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Organizing for Insurgency: Intraparty Organization and the Development of the House Insurgency, 1908–1910

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Ruth Bloch Rubin
Ruth Bloch Rubin*
Affiliation:
University of California, Berkeley
*
[email protected]
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Abstract

A legislative “breakpoint,” the Cannon Revolt profoundly transformed congressional operation, spurring a series of reforms that ultimately led to the disintegration of traditional modes of partisan authority and the creation of new patterns of governance. In this article, I argue that the Cannon Revolt affords an opportunity to examine a crucial, but poorly understood, dynamic in congressional politics. Whereas spatial theories of Congress typically hold that legislators located at the floor median are decisive actors in chamber politics, the archival account presented here suggests that these legislators require the scaffolding of an intraparty organization to secure pivotal status. As I demonstrate, intraparty organization enabled a ragtag group of Republican reformers opposed to Cannon's “czar rule” to draft and unite behind a common proposal for parliamentary reform, and to build the cross-party coalition that scholars agree was critical to its passage. In this account, the influence of the so-called “Insurgent” Republicans hinged on their collective capacity to hang together in sufficient numbers to hold the balance of power in the chamber—in effect, organizing all potentially pivotal votes into one bloc essential to sustaining the majority party coalition.

Type
Research Article
Information
Studies in American Political Development , Volume 27 , Issue 2 , October 2013 , pp. 86 - 110
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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References

1. John Mandt Nelson, “Meeting Minutes,” January 10, 1910, Wisconsin Historical Society (WHS), John Mandt Nelson Papers, Box 10. Responding to a smear campaign orchestrated by the Taft Administration and Cannon's allies in the legislature, the Insurgents issued this resolution to make clear to the public their political objectives and continued affiliation with the Republican Party.

2. Congressional Record, 61st Congress, 2nd Sess., 1910, 45, 3291.

3. Congressional Record, 61st Congress, 2nd Sess., 1910, 45, 3241–3250. On March 16, 1910, Census Committee chairman Rep. Edgar Crumpacker (R-IN) motioned that a measure calling for a new census be debated on the House floor. Though under House rules Crumpacker's proposal was unlikely to be considered, as the measure had only recently been reported to the full chamber and many more bills should have received first consideration, the chairman hoped his loyalty to the Speaker would tip the scales in favor of his motion. As expected, Cannon ruled Representative Crumpacker's request to be in order. The Speaker declared: “Taking of the census as to population [has] invariably been admitted as involving constitutional privilege, presenting a privilege higher than any rule of the House would give.”

4. Norris, George W., Fighting Liberal: The Autobiography of George W. Norris (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1945), 113Google Scholar.

5. The resolution provided a new structure for the Committee on Rules, requiring that the committee be geographically and politically representative. The redesigned committee would consist of fifteen members, eight representing the majority party and seven the minority party, distributed throughout the country. The resolution denied the Speaker the right to sit on the committee and stripped him of the power to appoint House members to standing committees. Norris's proposed Committee on Rules would, among its new duties, appoint House members to other standing committees. Norris, Fighting Liberal, 115.

6. Hechler, Kenneth W., Insurgency: Personalities and Politics of the Taft Era (New York: Russell & Russell, 1964), 70–71Google Scholar.

7. Congressional Record, 61st Congress, 2nd Sess., 1910, 45, 3436. As discussed in the article's penultimate section, this amended resolution stripped Cannon of his seat on the Rules Committee, but allowed the Speaker to retain appointment power to other standing committees.

8. Orren, Karen and Skowronek, Stephen, The Search for American Political Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 10CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9. Cooper, Joseph and Brady, David W., “Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn,” American Political Science Review 75 (1981): 416CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10. For example, see Atkinson, Charles R., The Committee on Rules and the Overthrow of Speaker Cannon (New York: Columbia University Press, 1911)Google Scholar; Scott, Anne Firor, “A Progressive Wind from the South,” Journal of Southern History 29 (1963): 53–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jones, Charles O., “Joseph G. Cannon and Howard W. Smith: An Essay on the Limits of Leadership in the House of Representatives,” Journal of Politics 30 (1968): 617–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Binder, Sarah A., Minority Rights, Majority Rule: Partisanship and the Development of Congress (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997CrossRefGoogle Scholar); Brady, David and Epstein, David, “Intraparty Preferences, Heterogeneity, and the Origins of the Modern Congress: Progressive Reformers in the House and Senate, 1890–1920,” Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 13 (1997): 26–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wolfensberger, Donald R., “The Motion to Recommit in the House: The Creation, Evisceration, and Restoration of a Minority Right,” in Party, Process, and Political Change, ed. Brady, David and McCubbins, Mathew D. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 271–95Google Scholar; Sheingate, Adam, “Creativity and Constraint in the U.S. House of Representatives” in Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency and Power, ed. Mahoney, James and Thelen, Kathleen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 168–203Google Scholar.

11. Binder, Minority Rights, 134–35.

12. Sheingate, “Creativity and Constraint,” 197.

13. Intraparty organization refers to the formation of an internally bounded alliance between co-partisans, with an associated institutional apparatus to support and enforce that alliance. By internally bounded, I mean that such alliances are composed of an identifiable set of co-partisans selected on the basis of some criteria set forth explicitly or implicitly by the group. Although their design may vary, intraparty organizations are characterized by one or more of the following organizational features: members identify publicly with the group and meet together regularly, members provide or seek resources for the group, and members consent to be bound by a group position or strategy on one or more policy or procedural issues.

14. Schickler, Eric, Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the Development of the U.S. Congress (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 14Google Scholar.

15. Indeed, the activities of the Insurgents would ultimately help to form the basis of the Progressive Party. Beginning in the summer of 1910, progressive members of the Insurgency in the House and Senate began to use the group's electoral infrastructure and contacts with the press to organize a third-party challenge in the 1912 presidential election. Robert Collier to Robert La Follette and Victor Murdock, July 1, 1910, Library of Congress Manuscript Division (LOC), Robert La Follette Papers, Box 63.

16. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, “Democratic Party Platform of 1908,” July 7, 1908, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29589 (date accessed: February 4, 2013).

17. Jones, “Joseph G. Cannon and Howard Smith,” 626.

18. Cox, Gary W. and McCubbins, Mathew D., Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party in Government in the U.S. House of Representatives (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 20–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

19. Cox and McCubbins, Setting the Agenda, 31.

20. Krehbiel, Keith, Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 165–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

21. Rohde, David W., Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 35–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

22. Schickler, Eric and Rich, Andrew, “Controlling the Floor: Parties as Procedural Coalitions in the House,” American Journal of Political Science 41 (1997): 1342CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

23. In some instances, it may be sufficient to simply threaten defection until compromise is induced.

24. Cox and McCubbins allude to this dynamic, noting that “[p]otential defectors must coordinate, not just in the sense of jumping at the same time but also in the sense of negotiating, before actually defecting, with their prospective new partners over the division of spoils.” Cox and McCubbins, Setting the Agenda, 31, emphasis in the original.

25. Baker, John D., “The Character of the Congressional Revolution of 1910,” Journal of American History 60 (1973): 683CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

26. Edward E. Higgins to William H. Taft, March 8, 1909, LOC, Victor Murdock Papers, Box 23.

27. Binder, Minority Rights, 135.

28. Richmond P. Hobson to Murdock, November 24, 1909, LOC, Murdock Papers, Box 22.

29. Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism, 76.

30. Brady, Henry E. and Collier, David, Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 12Google Scholar.

31. Included in the Nelson papers are a series of transcribed interviews with the congressman conducted by Kenneth Hechler as part of the latter's research for Insurgency: Personalities and Politics of the Taft Era. Attentive to concerns of potential bias, these interviews are used primarily to contextualize the information provided by the bloc's meeting minutes.

32. Nevertheless, the relationship between the Insurgent members and their journalist colleagues is complex. The historical record reveals that House reformers often communicated with progressive Republican editors, and were largely successful in influencing news coverage of the Insurgent organization. The Insurgents' success notwithstanding, the newspaper editors were, for their part, independently committed to parliamentary reform. As a result, it is problematic to argue either that the Insurgents were fully responsible for the coverage they received, or that the coverage they received is an entirely independent variable that influenced the reformers' ultimate success. Nonetheless, correspondence among Insurgents and members of the press suggests that progressive publications were an important resource for Insurgent legislators, and that with the cooperation of sympathetic journalists, certain electoral and organizational objectives were advanced. See correspondence with the editors of Collier's Magazine, The American Magazine, and Kansas City Star: Collier to Murdock, March 10, 1909, LOC, Murdock Papers, Box 22; Collier to Murdock, March 19, 1909, LOC, Murdock Papers, Box 22; Richard Lloyd Jones to Murdock, May 13, 1910, LOC, Murdock Papers, Box 28, Folder “F”; John S. Phillips to Murdock, March 15, 1909, LOC, Murdock Papers, Box 22, Folder “Phillips, John S.”; Henry J. Haskell to Murdock, January 28, 1910, LOC, Murdock Papers, Box 28, Folder “Haskell, Henry J.”

33. Taft's personal correspondence corroborates this view of history, suggesting that the president was reluctant to intervene in the congressional contest and did so only as a result of appeals by Republican and Insurgent leaders. Taft to William Allen White, March 12, 1909, LOC, William Allen White Papers, Box 2; Butt, Archibald W., Taft and Roosevelt: The Intimate Letters of Archie Butt, Military Aide (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1930), 5–8Google Scholar.

34. Pierson, Paul, “The Costs of Marginalization: Qualitative Methods in the Study of American Politics,” Comparative Political Studies 40 (2007): 145–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

35. Following a pattern of congressional leadership pioneered by former Speaker Thomas Reed (R-ME), Cannon placed members of Congress loyal to him in committee chairmanships and packed supporters into key committees, sometimes displacing more senior, independent Republicans. He also tightened the rules of recognition on the floor, refusing to grant recognition to members who had not explained their intentions to him in advance. Strahan, Randall, Leading Representatives: The Agency of Leaders in the Politics and Development of the U.S. House (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

36. Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism, 70.

37. The vast majority of Insurgent members of Congress hailed from the mid and far West: California, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Washington, and Wisconsin. A minority of Insurgents represented districts in the mid-Atlantic and New England: Massachusetts, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Vermont, and West Virginia.

38. Many Union soldiers took advantage of the Homestead Act of 1862 to move westward at the close of the Civil War. As veterans of the Grand Army of the Republic, they were confirmed Lincoln Republicans, proclaiming “Vote the way you shot!” Their increased presence in western states assured Republicans control of the region. Hechler, Insurgency, 17.

39. Ritter, Gretchen, Goldbugs and Greenbacks: The Antimonopoly Tradition and the Politics of Finance in America, 1865–1896 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

40. Overproduction of agricultural commodities, once encouraged by advocates of western settlement, led to falling prices. Strom, Claire, “James J. Hill: Empire Builder as Farmer,” Minnesota History Magazine 54 (1995): 242–53Google Scholar.

41. For more on the economic circumstances that rooted the political movements of the time, see Bensel, Richard F., The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 1877–1900 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sanders, Elizabeth, Roots of Reform: Farmers, Workers, and the American State 1877–1917 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999)Google Scholar.

42. According to Nelson, “Bob La Follette was the moving force behind this great fight to reform the rules of the House of Representatives, insofar as it is possible to single out one man who provided the inspiration for a great deal of the movement. It must of course be recognized that no one individual had control over the progress of the movement, nor was any one individual responsible for the crystallization of the discontent in the first rules revolution of March of 1910, yet La Follette provided much of the impetus.” Nelson to Hechler, “Miscellaneous Interviews,” February 5–7, 1939, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 1.

43. While populist Democrats were often more radical in their demands than progressive Republicans, both movements called for similar reforms—with the exception of currency reform. As the journalist William Allen White described the difference between the two groups: “The Insurgents caught the Populists swimming and stole all of their clothing except the frayed underdrawers of free silver.” Hechler, Insurgency, 21–22.

44. Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism, 71.

45. The western progressive Republicans were joined by a handful of representatives who, by some accounts, believed parliamentary reform would either ease the passage of their favored legislation—as was the case for Rep. George A. Pearre (R-MD) and Rep. Charles Fowler (R-NJ)—or promote “good government” more broadly, as articulated by Rep. Augustus Gardner (R-MA). Bolles, Blair, Tyrant from Illinois: Uncle Joe Cannon's Experiment with Personal Power (New York: Norton & Company, 1951), 174–75Google Scholar.

46. In the period prior to Joseph Cannon's tenure as Speaker there was no lack of objections to House rules. In 1902, for example, Rep. Francis Cushman (R-WA) railed against the chamber's repressive legislative calendar, arguing that House rules enabled party leaders to push through at least some legislation by arbitrary procedure for partisan or personal benefit. “The Calendar!” he cried, “That is a misnomer. It ought to be called a cemetery. For therein lie the whitening bones of legislative hopes.” However, scholars generally characterize the speeches leveled against House rules prior to the Insurgency as disorganized and polemic. Insurgent speeches, by contrast, were typically dispassionate and analytic. Congressional Record, 57th Congress, 1st Sess., 1902, 35, 4320.

47. In most instances, Nelson and Murdock were granted recognition to make their speeches during floor debate on appropriations bills, where it was House custom for members “to speak on any subject under the sun.” Nelson explained that the custom for wide recognition when considering appropriations legislation on the floor acted “as a device to give the members a chance to make speeches for home consumption, and to ease up the tension caused by the powers that be, giving [members] no chance to speak on bills that [were] really under consideration.” Nelson to Hechler, “Annotated Interview Notes,” February 13, 1939, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 12.

48. Nelson to Hechler, “Annotated Interview Notes,” February 13, 1939, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 13. Roosevelt's relationship with the Insurgents varied considerably over time. Early in his first term, Roosevelt vowed to work with Cannon to push through the Republican agenda. In doing so, he achieved a momentary detente with the House leader. When it became clear that Cannon was intent on obstructing the progressive legislation Roosevelt had made the linchpin of his own agenda, the president's relationship with the Speaker cooled. By late 1907, Roosevelt sought to straddle the cleavage between growing public opposition to Cannon in the West and the need to maintain a cohesive Republican majority for President-elect William Howard Taft. While he would later be a vigorous proponent of the Insurgent cause, as an elected official Roosevelt proved largely diffident to the organization—refusing, at one point, even to make introductions to Taft on the group's behalf.

49. Nelson recounted: “I found out that this speech was sent to Uncle Joe Cannon by an obliging enemy. He only laughed and said that everybody took a knock at the rules, but just the same he never forgave me for it, as I found out afterwards.” Nelson to Hechler, “Annotated Interview Notes - Part Two,” February 13, 1939, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 10.

50. As Nelson explained, “The Cannon crowd vowed vengeance and I got no favorable committee assignments. I was placed upon the Election Committee, No. 2, the Committee on Arts and Expositions, and the dead Committee on Pacific Railroads.” Nelson to Hechler, “Annotated Interview Notes - Part Two,” February 13, 1939, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 10; Congressional Record, 60th Congress, 1st Sess., 1907, 42, 426–429; Murdock to White, December 9, 1909, LOC, White Papers, Box 2.

51. Cannon's determination to exact retribution should not be taken as an indication that the reformers posed a credible threat to the speakership. The institutional impediments to rules reform made it incredibly unlikely that the men would achieve their objective.

52. James S. Sherman to Col. H.L. Swords, February 6, 1909, New York Public Library Rare Books and Manuscript Division (NYPL), James Schoolcraft Sherman Papers, Box 17, File “1909 Feb, 6–7.”

53. Hechler, Insurgency, 194.

54. Nelson to Hechler, “Annotated Interview Notes,” February 13, 1939, WHS, Nelson Papers Box 10, p. 13–14.

55. Sitting behind Nelson just after he had delivered his speech for parliamentary reform, Norris leaned forward and promised the congressman: “John, I'll be with you on that.” Nelson to Hechler, “Miscellaneous Interviews,” February 5–7, 1939, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 2.

56. Though sectional divisions would rankle the Progressive Party a short decade later, there is little archival evidence to suggest that a single state delegation dominated Insurgent proceedings in the House. Indeed, while the Wisconsin delegation boasted the largest state membership, leadership positions were not distributed in a way that favored that delegation in particular. The Wisconsin delegation's principal influence came insofar as members from Wisconsin typically supported more radical reform measures, and voted cohesively in their favor. However, Wisconsin members' capacity to dominate the substance of Insurgent proposals was limited by the reticence of some eastern reformers—whom the Insurgent leadership was unwilling to alienate.

57. At the time, the House numbered 391 members. Because a majority in the House required 196 members, twenty-four Insurgents would need to cooperate with the opposition to overpower Cannon's regime.

58. Hechler, Insurgency, 45; Miles Poindexter to Norman Hapgood, November 17, 1908, University of Washington Libraries and Special Collections (UWSC), Miles Poindexter Papers, Box 8, Folder “Special Correspondence H.”

59. Norris, Fighting Liberal, 108.

60. Nelson to Hechler, “Miscellaneous Interviews,” February 5–7, 1939, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 2.

61. Hechler, Insurgency, 45.

62. Norris, Fighting Liberal, 135; “Hepburn May Contest,” The Washington Post, December 2, 1908, p.1; Poindexter to Theodore Burton, November 10, 1908, UWSC, Poindexter Papers, Box 8, Folder “A Special Correspondence.” See also Poindexter to W. H. W. Rees, November 24, 1908, UWSC, Poindexter Papers, Box 8, Folder “Correspondence P and Q.”

63. One might think that the Insurgents believed Cannon would be reelected and that, consequently, there would be little value in devoting resources to a unified campaign. However, Insurgent correspondence suggests otherwise; letters reveal that members believed speed of entry into the race was the primary variable in determining a rival candidate's success. Poindexter to Hapgood, November 17, 1908, UWSC, Poindexter Papers, Box 8, Folder “Special Correspondence H.”

64. While Fowler flooded the mail with pleas for support in his bid for the speakership, western Insurgents busily mobilized around local candidates. Fowler to Poindexter, November 6, 1908, UWSC, Poindexter Papers, Box 8, Folder “Special Correspondence A”; Poindexter to Fowler, November 14, 1908, UWSC, Poindexter Papers, Box 8, Folder “Special Correspondence A”; William Ewart Humphrey to Poindexter, December 7, 1908, UWSC, Poindexter Papers, Box 8, Folder “Special Correspondence A.”

65. With the Insurgents divided, Cannon sought to clinch his control of the speakership for another term by persuading the White House to remain neutral on the matter. Cannon had some reason to fear that either President Roosevelt or President-elect Taft would intervene on the progressive Republicans' behalf, as the Speaker had proved a liability in the West. Dispatching his close confidant, Vice President-elect James Sherman, to speak with Taft and Roosevelt, Cannon convinced the White House that interfering in the battle over House rules would derail the party's capacity to implement its legislative agenda. Unbeknownst to the Insurgents, Taft withdrew his support of their budding cause. Shortly after the 1908 election, Poindexter wrote to President-elect Taft, urging him to consider supporting the bid of a progressive Republican to replace Cannon as Speaker. Taft did not respond. See Hechler, Insurgency, 44; Poindexter to Taft, November 10, 1908, UWSC, Poindexter Papers, Box 8.

66. As Hechler observes, “Political strategy should have dictated a firm cohesion as the prime necessity of the Insurgents, but they failed to come to any agreement and thus lost much of their bargaining power.” Hechler, Insurgency, 45.

67. Nelson to Hechler, “Annotated Interview Notes,” February 13, 1939, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 14. Other accounts, including that of Hechler, hold that the group numbered no more than twenty-five.

68. One local Kansas politician counseled Murdock against breaking with Cannon, even for the sake of pleasing his constituents: “As you will have ‘Uncle Joe’ on your neck up there—stay with him, we will protect your rear.” J. A. Burnette to Murdock, December 23, 1908, LOC, Murdock Papers, Box 21, Folder “B.” However, for some would-be Insurgents, Cannon's penchant for punishment motivated their membership. Nelson explained, “I won Gussie Gardner over to our side in the fight on the Rules, by pointing out to him the injustices which Cannon had done to him personally, in the way of removing him from his committee chairmanship.” Nelson to Hechler, “Miscellaneous Interviews,” February 5–7, 1939, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 5.

69. According to Nelson, “In many caucuses, Hepburn would arise and read the riot act to Uncle Joe, but when the vote was taken and afterward, Hepburn would inevitably submit to the party steamroller and remain regular.” Nelson to Hechler, “Miscellaneous Interviews,” February 5–7, 1939, Wisconsin Historical Society, John Mandt Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 3.

70. According to Murdock, “It was only through the use of the headquarters of Hepburn, a dyed-in-the-wool machine man on other issues, that most . . . consented to attend.” Hechler, Insurgency, 195.

71. The committee consisted of Rep. William Hepburn (R-IA), Rep. Charles Townsend (R-MI), Rep. Henry Cooper (R-WI), Rep. Everis Hayes (R-CA), and Rep. David Foster (R-VT).

72. The text of the Insurgent proposal: “The House shall elect at the commencement of each Congress the following standing committees . . . The House shall select a committee of nine members whose duty it shall be to nominate to the House the proper number of Representatives and delegates to constitute the above committees.” Nelson, “Meeting Minutes,” December 16, 1908, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 1.

73. The text of the Insurgent proposal: “On each Tuesday and Thursday, the Speaker shall call the committees . . . and such call shall not be omitted unless by a vote on the day the House shall consent to such omission.” Nelson, “Meeting Minutes,” December 16, 1908, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 1–2.

74. In the Insurgents' final resolution, voted on in February 1909, the proposed Committee on Rules and Committees would consist of fifteen members: nine majority members, six minority members. By contrast, the Norris Resolution offered on the House floor in March 1910 called for eight majority members and seven minority members to be appointed to the proposed Committee on Rules and Committees. Nelson, “Meeting Minutes,” January 18, 1909, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 1–2. Meeting minutes suggest that no further action was taken on the Norris proposal at this time. Nelson, “February 4th Resolution,” February 4, 1909, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 3.

75. Nelson, “Meeting Minutes,” January 26, 1909, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 1–2. Members debated whether the Committee on Rules ought to be the same committee that was tasked with assigning committee positions, and whether members on either committee could simultaneously sit on a standing committee. In a series of close votes, it was decided that the Committee on Rules would also assign committee seats, but that membership on the proposed “Committee on Rules and Committees” would not preclude legislators from sitting on other standing committees.

76. Eastern Insurgents had perhaps the most to lose from a more equitable regional distribution of power in the House, as the region tended to dominate House proceedings. Nelson's meeting minutes, however, reveal that this group of reformers believed that the status quo favored stand-pat eastern interests and limited their own access to the chamber's most powerful offices. Nelson, “Meeting Minutes,” January 26, 1909, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 1–2. See also Hechler, Insurgency, 41–42.

77. The Insurgents eventually formed a Committee on Procedure, a Committee on Publicity, a Committee on Recruitment, and a Steering or Executive Committee to direct the group's strategy.

78. Nelson, “Miscellaneous Interviews,” February 5–7, 1939, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 7. See also Hechler, Insurgency, 196.

79. Nelson, “Miscellaneous Interviews,” February 5–7, 1939, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 7–8.

80. More broadly, the Insurgents' attention to matters of organization as a means of structuring consistent participation, ideological cohesion, and common strategy suggests a sort of institutional isomorphism between parties and their constitutive intraparty organizations. Indeed, the Insurgents' use of these party-like mechanisms to keep group members invested in their collective objective is striking. Whereas it is probably not the case that intraparty organizations are simply “nascent parties within parties, seeking to pour new wine into old bottles,” the fact that Insurgent organizers looked to their party coalition for structural inspiration suggests a strong affinity between the two phenomena. Ceaser, James W., “Political Parties—Declining, Stabilizing, or Resurging?” in The New American Political System, 2nd ed., ed. King, Anthony (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1990), 90–91Google Scholar.

81. Hechler, Insurgency, 195.

82. Murdock to White, August 1, 1910, LOC, White Papers, Box 4.

83. Nelson, “Meeting Minutes,” January 10, 1910, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 3.

84. Poindexter to Murdock, February 20, 1909, LOC, Murdock Papers, Box 22, Folder “Poindexter, Miles”; William P. Sheffield to Murdock, February 16, 1909, LOC, Murdock Papers, Box 22, Folder “Sheffield, William Paine”; Irving L. Lenroot to Murdock, February 16, 1909, LOC, Murdock Papers, Box 22, Folder “Lenroot, I. L.”

85. Nelson, “Meeting Minutes,” February 8, 1909, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10.

86. In contrast to Pollard, Norris recognized that Cannon's ruling on constitutional privilege provided an opening to bring his resolution to the floor. However, in Norris's view, the critical factor was giving the House the chance to overturn the Speaker, thus devolving decision-making authority to the chamber body. “The entire membership knew with equal sureness that Mr. Cannon would sustain that point of order [against Norris's right to propose his resolution], and that I would appeal at once. It was then up to the House to decide whether my resolution was in order, and whether the House desired to consider it.” Norris, Fighting Liberal, 115–16.

87. Although the House Insurgents received little counsel from their Senate counterparts on most aspects of their reform efforts, there is strong archival evidence that the two organizations coordinated on matters of press. La Follette and Murdock corresponded frequently to share news reports, material to be printed, and “story pitches.” Even early on in the Insurgent campaign, the two chamber organizations worked closely together; in October 1908, La Follette wrote to Murdock urging the congressman to run Insurgent editorials previously printed in La Follette Magazine in Kansas newspapers. F.W. Mackenzie to Murdock, October 22, 1908, LOC, Murdock Papers, Box 21, Folder “M.”

88. Charles F. Scott to Alex Butts, November 14, 1908, LOC, Murdock Papers, Box 21, Folder “S”; Lawrence F. Abbott to Murdoch, March 13, 1909, LOC, Murdock Papers, Box 22, Folder “Abbott, Lawrence F.”; Collier to Murdock, March 10, 1909, LOC, Murdock Papers, Box 22, Folder “Collier, Robert J.” Both Murdock and La Follette, who had left his post as governor of Wisconsin in January 1906 to serve the state as a senator, edited such publications.

89. Haskell to Murdock, December 20, 1909, LOC, Murdock Papers, Box 22, Folder “Haskell, Henry J.”

90. The text of the Success Magazine ballot: “Please mail this ballot to SUCCESS MAGAZINE immediately . . . Answers to the questions below will be regarded by SUCCESS MAGAZINE as absolutely confidential as regards authorship. (1.) With what political party are you in general sympathy? (2.) For what Presidential candidate did you vote in November, 1908? (3.) Do you now believe that your vote was wisely cast? (4.) Are you satisfied with the first nine months [sic] experience in the administration of President Taft? (5.) Do you approve the position of Senator Aldrich in the recent tariff legislation? (6.) Do you approve the position of Speaker Cannon in the recent tariff legislation? (7.) Do you approve the position of President Taft in the recent tariff legislation? (8.) Is it your desire that President Taft should support and co-operate with Senator Aldrich and Speaker Cannon in the general public policies which they represent? (9.) Do you desire that he should oppose them? (10.) Who is your Representative in Congress? (11.) To what political party does he belong? (12.) Did he support Joseph G. Cannon for Speaker of the House, and in the fight on the rules at the beginning of the special session? (13.) Do you approve his position in the Speakership contest? (14.) Would you vote for him if there should be another election this month, provided that he were opposed by a reputable man of the opposite party? (15.) Is it your desire that he support the administration and policies of Speaker Cannon, or would you prefer that he oppose them?” Readers were asked to record their name, state, and city or town on the ballot. “Questions to Success Magazine Members of Auxiliary Editorial Board,” 1909, LOC, Murdock Papers, Box 23, Folder “Success Magazine.”

91. Higgins to Murdock, December 3, 1909, LOC, Murdock Papers, Box 23, Folder “Success Magazine.”

92. “Is President Taft Leader or Follower in His Party?” Success Magazine, January 1910, p. 31.

93. The resolution created a “Committee on Rules and Committees to consist of fifteen members, nine of whom shall belong to the party having the largest representation in the House and six of whom shall belong to the party or parties having lesser representation in the House.” Nelson, “Feb. 1909 Resolution, Annotated,” WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10.

94. Nelson, “Feb. 1909 Resolution, Annotated,” WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10.

95. Nelson to Hechler, “Miscellaneous Interviews,” February 5–7, 1939, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 10.

96. Nelson, “Vote on Resolution of Feb. 9 & 10,” WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10.

97. Nelson to Hechler, “Annotated Interview Notes,” February 13, 1939, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 14.

98. Hechler, Insurgency, 46–47.

99. At the close of the 60th Congress, the bloc of twenty-nine Insurgents required the full Democratic minority (167 members) to break the Republican majority (223 members), 196 to 194.

100. Nelson to Hechler, “Miscellaneous Interviews,” February 5–7, 1939, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 10.

101. Hechler, Insurgency, 48–49.

102. Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism, 76.

103. Hechler, Insurgency, 196. The historical record is unclear as to who initiated the cross-party coalition. According to Nelson, he and Gardner approached Clark through Rep. Albert Burleson (D-TX), while Clark claims he reached out to the Insurgents first. Nelson to Hechler, “Annotated Interview Notes,” February 13, 1939, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 16.

104. Nelson explained the nature of the cross-party collaboration: “We only agreed to stand together on this issue and not on party policies generally.” Nelson to Hechler, “Annotated Interview Notes,” February 13, 1939, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 16.

105. Wallace D. Bassford to Higgins (and forwarded to Victor Murdock), March 9, 1909, LOC, Murdock Papers, Box 23, Folder “Success Magazine.”

106. The eight-man Insurgent resolution and the Regular Republicans' proposal differed in two respects. One, the latter sought to make the calendar day for the call of legislation from committees Wednesday rather than Tuesday. Two, the Regulars wanted to allow the “Calendar Wednesday” to be set aside by a majority, rather than two-thirds, vote, as the Insurgents preferred.

107. Congressional Record, 60th Congress, 2nd Sess., 1909, 43, 3570.

108. Congressional Record, 60th Congress, 2nd Sess., 1909, 43, 3572. It appears that the Democratic leadership determined that, as a matter of principle, the Insurgents could not be held accountable for dividing over the “concession resolution.” Democratic leaders were sympathetic toward the mild, less radical Insurgents, who, they believed, were bound to support any reform proposal, regardless of its origins.

109. Hechler, Insurgency, 49.

110. Explaining his position to progressive Republican journalist and newspaper editor White, Taft wrote: “I have got to regard the Republican party as the instrumentality through which to try to accomplish something. When, therefore, certain Republicans decline to go into a caucus, and stand out 30 against 190, it would be the sacrifice of every interest I represent to side with the [I]nsurgents, however much sympathy I may feel with the principle in respect to the House rules that they seek to carry out. Very early in the campaign I thought of encouraging a movement to beat Cannon, but I found that he was so strongly intrenched [sic] with the membership of the House that that was impossible. I then tried to secure some modification of the rules, and I am not at all sure that if the [I]nsurgents remained in the caucus we might not do something of the sort, because there were a great many in the caucus who sympathize with the principle; but the difficulty which the thirty [I]nsurgents are going to find, in my judgment, is that Cannon will be able to control enough Democrats to defeat them on the vote, and then they will be left utterly in the hole.” Taft to White, March 12, 1909, LOC, White Papers, Box 2.

111. Nelson to Hechler, “Annotated Interview Notes,” February 13, 1939, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 18.

112. Hechler, Insurgency, 51–53. Whereas Roosevelt had encouraged the fractious progressive elements in the Republican Party, and resented Cannon's tariff policy, President Taft viewed the “test of Republicanism” as “compliance with the party platform.” Cannon's expressed commitment to implement the Republican platform—as he professed to Taft: “I am willing to aid you to carry out the party's pledges”—merged the two leaders' interests. Butt, Taft and Roosevelt, 303.

113. Nelson to Hechler, “Annotated Interview Notes,” February 13, 1939, Wisconsin Historical Society, John Mandt Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 18.

114. Bassford to Higgins (and forwarded to Murdock), March 9, 1909, LOC, Murdock Papers, Box 23, Folder “Success Magazine.”

115. Nelson to Hechler, “Annotated Interview Notes,” February 13, 1939, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 18–19.

116. As Nelson recounted: “Mr. Gardner, Mr. Madison, and myself agreed to stick to the fight but we wondered what the boys would do. One by one the boys dropped in or called up by telephone. I did not find one coward . . . there were no cold feet in the crowd.” Nelson to Hechler, “Annotated Interview Notes,” February 13, 1939, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 20.

117. In a joint letter to the Insurgents, the editors stated that their readership exceeds five million Americans across the United States. “News Endorsement,” 1909, Wisconsin Historical Society, John Mandt Nelson Papers, Box 10. Writing to Murdock, the editor of American Magazine promised: “Some of us periodical men are sending you a round robin of encouragement today by wire. All power to the elbows of you and your fellows in this fight.” Phillips to Murdock, March 15, 1909, LOC, Murdock Papers, Box 22, Folder “Phillips, John S.”

118. It may be tempting to think that the Insurgents' greater cohesion is attributable to the group's improved ideological agreement—having lost more moderate members to the Regulars. However, the substance of debates recorded in meeting minutes suggests that “radical” members were not homogenous in their preferences for parliamentary reform. Moreover, there was strong disagreement among the remaining Insurgents over the extent to which the bloc should cooperate with the Democratic minority. Nelson, “Meeting Minutes,” January 10, 1910, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10.

119. Nelson to Hechler, “Annotated Interview Notes,” February 13, 1939, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 22.

120. Cannon negotiated deals with two separate factions of the Democratic Party. First, he promised tariff concessions on sugar and other commodities grown in southern delta regions—winning the support of representatives from South Carolina and Louisiana. Second, the Speaker struck a deal with Tammany Democrats, offering several important committee positions in exchange for the group's support.

121. Nelson to Hechler, “Annotated Interview Notes,” February 13, 1939, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 21–22. See also Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism, 76. According to Success Magazine, “Tariff changes were threatened against certain Southern Democrats as the price of their adherence to their party caucus. Valuable committee appointments and rich ‘perquisites’ were offered, and would have been instantly granted to any of the Insurgents or Democrats who would consent to leave his associates in the lurch . . . Threats of vengeance against those who held out were, of course, freely and vigorously made; the form which these threats took being, as a rule, the promised refusal of the Speaker to appoint a recalcitrant to any committee more important than that on Acoustics and Ventilation of the Capitol.” “The Fight Against Cannonism,” Success Magazine, LOC, Murdock Papers, Box 23, Folder “Success Magazine.”

122. Nelson recounted that a reporter covering the Speaker's negotiations with the Democrats told the Insurgents: “When [Cannon and his lieutenants] heard that you had eighteen men present they went into the air. They knew that there were enough who did not attend, being out of town, to make the twenty-four [the Insurgents] needed . . . It was the next day that the Speaker's forces began to work on the Democrats.” Nelson to Hechler, “Annotated Interview Notes,” February 13, 1939, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 20.

123. Clark's proposal called for an expanded Committee on Rules and deprived the Speaker of the power to appoint committees, as the Insurgent resolution stipulated. By this time, the Insurgent resolution lacked a legislative calendar provision, as it had been passed in some form by the Regulars.

124. Congressional Record, 61st Congress, 1st Sess., 1909, 44, 33-34.

125. The Cannon resolution provided for a motion to recommit for the minority party and required a two-thirds vote, rather than a majority vote, to set aside Calendar Wednesday. Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism, 76.

126. Hechler, Insurgency, 197.

127. Congressional Record, 61st Congress, 1st Sess., 1909, 44, 33.

128. Nelson to Hechler, “Annotated Interview Notes,” February 13, 1939, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 22.

129. Nelson to Hechler, “Annotated Interview Notes,” February 13, 1939, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 22.

130. Bolles, Tyrant from Illinois, 180; Nelson to Hechler, “Annotated Interview Notes,” February 13, 1939, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 22.

131. Hechler, Insurgency, 63.

132. Hechler, Insurgency, 197.

133. Butt, Taft and Roosevelt, 256, 271-273.

134. “To Crush Insurgents,” Washington Post, January 5, 1910, p. 1; “Without Quarter,” Los Angeles Times, January 5, 1910, p. I1; Joseph Bristow to White, January 5, 1910, LOC, William Allen White Papers, Box 3.

135. Nelson to Hechler, “Annotated Interview Notes,” February 13, 1939, Wisconsin Historical Society, John Mandt Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 23.

136. See Krehbiel, Keith and Wiseman, Alan, “Joseph G. Cannon: Majoritarian from Illinois,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 26 (2001): 357–89CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lawrence, Eric D., Maltzman, Forrest, and Wahlbeck, Paul J., “The Politics of Speaker Cannon's Committee Assignments,” American Journal of Political Science 45 (2001): 551–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

137. Nelson to Hechler, “Miscellaneous Interviews,” February 5–7, 1939, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 10; Murdock to White, December 27, 1909, LOC, White Papers, Box 2.

138. Nelson explains that not every Insurgent faced the same kind or level of threat: “Not very much pressure was exerted on me personally, although Casson, Watson and Babcock [Republican whips] told me adroitly and in a nice, joshing way what the consequences of my bolting would be. The Regulars regarded men like Cooper and myself as definitely lost and not worth any amount of persuasion; they were interested in the weak fellows.” Nelson to Hechler, “Miscellaneous Interviews,” February 5–7, 1939, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 10; Murdock to White, December 9, 1909, LOC, White Papers, Box 2.

139. William J. Cary to Poindexter, October 21, 1909, UWSC, Poindexter Papers, Box 9, Folder “C Special Correspondence.”

140. Congressional Record, 61st Congress, 2nd Sess., 1910, 45, 3320–23. Addressing the House, Cooper described the Insurgents' predicament: “If, in the House, a member votes against rules adopted by the caucus his political destiny is in the hands of the Speaker. He can be punished by the Speaker for voting against the rules adopted by a caucus . . . [the Speaker] can punish them, discredit them in the eyes of their constituents, lessen their influence on this floor, coerce them into doing his will.”

141. Rufus Rockwell Wilson to Poindexter, October 7, 1909, UWSC, Poindexter Papers, Box 9, Folder “W–Z Special Correspondence.” See also Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism, 79.

142. Nelson to Hechler, “Miscellaneous Interviews,” February 5–7, 1939, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 8.

143. Hechler, Insurgency, 63–64. Atkinson, The Committee on Rules, 76–78.

144. Butt, Taft and Roosevelt, 222–23.

145. In a recent article, Miller and Squire note that some Insurgent participants in the Cannon Revolt were motivated principally by electoral concerns, rather than a strong commitment to the cause of rules reform. Their analysis comports with the account presented here—in short, that the electoral benefits of association with the Insurgent cause could be substantial given certain district characteristics. Miller, Susan and Squire, Peverill, “Who Rebelled? An Analysis of the Motivations of the Republicans Who Voted Against Speaker Cannon,” American Politics Research 40 (2013): 387–416CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

146. Poindexter to R.L. Farnsworth, October 3, 1909, UWSC, Poindexter Papers, Box 9, Folder “F Special Correspondence”; Poindexter to Bartlett Sinclair, October 27, 1909, UWSC, Poindexter Papers, Box 9, Folder “S Special Correspondence.”

147. Asle J. Gronna to Poindexter, July 2, 1910, UWSC, Poindexter Papers, Box 13; Poindexter to G. G. Ripley, February 25, 1910, UWSC, Poindexter Papers, Box 11; Deed H. Meyer to Poindexter, July 13, 1910, UWSC, Poindexter Papers, Box 12.

148. The one exception to this generalization is that members of the Insurgency who joined the Progressive Party in 1912 continued to collaborate on electoral matters. As I argue elsewhere in this article, the Progressive Party itself can be seen as an outgrowth of Insurgent activity.

149. In 1908, Townsend declared: “What the country demands is a revision of rules . . . I am in favor of rules reform and shall do everything to accomplish that end.” “Townsend Is Out for Senatorship,” The Independent, December 3, 1908, University of Michigan Bentley Historical Library (BHL), Charles Townsend Papers, Box 1, Folder 1. See also Mark Sullivan to Murdock, March 1909, LOC, Murdock Papers, Box 23; “Townsend of Michigan for Speaker,” Arthur Capper, November 19, 1908, BHL, Townsend Papers, Box 1, Folder 1.

150. Higgins to C. H. Edgar, December 9, 1909, LOC, Murdock Papers, Box 23. “Townsend Did Not Gain Many Friends,” Big Rapids Pioneer, March 19, 1909, BHL, Townsend Papers, Box 1, Folder 1. Writing for the Cedar Springs Liberal, editor George A. Link declared: “Congressman Townsend has disappointed his friends by a painful lack of candor in his attitude Monday at the organization of the new House. He has been applauded by good citizens everywhere for his stand for freedom from the Cannon despotism, and his pitiful flop when it came to a showdown has amazed and shocked those citizens who place liberty and popular rights above party expediency.” George A. Link, Cedar Springs Liberal, March 17, 1909, BHL, Townsend Papers, Box 1, Folder 1.

151. Townsend also called upon several Democratic congressmen to vouch for his Insurgent bona fides. “Stands By Townsend,” in The Daily News, December 1909, BHL, Townsend Papers, Box 1, Folder 1; “Indignant at Townsend's Foes,” in The Adrian Times, December 1909, BHL, Townsend Papers, Box 1, Folder 1; “Is Mr. Townsend a Progressive?” in The Detroit Patriot, December 1909, LOC, Murdock Papers, Box 23; “Townsend Wins Another Victory,” in The Detroit News, March 2, 1909, BHL, Townsend Papers, Box 1, Folder 1.

152. Higgins to Murdock, December 8, 1909, LOC, Murdock Papers, Box 23.

153. Nelson to Hechler, “Miscellaneous Interviews,” February 5–7, 1939, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 8.

154. Congressional Record, 61st Congress, 2nd Sess., 1910, 45, 404.

155. Nelson, “Meeting Minutes,” January 8, 1910, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10.

156. Hechler, Insurgency, 64–65.

157. Nelson, “Meeting Minutes,” January 8, 1910, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 2.

158. Nelson, “Meeting Minutes,” January 10, 1910, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 3.

159. Nelson, “Meeting Minutes,” January 31, 1910, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 2.

160. Nelson, “Meeting Minutes,” January 8, 1910, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 1.

161. Nelson to Hechler, “Miscellaneous Interviews,” February 5–7, 1939, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 10.

162. Nelson to Hechler, “Miscellaneous Interviews,” February 5–7, 1939, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 10.

163. The Congressman had amended the proposal to reflect the passage of components of the reformers' agenda that the Speaker had successfully co-opted. Specifically, Norris removed the provision establishing legislative calendar days.

164. Congressional Record, 61st Congress, 2nd Sess., 1910, 45, 3296–97.

165. Congressional Record, 61st Congress, 2nd Sess., 1910, 45, 3304.

166. Atkinson, The Committee on Rules, 106–7.

167. Hechler, Insurgency, 70–72.

168. Bolles, Tyrant from Illinois, 217.

169. Norris, Fighting Liberal, 117–18.

170. Congressional Record, 61st Congress, 2nd Sess., 1910, 45, 3428.

171. Congressional Record, 61st Congress, 2nd Sess., 1910, 45, 3436. Joining the Insurgents were a score of formerly stand-pat Republicans—legislators who had previously refrained from participating in the rules fight because of their unwillingness to break party bonds.

172. As Schickler argues, however, the substance and outcome of this reform effort reflected the competing interests of the Insurgent-Democratic coalition. Though the Insurgents succeeded in removing Cannon from the Rules Committee, Democratic interests precluded further reform of the sort the bloc had initially advocated. Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism, 83.

173. Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism, 106–7.

174. Nelson to Hechler, “Miscellaneous Interviews,” February 5–7, 1939, WHS, Nelson Papers, Box 10, p. 11; Schickler, Disjointed Pluralism, 81.