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THE PROGRESSIVE ERA ASSAULT ON INDIVIDUALISM AND PROPERTY RIGHTSa

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 July 2012

James W. Ely Jr.
James W. Ely Jr.
Affiliation:
Law and History, Vanderbilt University
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Abstract

This essay examines the far-reaching attack on individualism and property rights which characterized the Progressive Era of the early twentieth century. Scholars and political figures associated with Progressivism criticized the individualist values of classical liberalism and rejected the traditional notion of limited government espoused by the framers of the Constitution. They expressed great confidence in regulatory agencies, staffed by experts, to effectuate policy. Progressives paved the way for the later triumph of statist ideology with the New Deal in the 1930s.

The essay traces the sources of the Progressive antipathy to individual rights to the influence of Bismarck’s program in Imperial Germany and the Social Gospel theology. It gives attention to the views of leading Progressive intellectuals who stressed the perceived need for increased governmental power and governance by an educated elite. The essay also explores the impact of Progressivism on constitutional law, arguing that the rise of “sociological jurisprudence,” with its skepticism about courts and stress on judicial deference to legislative judgments, served to advance the Progressive political agenda. Progressives looked with disfavor on any constitutional doctrine which curtailed governmental authority. The Progressive movement left a lasting legacy of diminished regard for individualism and a jurisprudence which stripped property of muscular constitutional protection.

Type
Research Article
Information
Social Philosophy and Policy , Volume 29 , Issue 2: Natural Rights Individualism and Progressivism in American Political Philosophy , July 2012 , pp. 255 - 282
Copyright
Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 2012

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