Stefan Hedlund's monograph sets an ambitious task of investigating how Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine “could arrive as such a shocking surprise” to the west (ix). Hedlund argues that in the preceding decades Russia and the west “had simply not been playing the same game” (x): while the west had pursued the game of soft power seeking to shape the democratic and pro-western transformation of neighboring states, Russia had pursued the game of hard power seeking to secure its sphere of interests. This, in Hedlund's view, led to a lack of mutual understanding. Hedlund further argues that Ukraine is “the victim not only of Russian aggression but also of an ill-founded Western belief in the prospects for soft power to achieve fundamental institutional transformations, and of failure to realize that soft power not backed by a readiness to deploy serious hard power will not get you far” (101).
The main focus of the monograph is the critique of western preoccupation with soft power—“the urge to intervene” (8) that Hedlund links to western ethnocentricity. The monograph begins by surveying a vast literature on institutions to make a case for more attention to informal institutions in any analysis of political systems. Focusing on the slow and gradual evolution of institutions in the west over several centuries, Hedlund questions the role of agency by concluding that “those informal norms that are essential to functioning democracy and successful market economy cannot be introduced by direct action” (65–66). He then employs this institutional framework to reflect on the role of western actors in color revolutions, with a particular focus on the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan in Ukraine and the “abortive Snow revolution” (126) in Russia. In Hedlund's view, the subsequent evolution of political systems in the states that experienced color revolutions point at “failed ambitions to achieve fundamental institutional change by way of outside agency” (77). In the remaining monograph, Hedlund goes back to a wider discussion on the importance of informal institutions, moving from the critique of value promotion to chastising the western academia for complicity in the “formulation of policies that risk producing . . . seriously adverse outcomes” (178), and to reflecting on the rejection of “universal” values beyond the west. The monograph concludes by suggesting that the inability of the west to foresee and to find an appropriate response to Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and to other ongoing geopolitical crises signals “the end of policies of value promotion and a return to a more traditional focus on hard power” (252).
The monograph raises some important questions about the ways in which western governments and analysts may have underestimated Russia's preoccupation with hard power. The strongest feature of the study is its focus on informal institutions and its reflections on the (in)ability of external actors to shape political processes in other states when existing informal institutions resist such a change. For those less familiar with the theoretical literature, the monograph provides a very useful overview of relevant studies and points at convincing empirical evidence. However, the main argument is overdetermined by the author's choice of the theoretical framework. Yet, what about other major factors—apart from western preoccupation with soft power—that are likely to have contributed to the “shocking surprise” of Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion as seen from the west? For example, what about economic links and financial benefits of engaging with Putin's Russia for many among western elites before 2022?
Furthermore, the monograph ultimately tries to cover too much ground without tying its reflections in a sufficiently coherent argument. Instead of retaining its focus on external agency and informal institutions, it wanders off to reflect on the causes of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine or the changing international order—the areas that would require engaging with other literatures and developing more appropriate theoretical frameworks. For example, while critiquing the west for its reluctance to resort to hard power following Russia's 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea, the monograph does not ground this critique in any relevant debates on responding to military aggression. Finally, the monograph pays only limited attention to the agency of Ukraine and Ukrainians, or the agency of other states and peoples that experienced post-communist transition or color revolutions, in navigating their relationships with western actors or Russia. Although this lack of attention likely stems from the monograph's focus on external agency, it risks reproducing a vision of the world order where only the agency of major powers matters.
