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On Dworkinian Equality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 January 2009

Jan Narveson
Jan Narveson
Affiliation:
Philosophy, University of Waterloo, Ont.
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Extract

1. INTRODUCTION

Professor Dworkin's writings on moral and political subjects have never failed to interest me in the past, and the two-part article “What is Equality” which is the subject of this paper, is no exception. Its wealth of relevant distinctions is bound to be useful to every serious student of the subject, whatever – or, in view of the range of opinions on these matters now current, perhaps I should say almost whatever – his (or, of course, her) ideological proclivities, and whether or not he is sympathetic to Dworkin's position. The present treatment will be devoted, needless to say, primarily to disagreements, criticisms, and the raising of further questions, most of them designed to call in question either the general idea that equality should be regarded as a legitimate and important goal of social institutions or Dworkin's particular formulations of that equality. This largely negative-seeming consideration, I need scarcely add, is not intended to discount or detract from the positive contributions of Dworkin's work, which are very substantial indeed. It's just that having been ably set forth by Dworkin himself, they scarcely need seconding from this source.

Type
Research Article
Information
Social Philosophy and Policy , Volume 1 , Issue 1 , Autumn 1983 , pp. 1 - 23
Copyright
Copyright © Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 1983

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References

1 Dworkin, Ronald, “What Is Equality?” In Two Parts: Part I, Equality of Welfare, Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (Summer 1981)Google Scholar; Part II, Equality of Resources, Philosophy and Public Affairs10 (Fall 1981).

2 This idea was advocated, I believe, by Frankena, William in “The Concept of Social Justice”, in Brandt, R. B., ed., Social Justice (Englewood (1665, N.S.: Prentice-Hall, Spectrum Books, 1962)Google Scholar, cb. 20: “It is more accurate, in my opinion, to say that the just society must insofar as possible make the same relative contribution to the good life of every individual — except, of course, in cases of reward and punishment, and provided that a certain minimum standard has been achieved by all.”In Frankena's, later essay, “Some Beliefs About Justice” (U. of Kansas, Lindley Lecture, March 2, 1966)Google Scholar he remarks that he felt he had not done the concept of justice, justice in his earlier efforts. However, he nonetheless employs the same general formula in this later paper, e.g., on p. 15 where he observes, “… we are, therefore, not unjust if we put more effort or money into helping some then we do into helping others, as long as all are enabled to make the same relative advance toward the good life.”

3 Narveson, Jan, Morality and Utility (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967)Google Scholar, cf. 164, e.g., more generally, 154–169.

4 Sidgwick, H., Methods of Ethics (London: Macmillan, 7th ed., 1962), 382.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

5 Narveson, op. cit., Ch. IX, 271–275.

6 Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York, Basic Books, 1974), 206.Google Scholar

7 Narveson, Jan, “Rawls and Utilitarianism”, in H., Miller & W., Williams, eds., The Limits of Utilitarianism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982).Google Scholar On the first point, cf. 138. On the second, cf. 140–141.

8 Dworkin, Ronald, “The Original Position,” in N., Daniels, ed., Reading Rawls. (New York: Basic Books, 1975), 16–53.Google Scholar Originally in University of Chicago Law Review 40 Spring 1973): 500–533.

9 Gauthier, David P., “Justice and Natural Endowment: Toward a Critique of Rawls' Ideological Framework,” Social Theory and Practice, 3 (Spring 1974).CrossRefGoogle Scholar