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Mediated Density: The Indirect Relationship between U.S. State Public Policy and PACs

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 January 2021

Jennifer Benz ,
Justin H. Kirkland ,
Virginia Gray ,
David Lowery ,
Jennifer Sykes  and
Mary Deason
Jennifer Benz*
Affiliation:
University of Chicago, IL, USA
Justin H. Kirkland
Affiliation:
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA
Virginia Gray
Affiliation:
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA
David Lowery
Affiliation:
Pennsylvania State University, University Park, USA
Jennifer Sykes
Affiliation:
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA
Mary Deason
Affiliation:
University of Mississippi, University, USA
*
Jennifer Benz, University of Chicago, Public Health Research Department, National Opinion Research Center, Chicago, IL 60637 Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

How does the demand for lobbying reflected by government policy activity influence the use of lobbying strategies and tactics? The authors examine this question by assessing how the complexity of the policy space affects the political action committee (PAC) system. They hypothesize that the complexity of the policy space indirectly affects the size and activity of the PAC system through its direct effect on interest organization density. The authors test this hypothesis within the health sector using a unique data set that connects individual interest organizations registered to lobby U.S. state legislatures with active PACs in the state. It appears that social, economic, and political measures of policy space complexity influence the size of the lobbying community, which in turn influences the size and activity of the PAC community.

Keywords

interest groupspolitical action committeespublic policypopulation ecology
Type
Research Article
Information
State Politics & Policy Quarterly , Volume 11 , Issue 4 , December 2011 , pp. 440 - 459
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2011

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