Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-q99xh Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-30T23:10:37.808Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Oversight Capabilities in the States: Are Professionalized Legislatures Better at Getting What They Want?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 January 2021

Frederick J. Boehmke  and
Charles R. Shipan
Frederick J. Boehmke*
Affiliation:
The University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, USA
Charles R. Shipan
Affiliation:
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
*
Frederick J. Boehmke, The University of Iowa, 341 Schaeffer Hall, Iowa City, IA 52242, USA. Email: [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Once legislators delegate policymaking responsibility to executive agencies, they have the ability to oversee and potentially influence the actions of these agencies. In this article, we examine, first, whether the actions of agencies reflect the preferences of legislators, and second, whether legislative professionalism enhances the ability of legislatures to influence executive agencies and obtain more preferred outcomes. We study these effects in the context of annual nursing home inspections performed by state administrators and make two predictions. First, as Democratic legislators will, on average, prefer a more activist role for government and for government agencies, we should see agencies issue more citations for violations of regulations when state legislatures are Democratic and fewer when they are Republican. Second, as more professionalized legislatures are better able to monitor the agency inspectors' actions and inspection outcomes, this effect should be intensified for legislatures with greater professionalism. We find support for both arguments: agencies faced with more Democrats in the legislature will be more activist, and this effect is strengthened for more professional legislatures.

Keywords

legislaturesbureaucracyoversightnursing homes
Type
Research Article
Information
State Politics & Policy Quarterly , Volume 15 , Issue 3: Special Issue Title: Regulation in the States , September 2015 , pp. 366 - 386
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2015

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Aberbach, Joel D. 1990. Keeping a Watchful Eye. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.Google Scholar
Baranowski, Michael. 2001. “Legislative Professionalism and Influence on State Agencies.” Politics & Policy 29 (1): 147–61..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bawn, Kathleen. 1997. “Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and the Committee System.” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 13 (1): 101–26..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Berry, William D., Rindquist, Evan J., Fording, Richard C., and Hanson, Russell L.. 1998. “Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the American States, 1960–1993.” American Journal of Political Science 42 (1): 327–48..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Berry, William D., Rindquist, Evan J., Fording, Richard C., Hanson, Russell L., and Klarner, Carl E.. 2010. “Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the American States: A Reappraisal.” American Journal of Political Science 10 (2): 117–35..Google Scholar
Boehmke, Frederick J. 2007, April. “The Subversion of Administrative Oversight: Campaign Contributions and Nursing Home Inspections.” Paper presented at the 2007 Midwest Political Science Association's Annual Conference, Chicago, IL.Google Scholar
Bowblis, John R. 2011. “Staffing Ratios and Quality: An Analysis of Minimum Direct Care Staffing Requirements for Nursing Homes.” Health Services Research 46 (5): 1495–516..CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Calvert, Randall, McCubbins, Mathew D., and Weingast, Barry R.. 1989. “A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion.” American Journal of Political Science 33 (3): 588–611..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Epstein, David, and O'Halloran, Sharyn. 1999. Delegating Powers. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ferejohn, John, and Shipan, Charles. 1989. “Congressional Influence on Administrative Agencies: A Case Study of Telecommunications Policy.” In Congress Reconsidered, eds., Dodd, Lawrence C. and Oppenheimer, Bruce I., 4th ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Pp. 393–412.Google Scholar
Ferejohn, John, and Shipan, Charles. 1990. “Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy.” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 6:1–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gerber, Brian J., and Teske, Paul. 2000. “Regulatory Policymaking in the American States: A Review of Theories and Evidence.” Political Research Quarterly 53 (4): 849–86..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Government Accountability Office. 2005. Despite Increased Oversight, Challenges Remain in Ensuring High-Quality Care and Resident Safety (GAO-08-517) Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-08-517/content-detail.html.Google Scholar
Government Accountability Office. 2008. Federal Monitoring Surveys Demonstrate Continued Understatement of Serious Care Problems and CMS Oversight Weaknesses (GAO-06-117) Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-06-117/content-detail.html.Google Scholar
Grabowski, David C., and Castle, Nicholas G.. 2004. “Nursing Homes with Persistent High and Low Quality.” Medical Care Research and Review 61 (1): 89–115..CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Grassley, Charles E. Letter to McClellan, Mark. July 7, 2004. Accessed June 15 at: https://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/chairman/release/?id=5ba3a0c8-e249-438c-8ff7-aefaa1a9c324.Google Scholar
Hall, Richard L., and Miler, Kris C.. 2008. “What Happens after the Alarm? Interest Groups Subsidies to Legislative Overseers.” Journal of Politics 70 (4): 990–1005..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harrington, Charlene, and Carrillo, Helen. 1999. “The Regulation and Enforcement of Federal Nursing Home Standards, 1991–1997.” Medical Care Research and Review 56 (4): 471–94..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harrington, Charlene, Mullan, Joseph T., and Carrillo, Helen. 2004. “State Nursing Home Enforcement Systems.” Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 29 (1): 43–73..CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Harrington, Charlene, Zimmerman, David, Karon, Sarita L., Robinson, James, and Beutel, Patricia. 2000. “Nursing Home Staffing and Its Relationship to Deficiencies.” Journal of Gerontology 55B (5): S278–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Huber, John D., and Shipan, Charles R.. 2000. “The Costs of Control: Legislators, Agencies, and Transaction Costs.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 25 (February): 25–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Huber, John D., and Shipan, Charles R.. 2002. Deliberate Discretion: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Huber, John D., and Shipan, Charles R.. 2006. “Politics, Delegation, and Bureaucracy.” In The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, eds. Weingast, Barry R. and Wittman, Donald. New York: Oxford University Press. Pp. 256–72.Google Scholar
Huber, John D., Shipan, Charles R., and Pfahler, Madeleine. 2001. “Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy.” American Journal of Political Science 45 (2): 330–45..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Johnson, Cathy M., and Meier, Kenneth J.. 1990. “The Wages of Sin: Taxing America's Legal Vices.” Western Political Quarterly 43:577–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ka, Sangjoon, and Teske, Paul. 2002. “Ideology and Professionalism: Electricity Regulation and Deregulation over Time in the American States.” American Politics Research 30(3): 323–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and McCubbins, Mathew D.. 1991. The Logic of Delegation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Konisky, David M., and Reenock, Christopher. 2013. “Compliance Bias and Environmental (In) Justice.” Journal of Politics 75 (2): 506–19..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krause, George A. 2010. “Legislative Delegation of Authority to Bureaucratic Agencies.” In The Oxford Handbook of American Bureaucracy, ed. Durant, Robert F.. New York: Oxford University Press. Pp. 521–44.Google Scholar
Lewis, David E. 2003. Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design. Stanford: Stanford University Press.Google Scholar
McCubbins, Mathew D. 1985. “Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure.” American Journal of Political Science 29:721–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McCubbins, Mathew D., Noll, Roger G., and Weingast, Barry R.. 1989. “Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies.” Virginia Law Review 75:431–482.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McCubbins, Mathew D., and Schwartz, Thomas. 1984. “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols vs. Fire Alarms.” American Journal of Political Science 28 (1): 165–79..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McGrath, Robert. 2013a. “Congressional Oversight Hearings and Policy Control.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 38 (3): 349–76..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McGrath, Robert. 2013b. “Legislatures, Courts, and Statutory Control of the Bureaucracy across the U.S. States.” State Politics & Policy Quarterly 13 (3): 373–97..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moe, Terry M. 1982. “Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration.” American Journal of Political Science 26 (May): 197–224.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moe, Terry M. 1985. “Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation.” American Political Science Review 79 (December): 1094–116.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Moe, Terry M. 1989. “The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure.” In Can the Government Govern?, eds. Chubb, John E. and Peterson, Paul E.. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. Pp. 267–329.Google Scholar
Mooney, Christopher Z. 1994. “Measuring US State Legislative Professionalism: An Evaluation of Five Indices.” State & Local Government Review: 70–78.Google Scholar
Office of the Inspector General. 2003. Nursing Home Deficiency Trends and Survey and Certification Process Consistency (OEI-02-01-00600). https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-02-01-00600.pdfGoogle Scholar
Ogul, Morris S. 1976. Congress Oversees the Bureaucracy. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.Google Scholar
Perry, Charles. 1981. “Energy Conservation Policy in the American States: An Attempt at Explanation.” Social Science Quarterly 62:540–54.Google Scholar
Poggione, Sarah, and Reenock, Christopher. 2004. “Agency Design as an Ongoing Tool of Bureaucratic Influence.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 29 (August): 383–406.Google Scholar
Poggione, Sarah, and Reenock, Christopher. 2008. “Explaining Legislators' Strategies of Ongoing Bureaucratic Oversight.” Working paper, Florida State University, Tallahassee.Google Scholar
Potoski, Matthew. 1999. “Managing Uncertainty through Bureaucratic Design: Administrative Procedures and State Air Pollution Control Agencies.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 9 (4): 623–40..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Potoski, Matthew, and Woods, Neal D.. 2001. “Designing State Clean Air Agencies: Administrative Procedures and Bureaucratic Autonomy.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 11 (2): 203–22..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Scher, Seymour. 1963. “Conditions for Legislative Control.” Journal of Politics 25 (August): 526–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Scholz, John T. 1991. “Cooperative Regulatory Enforcement and the Politics of Administrative Effectiveness.” American Political Science Review 85 (1): 115–36..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Scholz, John T., and Wei, Feng Heng. 1986. “Regulatory Enforcement in a Federalist System.” American Political Science Review 80:1249–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shipan, Charles R. 1997. Designing Judicial Review. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
Shipan, Charles R. 2000. “The Legislative Design of Judicial Review: A Formal Analysis.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 12 (3): 269–304..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shipan, Charles R. 2004. “Regulatory Regimes, Agency Actions, and the Conditional Nature of Political Influence.” American Political Science Review 98 (August): 467–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shor, Boris, Berry, Christopher, and McCarty, Nolan. 2011. “Replication Data For: A Bridge to Somewhere: Mapping State and Congressional Ideology on a Cross-Institutional Common Space.” http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/15682.Google Scholar
Shor, Boris, and McCarty, Nolan. 2011. “The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures.” American Political Science Review 105 (3): 530–51..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sigelman, Lee, and Smith, Roland. 1980. “Consumer Regulation in the American States.” Social Science Quarterly 61:58–70.Google Scholar
Squire, Peverill. 2007. “Measuring State Legislative Professionalism: The Squire Index Revisited.” State Politics & Policy Quarterly 7 (2): 211–27..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Steunenberg, Bernard. 1992. “Congress, Bureaucracy, and Regulatory Policy-Making.” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 8 (2): 673–94..Google Scholar
Teske, Paul. 1990. After Divestiture: The Political Economy of State Telecommunications Regulation. Albany: SUNY Press.Google Scholar
VanSickle-Ward, Rachel. 2010. “The Politics of Precision: Specificity in State Mental Health Policy.” State and Local Government Review 42 (1): 3–21..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
VanSickle-Ward, Rachel. 2014. The Devil Is in the Details: Understanding the Causes of Policy Specificity and Ambiguity. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.Google Scholar
Volden, Craig. 2002. “Delegating Power to Bureaucracies: Evidence from the States.” Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 18 (1): 187–220..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Walshe, Kieran, and Harrington, Charlene. 2002. “Regulation of Nursing Facilities in the United States: An Analysis of Resources and Performance of State Survey Agencies.” The Gerontologist 42 (4): 475–86..CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Waterman, Richard W., Rouse, Amelia A., and Wright, Robert L.. 2004. Bureaucrats, Politics, and the Environment. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weingast, Barry R., and Moran, Mark J.. 1983. “Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control: Regulatory Policymaking by the FTC.” Journal of Political Economy 91 (5): 765–800..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Whitford, Andrew B. 2002. “Bureaucratic Discretion, Agency Structure, and Democratic Responsiveness: The Case of the United States Attorneys.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 12 (1): 3–27..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wood, B. Dan. 1990. “Does Politics Make a Difference at the EEOC?” American Journal of Political Science 34 (2): 503–30..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wood, B. Dan. 1992. “Modeling Federal Implementation as a System: The Clean Air Case.” American Journal of Political Science 36 (1): 40–67..CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wood, B. Dan, and Bohte, John. 2004. “Political Transaction Costs and the Politics of Administrative Design.” Journal of Politics 66 (February): 176–202.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wood, B. Dan, and Waterman, Richard W.. 1994. Bureaucratic Dynamic: The Role of Bureaucracy in a Democracy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.Google Scholar
Woods, Neal D., and Baranowski, Michael. 2006. “Legislative Professionalism and Influence on State Agencies: The Effects of Resources and Careerism.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 31 (4): 585–609..CrossRefGoogle Scholar