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The Role of Constituency, Party, and Industry in Pennsylvania's Act 13

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 January 2021

Bradford H. Bishop  and
Mark R. Dudley
Bradford H. Bishop*
Affiliation:
Wheaton College, Norton, MA, USA
Mark R. Dudley
Affiliation:
Duke University, Durham, NC, USA
*
Bradford H. Bishop, Wheaton College, 26 East Main Street, Norton, MA 02766, USA. Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

While a large body of research exists regarding the role of industry money on roll-call voting in the U.S. Congress, there is surprisingly little scholarship pertaining to industry influence on state politics. This study fills this void in an analysis of campaign donations and voting during passage of Act 13 in Pennsylvania during 2011 and 2012. After collecting information about natural gas production in state legislative districts, we estimate a series of multivariate models aimed at uncovering whether campaign donations contributed to a more favorable policy outcome for industry. Our findings indicate that campaign donations played a small but systematic role in consideration of the controversial legislation, which represented one of the first and most important state-level regulatory reforms for the hydraulic fracturing industry.

Keywords

interest groups and electionspolitical behaviorparties in legislaturesparties and interest groupspolitical action committeeslegislative behaviorlegislative politicsroll-call votinglobbyingenvironmental policypublic policy
Type
Research Article
Information
State Politics & Policy Quarterly , Volume 17 , Issue 2 , June 2017 , pp. 154 - 179
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2017

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