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“Policy Feedbacks” and Political Change: Contrasting Reagan and Thatcher's Pension-Reform Initiatives*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 December 2008

Paul Pierson
Paul Pierson
Affiliation:
Harvard University
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Extract

For those interested in understanding the role of government in modern life, important public policies have long been objects of close scrutiny. Traditionally, however, policies were treated only as outcomes that needed to be explained. More recently, there has been growing interest in the political consequences of policy development. Policies are no longer seen simply as effects, with attention focused on why these policies emerged. Policies have important repercussions as well: once adopted, they restructure the political and social environment that produced them.

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Articles
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Studies in American Political Development , Volume 6 , Issue 2 , Fall 1992 , pp. 359 - 390
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1992

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References

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50. Author's calculations from data in Cmnd 9691, Technical Annex, Tables p1, p3, and p5; Hansard, February 21, 1986, Col. 384–88w, Tables P1A, P3A. and P5A: Hansard, January 17, 1986, Col. 743–44w.

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78. Interestingly, within political science the idea of “lock-ins” (though focusing on institutions rather than policies) has mainly been utilized in the field of international relations. See, for example, Keohane, Robert O., After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 100–106Google Scholar. Keohane draws on Arthur Stinchcombe's analysis of “sunk costs.” See Stinchcombe, , Constructing Social Theories (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1968), pp. 120–125Google Scholar.

79. Bachrach, Peter and Baratz, Morton, “Two Faces of Power,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 56, 1962, pp. 947–952CrossRefGoogle Scholar. This is one reason why comparative analysis is helpful for highlighting the political consequences of policy “lock-ins.” An analyst needs a comparative case where “lock-in” has not occurred to identify the political effects of policy feedbacks.

80. See Weaver, R. Kent, “The Politics of Blame Avoidance,” Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 61, 10–12 1986, pp. 371–398CrossRefGoogle Scholar.