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The Institutional Context of Crossfiling

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2016

Stanley D. Hopper
Stanley D. Hopper*
Affiliation:
California State University, Los Angeles
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Extract

V. O. Key’s proposition that one-party politics in the American states has been destructive of both the dominant and minor parties in such systems fits California’s political experience very nicely. From 1893 to 1932 California Republicans captured almost all statewide offices and they maintained huge legislative majorities. Furthermore, both parties entered the 1930’s with little institutionalized capacity for performing the basic nominating and campaigning functions. It appears, therefore, that the notorious weakness of political parties in California could be accounted for in terms of Key’s theories of the debilitating impact of one-party politics. Understandably, however, this line of speculation raises questions in the minds of those students of California politics who are aware of the several studies that particularly credit crossfiling for the weakness of California parties at mid-century. Consequently, the purpose of this article is to demonstrate the relationship between intensity of interparty competition and crossfiling in California politics during the first half of this century. In establishing this relationship, this study first shows that crossfiling did not become a general practice until after the end of California’s one-party era (1893-1932). The analysis then goes on to demonstrate that, during the one-party 1920’s, crossfiling occurred more often in the relatively competitive areas of the state than in the most profoundly one-party areas. Finally, a deviant case analysis develops the correspondence between the incidence of successful crossfiling (winning both parties’ primaries) and the relative competitiveness of types of offices.

Type
Research Article
Information
Social Science History , Volume 1 , Issue 1 , Fall 1976 , pp. 1 - 19
Copyright
Copyright © Social Science History Association 1976 

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References

Notes

1 Key, V. O. Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: 1950)Google Scholar, esp. Chs. 13-14; American State Politics (New York: 1956), Chs. 4 and 6; Parties, Politics, and Pressure Groups (5th edition) (New York: 1964), 446-449.

2 Williams, R. Hal, The Democratic Party and California Politics 1880-1896 (Stanford, California: 1973)Google Scholar; Rogin, Michael, “California Populism and the ‘System of 1896,’” Western Political Quarterly 22 (March, 1969), 189–196CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Delmatier, Royce D. et al., The Rumble of California Politics 1848-1970 (New York: 1970), Chs. 7-8.Google Scholar

3 Hopper, Stanley D., “Fragmentation of the California Republican Party in the One-Party Era, 1893-1932,” Western Political Quarterly 28 (June, 1975), 372–386.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 The principal studies of crossfiling are: Binkley, Robert W., Double-Filing in Primary Elections (1945 Legislative Problems, No. 5), (Berkeley: 1945)Google Scholar; McHenry, Dean E., “Crossfiling of Political Candidates in California,” The Annals, Vol. 24 (November, 1946), 226, 231Google Scholar; Burke, Robert E., Cross-Filing in California Elections: 1914-1946 (Master’s Thesis, University of California, Berkeley: 1947)Google Scholar; McHenry, Dean R., “Invitation to Masquerade,” National Municipal Review 39, (May, 1950 228–232CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hazen, Evelyn, Cross Filing in Primary Elections (1951 Legislative Problems, No. 4) (Berkeley: 1951)Google Scholar; Rhoads, James B., A History of the Cross-Filing Practice in California (Master’s Thesis, University of California, Berkeley: 1952Google Scholar Pitchell, Robert J., “The Electoral System and Voting Behavior: The Case of California’s Cross-Filing,” Western Political Quarterly 12 (June, 1959), 459–484.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5 Pitchell, “The Electoral System…,” 463.

6 From 1930 through 1938 the Republicans suffered a net loss of more than 300,000 registrants from 1,638,575 down to 1,293,929 while the Democrat increased over four-fold from 456,096 to 2,144,036.

7 Mowry, George E., The California Progressives (Chicago: 1963; reprinted from the 1951 University of California Press edition), 192–194.Google Scholar

8 Findley, James C., “Cross-Filing and the Progressive Movement in California Politics,” Western Political Quarterly 12 (September, 1959), 702.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9 Ibid., 704; Mowry, 193.

10 The principal academic study of the party politics of this period concluded that crossfiling was particularly helpful to the Progressives: Dickson, Mildred E., “Third” Party Technique: the Progressive Party in California, 1912-1916 (Unpub. M.A. Thesis, University of California, Berkeley: 1937), 41.Google Scholar

11 Pitchell, 470. Pitchell’s statement is based on data that could not fully test the proposition because there were no durable one-party constitutencies in California during the 1932-1950 period to which he directed that part of his analysis.

12 They were not reapportioned between 1911 and 1929; consequently, no more than four counties are lumped into any one Assembly District. Later reapportionments of this “popular” house confined about two dozen of the less populour counties to only four of the eighty districts.

13 Use of multiple-district counties as units of analysis unfortunately minimizes the crossfiling performance of urban districts that might respond peculiarly to their own levels of competition. This is offset to the extent that the candidate (potential crossfilers) were likely conditioned in part by the political tenor of the broader community; thus San Francisco, Los Angeles, Alameda, Sonoma, Sacramento, San Joaquin, Santa Clara, Fresno, San Bernardino, and San Diego counties are treated as single entities.

14 1930 was omitted because a new apportionment became effective and changed the outlines of several “areas.”

15 These cutting points permitted inclusion of all but 10 of the 39 “areas. “Areas” in which the GOP enjoyed an average registration margin under 30 percent were: Districts 1 (Del Norte and Siskiyou Counties), 4 (Tehama, Glenn, and Colus Counties), 47 (Mariposa, Tuolumne, Mono, and Inyo Counties), 49 (Merced and Madera Counties); Fresno County which included Districts 50-52; and Kings, Tul are, Kern, and Imperial which were single-district counties. The “over 40 percent group of “areas” was composed of: Humboldt, Mendocino, Napa and Lake (combined into District 11), Sonoma (Districts 12-13), Sacramento (Districts 14-15) Marin, Contra Costa, San Joaquin (Districts 19-20), San Francisco (Districts 21-33) Alameda (Districts 34-41), San Mateo, Santa Cruz, Santa Clara (Districts 44-45) Santa Barbara, Ventura, Los Angeles (Districts 61-75), Orange, Riverside, and San Diego (Districts 79-80) Counties.

16 Because of peculiarities of incumbent advantages, use of percent of candidates crossfiled was inadequate. A single incumbent who might crossfile for any reason and be unopposed for all of the good reasons that find them unopposed could give a district a score approaching 100 percent. Therefore, in order to reduce the impact of a single officeholder on any individual district, the average number of crossfiled candidacies was selected.

17 The average score of crossfilers per district per year for the thirty-nine areas was 0.95; hence, the choice of a score of 1.00 crossfilers per district per year seemed adequate to discriminate between “areas” with greater or lesser crossfiling propensities. As a matter of fact, if any score between 0.75 and 1.25 had been used as the breaking point in place of 1.00, the proportions of areas that conform to the hypothesis would have been the same. All “areas” scoring between 0.75 and 1.25 lay between 30 and 40 percent in their GOP margins.

18 Chinn, Ronald E., Democratic Party Politics in California, 1920-1956 (Unpub. Ph.D. Thesis, University of California, Berkeley: 1958), 47.Google Scholar

19 Another deviant, Sacramento, also belied its massive Republican registration in its support for La Follette in 1924 and in its refusal to give President Hoover more than a bare 50.2 percent of the vote in 1928.

20 Crossfiled victory scores for each “area” are simply the percent of districts won by crossfiling in each area. In the First Assembly District (Del Norte and Siskiyou Counties), for instance, only the 1928 election was settled by the primaries. Therefore, with only one crossfiled victory in four years, the score for that “area” was 25 percent. The Los Angeles score was based on four crossfiled victories in fifteen districts during the four year period (four crossflled successes in sixty opportunities for a 7 percent score). The average for the 39 “areas” was 45 percent.

21 San Francisco and Sacramento were again among the deviant “areas.”

22 Two other candidates were credited with crossfiled wins in 1922 and one in 1926; however, they were beneficiaries of write-in votes and a dearth of opposition from their own, as well as the Democratic, party.

23 Beginning in 1954, primary election ballots identified candidates by their party labels, and victories outside one’s own party primary fell off abruptly.

24 Proportions of the eighty assembly seats won at the primaries by formally crossfiled major party candidates were (by election years):

25 The modest proportions of crossfiled success in the three-party years are probably a product of the same factors that found relatively few candidates even bothering to crossfile. It is probable, too, that a three-party context frustrates crossfiled victory more effectively than does a two-party political environment. In a three-party race the successful crossfiler must win three primaries while his counterpart in two-party politics needs only two victories on primary day. Other things being equal, the odds probably ran more heavily against successful crossfiling in the earlier competitive period.

26 Percentages of Senate seats won by crossfilers ran as follows:

27 The proportions by election years were:

28 The proportion of Congressional Districts with incumbents seeking reelection exceeded the comparable portion of Assembly Districts as follows:

1922 through 1930 - average excess + 11.3 percent

1932 through 1938 - average excess + 8.2 percent

1940 through 1952 - average excess + 5.0 percent

29 The 1932-1938 averages for proportions of incumbents crossfiling were 66.5 percent for the Congressmen and 64.2 percent for the Assemblymen. In the late period (1940-1952) the averages were 97.5 and 96.4 respectively.

30 E.g., McHenry, Dean E., The Annals 248 (November, 1946), 230.Google Scholar

31 Pitchell, 471. The Pitchell study shows the percent of crossfiled victories won by incumbents according to the various types of offices for all years from 1914 through 1956.

32 Pitchell’s work suggests this very strongly. One of his tabular analyses shows markedly higher proportions of incumbent over nonincumbent victories for the House than for the State Senate or Assembly. From 1914 through 1956 Pitchell counts only seven nonincumbent crossfiled Congressional winners.

33 Their margin here was 35.6 percent—just over the previously noted 34.0 percent norm for 1922 through 1930.

34 While it was almost impossible to ascertain the true party affiliation of some candidates listed in the Democratic primaries, careful work (cross-comparisons) with the several issues of the Statement of the Vote for the various elections revealed enough definitely abandoned Democratic battle stations to test the hypothesis.

35 In the case of the Congressional Districts the figure could conceivably run as high as 54.5 percent (30/55).

36 The fact of his Republican identification helps a voter very little in discriminating between the Republican candidates in a Republican primary. Since, in one-party California, the Republican primary became the election, the significance of party loyalty (self-identification) of Republican voters was neutralized.

37 Both groups were apportioned according to 1910 population through 1928. A Congressional district therefore approximated four Senate Districts and seven Assembly Districts.

38 Both tabulations include a few Democratic incumbents; their number and fate were not significant in either house. Three primaries of 1930 pitting reapportioned Assembly incumbents against each other were not included above.

39 Especially Campbell, Angus et al., The American Voter (New York: 1960), 146–167.Google Scholar

40 Key, Southern Politics, Chs. 13-14; American State Politics, Chs. 4 and 6.

41 Williams, Chs. 8, 10-11; Rogin, 189-196; Delmatier et al., Chs. 5, 7-8; Hutchinson, William H., Oil, Land, and Politics, Vol. II (Norman, Oklahoma: 1965), Chs. 16, 18-19Google Scholar; Mowry, The California Progressives, passim; Rose, Alice M., Rise of California Insurgency (Unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University: 1942)Google Scholar; and Hopper, “Fragmentation of the California Republican Party…”