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Fiscal Accountability in Gubernatorial Elections

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 January 2021

Jeff Cummins*
Affiliation:
California State University, Fresno, Fresno, CA, USA
Thomas T. Holyoke
Affiliation:
California State University, Fresno, Fresno, CA, USA
*
Jeff Cummins, California State University, Fresno, 2225 East San Ramon M/S MF 19, Fresno, CA 93740-8029, USA. Email: [email protected]

Abstract

Although significant research has been conducted on economic voting in gubernatorial elections, very few explore the impact of state fiscal conditions in these elections. The little that has been done yields conflicting results regarding the effects of state spending and found that governors are not held responsible for a state's overall fiscal health. Our study examines the impact of spending and fiscal health on gubernatorial elections from 1982 to 2013. We find evidence that voters reward incumbent parties for fiscal health and spending growth and that unified government and stronger executive budget powers enhance fiscal accountability for these outcomes. These findings contradict previous research that suggests voters punish one or both parties for higher spending. We conclude by discussing the implications of this research for the debate about the balance of powers between the executive and legislative branches.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1969 by The Modern Language Association of America

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