Welfare reform gave the U.S. states the opportunity to engage in second-order devolution (SOD), which allows local governments to exercise more discretion in the implementation of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. Proponents of welfare decentralization insist that local governments better understand the needs of the poor and are therefore able to implement TANF more effectively. Nevertheless, opponents argue that decentralization could lead to a “race to the bottom” and, thus, SOD might lead to more restrictive TANF implementation. We investigate these competing claims by examining how differences in decentralization affect (1) TANF caseload decline, (2) the use of sanctions, and (3) several work-related outcomes among recipients. Based on a series of state-level analyses, we find that SOD states experienced a greater degree of caseload decline than non-SOD states. In addition, SOD states were more likely to use punitive policy tools, such as TANF sanctions. However, we also find that SOD states display marginally better TANF performance, as reflected in higher rates of employment exits and earnings gains among TANF recipients. Thus, we find support for both sides of the decentralization debate.

Over the past two decades, campaigns for judicial elections in the U.S. states have become larger in scale. We analyze the impact of this development on voters' choices between candidates. Using a series of post-election surveys of voters in fourteen contests for the Ohio Supreme Court over twenty years, we probe the relationship between the amount of media coverage and campaign spending in a contest and the level of partisan voting. We find that in a state in which candidates' party affiliations are not listed on the ballot, high-visibility contests for judgeships produce more partisan voting than do lower-visibility contests. That effect was more pronounced for voters with greater political knowledge. These findings indicate that, at least in one state setting, high-visibility judicial contests have the effect of making more voters aware of basic information about the candidates, and that information informs their voting choices.

All 50 U.S. states currently regulate lobbying. Data restrictions, however, limit our understanding of the relationship between legislative lobbying laws and interest group influence within the legislative process over time. A comparable measure of these laws published in the summer 2005 issue of State Politics and Policy Quarterly suggests a dynamic analysis. The early 1990s witnessed a marked increase in the stringency of state legislative lobbying regulations. This article examines how lobbying regulation impacted interest group influence across all 50 state legislatures in 1995. I then determine whether changes in a state's regulations affected interest group influence over time from 1990 to 1995. Evidence suggests that increased regulation reduces influence both across and within states over time.

While the dynamics of trust in the national government have been shown to be responsive to political events and governmental performance, less is known about why the public's trust in U.S. state and local government rises and falls over time. We examine the trends in confidence in subnational government using an aggregate level approach. First, we consider whether levels of trust are defined by reactions to the national government. Second, we consider how factors specific to subnational politics such as governmental performance and the quality of community life influence trust. Using measures of confidence in state and local government from 1968 to 2004 and a set of error correction models, we find evidence for both accounts. Confidence in subnational governments reflects national trends such as economic tides and public preferences for more or less government, but also exhibits unique dynamics explained by factors specific to subnational politics.

As numerous pieces of past research have shown, the opinions of state residents significantly influence the politics and policies of the 50 U.S. states. This type of research flourished when aggregate-level indicators of overall state ideology and partisanship were devised from pooled national public opinion polls. This article provides an extension of such research by devising, from state surveys, aggregate-level measures of the ideological and partisan orientations of racial and ethnic minority voters, as well as that of white voters. These new data demonstrate that the opinions of African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans vary across the states, and in many cases, significantly alter the political orientations of a state's citizenry. These data will facilitate research that incorporates racial and ethnic diversity in the study of public opinion, U.S. state politics, and policy.