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Legislative Organization Theory and Committee Preference Outliers in State Senates

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 January 2021

David W. Prince  and
L. Marvin Overby
David W. Prince
Affiliation:
Bellarmine University
L. Marvin Overby
Affiliation:
University of Missouri
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Abstract

Recently, several studies of Congress and the state legislatures have found evidence to support the information theory of legislative organization, that is, that legislatures develop committees whose characteristics reflect those of the parent body so as to acquire unbiased policy and political information. However, most of these studies have been conducted on the lower, larger legislative chambers. Senates, as smaller bodies that often follow the lead of legislation originating in their lower chambers, may have less need for unbiased information, perhaps allowing those bodies to develop more outlying, unrepresentative committees. We test this hypothesis in 42 state senates and find that unrepresentative committees also tend to be the exception in these upper chambers. Furthermore, as shown in previous studies of state house committees, the frequency of committee outliers in state senates appears to be idiosyncratic, with cultural, political, and institutional variables being unable to account for their observed patterns. While results support the information theory of legislative organization, evidence of outliers among party delegations on committees in these senates provides some support for the party-dominant theory.

Type
Research Article
Information
State Politics & Policy Quarterly , Volume 5 , Issue 1 , Spring 2005 , pp. 68 - 87
Copyright
Copyright © The American Political Science Association, 2005

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