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2016

Brian Tierney
Brian Tierney*
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Cornell University
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Extract

Francisco Suarez devoted the opening chapter of his major work, De legibus ac Deo legislatore, to definitions of the words lex (law) and ius (right). In one sense, he wrote, ius could mean the same as lex, as in phrases like ius civile (civil law) or ius divinum (divine law). But there were other meanings too. In discussing them, Suarez quoted Isidore of Seville, ‘Ius is so called because it is just’, and Augustine, ‘What is done by right (iure) is done justly’—two texts that earlier had been incorporated into the medieval Corpus iuris canonici. According to this etymology, Suarez wrote, ius could mean ‘the just and fair’ or ‘what is prescribed by law’. Then Suarez presented a third, ‘strict’ definition.

Type
Research Article
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Studies in Church History Subsidia , Volume 9: The Church and Sovereignty c.590-1918 , 1991 , pp. 457 - 466
Copyright
Copyright © Ecclesiastical History Society 1987 

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References

1 Suarez, F., Tractatus de legibus ac Deo legislatore, ed. Pereña, L. (Madrid, 1971), I.ii.1-7, pp. 19–27, p. 24, ‘Et iuxta posteriorem et strictam iuris significarionem solet proprie ius vocari facultas quaedam moralis, quam unusquisque habet vel circa rem suam vel ad rem sibi debitam; sic enim dominus rei dicitur habere ius in re et operarius dicitur habere ius ad stipendium…’.Google Scholar

2 De paupertate in Opera omnia, 15 (Paris, 1856), p. 563.

3 Villey, M., La formation de la pensée juridique moderne, 4th edn (Paris, 1975), p. 253Google Scholar. Villey also developed his argument in many other writings. For a critical discussion see my ‘Villey, Ockham and the origin of individual rights’, in T. Witte and F. S. Alexander, eds, The Weightier Matters of the Law. A Tribute to Harold J. Berman (Adanta, 1988), pp. 1-31 and ‘Origins of natural rights language: texts and contexts, 1150-1250’, HPT (forthcoming).

4 For some references see my ‘Villey’, p. 2, n. 5. Besides the authors mentioned there, others who have recendy treated Ockham as a pioneer in the development of rights theories include Vereecke, L., ‘Individu et communnauté selon Guillaume d’Ockham’, Studia moratlia, 3 (1965), pp. 150–77Google Scholar; McGrade, S., ‘Ockham and the birth of individual rights’, in Tierney, B. and Linehan, P., eds, Authority and Power. Studies on Law and Government Presented to Walter Ullmann (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 149–65Google Scholar; Leff, G., ‘The Bible and rights in the Franciscan disputes over poverty’, in Walsh, K. and Wood, D., eds, The Bible in the Middle Ages (Oxford, 1986)Google Scholar = SCH.S, 4, pp. 225-35; Dumont, L., Essays on Individualism (Chicago, 1986)Google Scholar. Richard Tuck emphasized more the role of Gerson. On his work see ‘Tuck on rights: some medieval problems’, HPT, 4 (1983), pp. 429-40 and ‘Conciliarism, corporatism and individualism: the doctrine of individual rights in Gerson’, Cristianesimo nella Storia, 9 (1988), pp. 81—111.

5 For criticisms of this approach see A. Folgado, Evolucion historica del concepto del derecho subjetivo (Madrid, 1960), pp. 49-55.

6 Hostiensis, for instance, used the word in both senses when he wrote of rights proceeding from natural and civil law. Inprimum decretalium librum commentaria (Venice, 1581) ad X.1.2.7, ‘Hoc enim stacutum reprehendendum est indistincte cum laedat alterius ius quod omnibus competit de iure naturali i.e. gentium… ubi vero rescriptum vel statu rum laederet alterius ius de iure civili proveniens… si ex roto perimitur non valet…’. Medieval lawyers understood very well that the word ius was polysemous. At the beginning of the thirteenth century the Roman lawyer Azo gave fifteen definitions of the term (but without including the sense of a private right), and early in the fourteenth century the canonist Johannes Monachus found over a score of meanings. They included potestas and dominium, but, surprisingly, not lex. On this text see my ‘Villey’, p. 29.

7 Decretum, col. 2. Suarez treated ius as derived from iubeo when he equated ius and lex. The canonists more commonly relied on the derivation from iustus.

8 Comp. 1, 5.36.12, Munich, MS SB lat 3879, fol. 94rb; Admont, MS 22, fol. Bsva. See Friedberg, E., ed., Quinquecompilationes antiquae (Leipzig, 1882), p. 65Google Scholar and Isidore, Etymologiae, v. xxv.3 (PL 82, col. 206).

9 Augustine, ep. 54 (153), PL 33, col. 665. I have not found any relevant tradition of Decreust commentary on C.14 q.4 c.11.

10 Etymologiae, V.xxv.2 (PL 82, col. 206), ‘Res sunt quae in nostro jure consistunt. Jura autem sunt quae a nobis juste possidentur, nec aliena sunt.’

11 Munich, MS SB lat 3879, fol. 94rb.

12 Tancred included die gloss cited, with an attribution to Alanus, in his apparatus on the Comp. I. Admont, MS 22, fol. 85va.

13 Decretales, col.915.(5.40.12).

14 Apparatus ad Decretales, 5.40.12, Paris, BN, MS 3967, fol. 209 va, ‘Ius dictum est a iure possidendi, i.e. possidendi secundum ius, quod bene, xiiii q. iiii quid dicam. male autem, male possidet qui pro possessore possidet quia qui requiretur quare possidet responsurus est quia possideo, ff de petitione hereditatis, qui interrogatus (Dig. 5.3.12).’

15 Apparatus ad Decretales, 5.40.12, Vienna, MS SB 2197, fol. 159rb, ‘secundum eos iure possidet qui post completam prescriptionem cognoscit rem alienam fuisse, non tamen iuste quia contra conscientiam.’

16 Decretales D. Gregorii Papae IX cum glossis (Lyons, 1624), Gloss ad. 5.40.12, col. 1937, ‘Quod iuste. Non tamen econverso secundum leges, quia iure possidet qui mala fide praescripsit, non tamen iuste …’.

17 In quintum decretalium librum commentaria (Venice, 1531) ad X.5.40.12, fol. 125ra.

18 Tarrant, J., Extravagantes Johannes XXII (Vatican City, 1983), pp. 228–54Google Scholar (Cf. Decretales, cols 1225-9).

19 Tarrant, p. 256 (Decretales, col. 1230): ‘Rursusque iṃposterum pertinaciter affirmare quod redemptori nostro predicto eiusque apostolis hiis, que ipsos habuisse scriptura sacra testatur, nequaque ius ipsis utendi competierit… cum talis assertio ipsorum usum et gesta evidenter includat in premissis non iusta … deinceps erroneam fore censendam merito ac hereticam declaramus.’

20 Extravagantes D. Ioannis Pape XXII … una cum glossis restitutae (Venice, 1583), col. 149, ‘Respondeo, quia cum nullus rectus vel iustus usus seu possessio possit esse, nisi aut iure divino vel humano vires sumat… necessario concluditur omnem cuiuscumque rei usum iniuriosum et iniustum esse, qui haberi dicitur absque aliquo iure…’.

21 Ibid.

22 Bull Fr, 5, p. 433,’qui sine iure uritur, urarur iniuste; si dicat, quod iuste uritur, sequirur per consequens, quod et iure, quia, quod iuste fit, et iure fit (extra de verborum significarione cap. iut dictum est, XIV q.4 cap. Quid dicam).’

23 Opus nonaginta dierum, in Offler, H. S., et al., eds, Guillelmi de Ockham opera politica, 2 (Manchester, 1963), pp. 573ff.Google Scholar Zenzellinus held that Christ and the Apostles (and hence the Franciscans) had a right to property derived from human law. Ockham, of course, denied this.

24 At one point he wrote, p. 574, ‘lus autem poli vocatur aequitas naturalis… consona rationi rectae’; then, a little further on, p. 579, ‘Ius autem poli non est aliud quam potestas conformis rationi rectae…’. First ius was abstract equity, then a ‘power’ inhering in persons.

25 Marsilius of Padua, Defensor pads, ed. R. Scholz (Hanover, 1933), II.xii.3-10, pp. 264-9. On this passage see my paper ‘Marsilius on rights’ (forthcoming).

26 On Johannes Andreae see most recently Pennington, K., ‘Johannes Andreae’s additions to the Decretals of Gregory IX’, ZSRG.K, 150 (1988), pp. 328–47Google Scholar, with references to earlier literature.

27 In quintum decretalium librum commentario (Venice, 1581), ad 5.40.12, fol. 15 1vb, ‘Non loquitur hie Isidoras de iure generali, quod legibus vel moribus constat, de ilio enim dicit, quod dictum est ius, quia iustum est, hoc patet 1 disc c. ii et v. Etimo, secundo ca. Sed sumitur pro iure, quod competit privato in re aliqua. Unde textus Isidori sic iacet li. v cxxiii, de haereditaribus in prin. “Res in nostro iure consistunt. Iura autem sunt, quae a nobis iuste possidentur nec aliena sunt, dicta est autem res a recte habendo, ius a iuste possidendo” … multas significationes huius verb, ius, dicam, de reg. iu. li. vi super gl. Rubricae, in fi….’.

28 Panormitanus super IIII. et V. decretalium (Lyons, 1531), fol. 183ra, ‘scias quod hic non diffinitur ius prout est generale nomen, sed prout applicatur ad certam rem, ut quando dicitur: habeo ius in tali re: tunc enim dicitur ius a iure possidendi et ita intellige istum textum. Sed capiendo ius generaliter, ius dicitur a iusrida et est ars boni et aequi… et istud generale nomen habet multas species sub se, nam quoddam est ius civile, quoddam est ius gentium etc. et hoc persequere ut habetur in decretis, 1 di. ius enim §seq.’

29 In quartum et quintum librum decretalium commentaria (Lyons, 1558), ad 5.40.12, fol. 138vb.

30 In Clementinarum volumen commentarla (Venice, 1602), foL 265va, “Saepe cogitavi quod utile esset quod Ecclesia Romana permitteret libere de hoc disputan an Christus habuerit vel non habuerit, vel habere potuerit proprium vel non potuerit…’. On this comment see my Origins of Papal Infallibility (Leiden, 1972, repr. 1988), p. 321 of the reprint.

31 Zabarella concluded that in any case the whole dispute over evangelical perfection was a mere strife of words: ibid., fol. 205b, ‘Viderur dicendum quod fratres non habent aliqua propria, nee in communi nee in speciali, sed habent usum faca non nudum sed facri iusti et liciti ut volunt dictae extravagantes … rarione partis contrariae id est ut utantur de facto in suas necessitates, qui tamen usus non infert atiquam proprietatem, sed utuntur de licencia dantis … et sic dicendo salvaretur intendo illorum qui dicerunt fratres excludi ab ornili proprio quoquo modo, nec esset aliqua absurditas. Sed non video quod in hoc est summa perfecrio, sed potius est contendo de verbis.’

32 Among the original disputants in the fourteenth-century dispute, Marsilius of Padua came closest to formulating the position later adopted by Suarez (Zabarella referred to Marsilius in the course of his discussion on the poverty question. In Clementinarum, fol. 205va).

33 For example, the editions of Paris 1612, Venice 1615, and Venice 1624, all presenting the text of the correctores romani.