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WHEN DOES A PERSON BEGIN?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 June 2005

Lynne Rudder Baker
Lynne Rudder Baker
Affiliation:
Philosophy, University of Massachusetts, Amherst
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Abstract

According to the Constitution View of persons, a human person is wholly constituted by (but not identical to) a human organism. This view does justice both to our similarities to other animals and to our uniqueness. As a proponent of the Constitution View, I defend the thesis that the coming-into-existence of a human person is not simply a matter of the coming-into-existence of an organism, even if that organism ultimately comes to constitute a person. Marshalling some support from developmental psychology, I give a broadly materialistic account of the coming-into-existence of a human person. I argue for the metaphysical superiority of the Constitution View to Biological Animalism, Thomistic Animalism, and other forms of Substance Dualism. I conclude by discussing the single implication of the Constitution View for thinking about abortion.

Type
Research Article
Information
Social Philosophy and Policy , Volume 22 , Issue 2 , July 2005 , pp. 25 - 48
Copyright
© 2005 Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation

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Footnotes

Thanks to Gareth Matthews and Catherine E. Rudder for comments. I am also grateful to other contributors to this volume, especially Robert A. Wilson, Marya Schechtman, David Oderberg, Stephen Braude, and John Finnis.