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Lobbying Across Venues: An Issue-Tracing Approach

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 January 2021

Charlotte Jourdain*
Affiliation:
University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
Simon Hug
Affiliation:
University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
Frédéric Varone
Affiliation:
University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
*
Charlotte Jourdain, Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Geneva, Unimail – 40 Bvd. du Pont d'Arve, CH-1211 Geneva, Switzerland. Email: [email protected]

Abstract

This study examines lobbying activity during four California policymaking processes and through the four institutional venues available in that state: the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, and the ballot initiative. It shows that past advocacy activity explains future mobilization on the same policy issue. Groups that fail to reach their policy goals will be more likely to mobilize later if the policy process changes venue, compared with those that have achieved their policy preference. Thus, the availability of multiple venues provides a counterweight to the possible advantages received by certain group types in each venue. Furthermore, public interest groups are more likely to mobilize across venues and repeatedly within a venue, while business groups are less likely to do so.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2017

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