The scholarly exchange over approaches to measuring public preferences in the American states dates back several years. This introduction to the debate attempts to provide broad perspective on how scholars have conceptualized and measured policy mood among state mass publics in the past and the implications of those choices for theoretical and empirical questions in state politics. We frame the discussion around two questions: (1) what is the concept to be measured? and (2) how does the concept fit with the research question? We conclude with some insight on the future of the debate and its implications for state politics research.

Enns and Koch question the validity of the Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson measure of state policy mood and defend the validity of the Enns and Koch measure on two grounds. First, they claim policy mood has become more conservative in the South over time; we present empirical evidence to the contrary: policy mood became more liberal in the South between 1980 and 2010. Second, Enns and Koch argue that an indicator’s lack of face validity in cross-sectional comparisons is irrelevant when judging the measure’s suitability in the most common form of pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis. We show their argument is logically flawed, except under highly improbable circumstances. We also demonstrate, by replicating several published studies, that statistical results about the effect of state policy mood can vary dramatically depending on which of the two mood measures is used, making clear that a researcher’s measurement choice can be highly consequential.

To fully understand state policy outcomes or elections in the US, we need valid over-time measures of state-level public opinion. We contribute to the research on measuring state public opinion in two ways. First, we respond to Berry, Fording, Hanson, and Crofoot’s (BFHC) critique of Enns and Koch’s measure of state policy mood. We show that when BFHC’s analysis is performed using the same states and examining annual change, it validates the Enns and Koch measure and raises questions about the Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson measure. Second, we generate a new measure of state policy mood building on Enns and Koch’s approach. The new measure has even better properties than the previous measure and relates to state presidential vote and state policy liberalism in similar ways to Caughey and Warshaw’s measure of state economic liberalism. We conclude with recommendations for using the various direct measures of state public opinion.

This article presents a short summary of the conclusions we report in a longer manuscript (available in our Supplementary Material) subjecting Lagodny et al.’s new measure of state policy mood to the same set of face validity and construct validity tests we applied earlier to Enns and Koch’s measure. We encourage readers to read this longer manuscript, which contains not only the conclusions herein, but also the evidence justifying these conclusions, before accepting or rejecting any claims we make. Our results show that the characteristics of Enns and Koch’s measure that led us to be doubtful that it is valid are also present in Lagodny et al.’s new measure – leaving us just as doubtful that Lagodny et al.’s measure is valid. Moreover, the low correlation between Lagodny et al.’s measure and Enns and Koch’s measure, combined with evidence from replications of seven published studies that the two measures frequently yield quite different inferences about the impact of policy mood on public policy, indicate that Lagodny et al.’s claim that both their measure and Enns and Koch’s measure are valid is wrong; either neither measure is valid, or one is valid and the other is not. Moreover, extending the replications to include not only Lagodny et al.’s and Enns and Koch’s measures, but also Berry et al.’s measure and Caughey and Warshaw’s measure of mass economic liberalism, shows that each of the four measures yields a substantive conclusion about the effect of policy mood that is dramatically different than each of the other three measures. This suggests that the goal of developing a measure of state policy mood that would be widely accepted as valid remains elusive.

This article concludes an exchange on developing and improving longitudinal estimates of state-level public opinion in the United States by introducing the U.S. Partisanship and Presidential Approval Dataset, which combines more than 1.1 million survey responses from 1948 to 2020 into a single harmonized “mega poll.”

Former president Trump made hundreds of candidate endorsements in the 2022 Republican primaries. The state of Georgia garnered outsized attention because it was ground zero for Trump’s false accusations of a stolen 2020 presidential election. Trump endorsed several candidates in Georgia’s May 2022 GOP primary contests, including candidates challenging Governor Brian Kemp and Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger, incumbents drawing Trump’s ire for upholding the 2020 outcome favoring Joe Biden. In a survey of likely Georgia GOP primary voters randomizing whether they are told which candidate Trump endorsed in five statewide races (governor, US Senate, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, and insurance commissioner), our analysis shows substantial variability in the influence of Trump’s endorsement. With scant prior information in low-profile contests (e.g., insurance commissioner), the Trump endorsement has a substantial impact, whereas it is rendered ineffectual in the most high-profile race for governor. Thus, the findings demonstrate the remarkable variability of a Trump endorsement, which is primarily contingent upon the salience of a specific race.

What is the effect of divided government on issue attention in state legislatures? Much of the research on divided government examines how it affects the enactment of significant legislation but does not consider other effects on legislative behavior. In this article, I propose a new theory of the relationship between divided government and legislative activity. Regardless of partisan control, reelection-minded legislators face pressure to deliver benefits to voters, yet divided government can make substantive policy change difficult. As a result of these competing pressures, under divided government legislators increasingly turn their focus to bills that benefit their local constituents, which are seen as easier to enact and allow them to engage in advertising, credit claiming, and position taking. Consistent with this theory, I find that under divided government, legislators introduce bills at the same rate, but the type of legislation introduced shifts away from statewide policy changes and towards district-specific legislation.

Political scientists have largely come to a consensus that “most citizens are politically uninformed” (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1997), but even with increased attention to state-level representation and electoral behavior, political scientists know surprisingly little themselves regarding what Americans know about state politics. Past studies of state political knowledge examine narrow domains of knowledge and make few comparisons between individuals’ understanding of national and state politics. To provide a more comprehensive account of Americans’ state political knowledge, I conducted a novel national survey that included over 30 political knowledge questions. In a descriptive and exploratory analysis, I show Americans demonstrated more knowledge about who their Governor is but less knowledge about who represents them in the state legislature, state government institutions, and the state economy, particularly compared to their knowledge of federal politics. The different levels of political knowledge across different domains and levels of government raise concerns for statehouse democracy and should be considered before testing theories at the state level. To guide future research and surveys, I identify political knowledge questions that discriminate well between those who know little, some, and a lot about state politics across different domains of political knowledge.

Interest groups and policy advocates often view the initiative process as a way to circumvent a gridlocked state legislative process. A major assumption behind this strategy is that this alternative path can be successful. We theorize that the same conflict and lack of consensus that killed the legislation in the legislative process may resurface in the electorate and jeopardize the measure’s chances of success at the ballot box. We test this proposition on all initiatives in California from 1912 to 2020 and on a smaller subset of the data that controls for campaign spending and the economy. We find clear and consistent evidence that voter support for initiatives, especially fiscal initiatives, declines under periods of divided government. In addition, interactive models show that increasing levels of party polarization exacerbate these effects. We conclude by discussing the implications of these results for the debate about whether the initiative process makes states more responsive to constituent opinion.

We build upon Brace, Langer, and Hall’s (2000, The Journal of Politics 62: 387–413) original measure of American state supreme court justice ideology – the PAJID scores. To do so, we gather new data on 1,666 state supreme court justices who served between 1970 and 2019 and update the PAJID scores throughout this period. Testing indicates that PAJID scores are a valid measure of state supreme court justices’ policy preferences and compare favorably, though less efficiently, to others such as Bonica and Woodruff (2015, The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 31: 472–98) and Windett, Harden, and Hall (2015, Political Analysis 23: 461–9). Given limited data availability for other ideological measures pre-1990 and post-2010, we conclude that these updated PAJID scores should prove attractive to scholars studying state courts during these periods and among those who desire additional state supreme court ideological data for robustness checks.