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A Game-Theoretical Approach to the Results of Parliamentary Elections in Belgium between the Wars

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2016

Erik Buyst ,
Luc Lauwers  and
Patrick Uvtterhoeven
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Extract

This paper deals with the distribution of power among Belgian political parties during the interwar period. In the 1930s Belgium, like most European countries, was confronted with the electoral success of extreme right- and left-wing parties that wanted to change the existing political system into an authoritarian one. Usually, historians draw attention to the rapidly growing share of seats in Parliament held by extreme parties as a sign of their increasing influence on Belgian politics. Among game theorists, however, it is widely accepted that the proportion of seats is a poor proxy for power relations (Schotter, 1979). It is indeed possible that a political party acquiring a higher proportion of seats in Parliament loses its capacity to influence the outcome of a vote, and vice versa.

Type
Research Article
Information
Social Science History , Volume 13 , Issue 3 , Fall 1989 , pp. 237 - 254
Copyright
Copyright © Social Science History Association 1989 

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References

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