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Redistribution Without Egalitarianism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 January 2009

Baruch Brody
Baruch Brody
Affiliation:
Philosophy, Rice University and Baylor College of Medicine
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Extract

I will, in this paper, set out the philosophical foundations and the basic structure of a new theory of justice. I will argue that both these foundations and the theory which is based upon them are intuitively attractive and theoretically sound. Finally, I will argue that both are supported by the fact that they lead to attractive implications such as the following:

(1) One can justify at least some governmental redistributive programs which presuppose that those receiving the wealth have a right to it, without being committed to any form of egalitarianism.

(2) The justification for these redistributive programs respects property entitlements; it argues, in effect, that property entitlements and rights to some redistribution of wealth presuppose each other, rather than being in conflict with each other.

(3) The amount of redistribution to which each indigent person is entitled is directly proportional to the wealth of the society in question (the wealthier the society, the greater the entitlement) and inversely proportional to the number of indigents in the society in question (the more indigents, the less to which each is entitled).

There are at this stage in the history of Western thought few entirely new ideas in philosophy. Too much has been written about the important issues to allow for entirely new approaches. My theory is no exception to these generalizations, for it draws upon the tradition of John Locke, of the agrarian reforms such as Paine, Spence, and Ogilvie, and of libertarian writers such as Robert Nozick. Nevertheless, I will argue, the resulting theory is a significant advance over the ideas of these earlier writers.

Type
Research Article
Information
Social Philosophy and Policy , Volume 1 , Issue 1 , Autumn 1983 , pp. 71 - 87
Copyright
Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 1983

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References

1 Earlier versions of this theory are found in my “Work Requirements and Welfare Rights” in Brown, P., Johnson, C. and Vernier, P.. Income Support (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981)Google Scholar and in my “Health Care for the Haves and Have-Nots” in Shelp, E., Justice and Health Care (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1981).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 In J. Locke. Second Treatise on Civil Government, chapter 5.

3 The relevant texts are W. Ogilive. Essay on the Right of Property in Land (1781) and T. Paine. Agrarian Justice (1798).

4 Nozick, R.. Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974).Google Scholar

5 This debate is surveyed in Martin, R. and Nickel, J.. “Recent Work on the Concept of Rights” American Philosophical Quarterly 17 (1980): 165–167.Google Scholar

6 Some of the more prominent figures who come close to this point of view in connection with at least some rights are Dworkin, R.. Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard U. Press, 1977), 90–94Google Scholar and R. Nozick. Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 30.

7 This point has been discussed in such philosophical writings as McCloskey, H. J.. “Rights–Some Conceptual Issues” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 54 (1976)CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Thomson, J.. Self-defense and Rights (Lindley Lecture, University of Kansas, 1976).Google Scholar It has long been familiar to lawyers.

8 On this problem, see such essays as Steiner, H.. “The Structure of a Set of Compossible Rights” Journal of Philosophy 74 (1977)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and “Individual Liberty” Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society 75 (1974–1975), and Fressola, A. “Liberty and Property” American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (1981).Google Scholar

9 An important survey of such views is found in Becker, L.Property Rights (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977)Google Scholar, especially chapters 2–4. My views differ from the one put forward by him on pp. 48–56, although I am obviously indebted to his careful discussion.

10 This distinction was first drawn by R. Nozick on p. 153–160 of his Anarchy, State, and Utopia.

11 These different accounts were already recognized by H. Grotius and S. Puffendorf. See, for an introduction to their ideas, Tully, J.A Discourse on Property: John Locke and his Adversaries (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1980) pp. 64–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

12 Second Treatise, paragraph 27.

13 ibid., paragraph 40.

14 ibid., paragraph 33.

15 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 175.

16 ibid., 178–182.

17 The two classic cases are Vincent v. Lake Erie Trans. Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N. W. 221 (1910), and Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188 (1908).

18 It is this step which involves the crucial change from the earlier versions of my theory presented in the papers cited in footnote §1. In the earlier versions, I placed the basis of the permissibility and resulting obligation in the hypothetical consent of the parties, as opposed to the current approach which places the basis of the permissibility in general utility and the basis of the obligation in the need to pay compensation.

19 See my review of Nozick's book in Philosophia (1976).

20 A good discussion of possible bases for that principle is to be found in Callahan, C.Adverse Possession Columbus: (Ohio State University Press, 1981).Google Scholar

21 Libertarians are one example. But there are others who equally believe in the conflict and, therefore, reject a robust belief in property rights.