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Red Army Opposition to Forced Collectivization, 1929-1930: The Army Wavers

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2017

Roger R. Reese
Roger R. Reese*
Affiliation:
Department of History, Texas A & M University
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Extract

Some years ago, in his biography of Nikolai Bukharin, Stephen Cohen postulated that there was a reservoir of latent support in the Party's rural and urban cadres for Bukharin's moderate alternative to Stalin's rapid industrialization and the forced collectivization of agriculture of the first five-year plan. Cohen did not suspect that potential support for Bukharin and his policies of gradual industrialization and retention of private farming also existed in the Red Army's company and battalion party cells, as well as among some regimental leadership of the political administration of the Red Army (PUR). At first glance, Cohen's seems to have been a natural omission; after all, the army, with its hierarchy of commissars and political officers (politruki) ostensibly dedicated to the general line of the Party, appeared obedient and loyal to the dictates of the party Central Committee. PUR showed apparently little interest in the struggle between Stalin and Bukharin over future industrial policy.

Type
Articles
Information
Slavic Review , Volume 55 , Issue 1 , Spring 1996 , pp. 24 - 45
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies. 1996

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References

I thank the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Texas A&M University Office of International Coordination and the Military Studies Institute of Texas A&M University for their financial support of my research activities that made this article possible.

1. Cohen, Stephen F., Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888–1938 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 322, 323 and fn. 219, 222Google Scholar. Nikolai Bukharin was born in 1888, joined the Bolshevik Party in 1906 and rose to Politburo member soon after the revolution. He was executed on Stalin's orders in 1938 as an “enemy of the people” after a show trial.

2. Fedotoff-White, D., The Growth of the Red Army (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), 332.Google Scholar

3. Bukharin to Kamenev in Sotsialisticheskii Veslnik, no. 9 (1929): 10, quoted by Lewin, Moshe in “The Immediate Background of Soviet Collectivization,” Soviet Studies 17 (October 1965): 172.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4. Hagen, Mark von, Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship: The Red Army and the Soviet Socialist State, 1917–1930 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 308–25.Google Scholar

5. Voroshilov, Kliment E., Stat'i i rechi (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1936), 442, 443.Google Scholar

6. D. Fedotoff-White, The Growth of the Red Army, 278; J.M. Mackintosh, “The Red Army, 1920–1936,” in Liddell Hart, B.H., ed., The Red Army, 1918–1945, The Soviet Army, 1946 to the Present (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1956), 63 Google Scholar; Erickson, John, The Soviet High Command: A Military-Political History 1918–1941 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1962), 357 Google Scholar; Haslam, Jonathan, Soviet Foreign Policy, 1930–33: The Impact of the Depression (New York: St. Martin's Press 1983), 121–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mark von Hagen, Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship, 319. The United States’ military attachés in Warsaw and Riga, beginning in 1928, reported numerous instances of soldier unrest in the regular and territorial forces ranging from grumbling to outright mutiny throughout the USSR, but most especially in the Ukraine and central Volga region through 1936. Unfortunately, their information is all secondhand and is therefore highly impressionistic. The impression they give is, however, consonant with the one I derived from the Russian archives, that the army was in turmoil over collectivization, the Party was not solid and the leadership was unsure of its control over the troops. See U.S. Military Intelligence Division Reports 1919–1941: Russia Military Intelligence Division War Department General Staff Military Attache Reports: Soviet Union, National Archives and Record Service, Washington, DC: Record Group no. 165, Military Intelligence Files: Russia. Published by University Microfilms of America.

7. Formerly the Central State Archives of the Soviet Army (TsGASA). I conducted my research in the RGVA in summer 1993, the second year that these archives were open to “unrestricted” access by foreigners. The five fondy from which I gathered evidence were: fond 9, Politicheskoe upravlenie RKKA;fond 887, Upravlenie XVIII Strelkovo Korpusa, fond 1293, Upravlenie XXI Permskoi Strelkovoi Divizii;fond 25893, Sibirskii voennyi okrug; and fond 37837, Upravlenie po nachal'stvuiushchemu soslavu RKKA. I used political reports from all levels of PUR, from military district headquarters down to party cells namely reports (doneseniia) from PUR military district chiefs to the Central Committee, accounts of cell meetings and special events (otchety), orders (prikazy) from district and division level to subordinate political agencies, and reports (doklady) from regimental commissars to division chiefs and from division chiefs to district chiefs. The accuracy of these reports is an important question. My sense is that they are quite accurate, that is they closely—certainly not perfectly—reflect conditions in the units as interpreted by the men making the reports. Each report was destined for the next higher level of PUR so, on the one hand, one may speculate that men would want to paint as good a picture as possible to keep themselves in the good graces of their superior; on the other hand, they would not want to cover up bad situations to such a degree that, if trouble became unconcealable, the superior would find out about it anyway and they would be in greater trouble than if they had been truthful all along. What makes me think that these reports are fairly representative is that the reports at the very top—those from the military district chiefs to the Central Committee—do reflect what the reports at the bottom sent up. Division political chiefs’ reports to the district chiefs do reflect what the regimental commissars passed up to them; and the regimental reports on the whole were representative of the reports from battalion commissars, company politruki and cell secretaries. Therefore, if there was a problem of distortion it would be with cell secretaries not reporting unfavorable conditions or at least attempting to minimize their extent and then having troubles watered down as reports went up the political chain of command. Because cell secretaries and their superiors did send forward information that was very negative, even after having been criticized for not getting things under control, I tend to believe distortion was not a major problem.

8. See Lewin, Moshe, Russian Peasants and Soviet Power: A Study in Collectivization (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975)Google Scholar; Davies, R. W., The Socialist Offensive (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Ivanitskii, Danilov and, Dokumenty svidetl'stvuiut: Iz istorii derevni nakanune i v khode kollektivizatsii 1927–1932 gg. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1989), 23, 32, 297.Google Scholar

9. RGVA f. 9, op. 26, d. 487, 11. 15–16; f. 25893, op. 1, d. 292, 11. 8, 44–46. Prodrazverstka is a reference to the bolshevik grain requisitioning campaign during the civil war 1918–1920.

10. Joseph Stalin, “The Right Deviation in the CPSU (B) (Excerpt from a Speech Delivered at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B), April 1929” reprinted in Problems of Leninism (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1940), 289.

11. RGVA f. 9, op. 26, d. 487, 1. 2; f. 25893, op. 1, d. 292, 11. 22, 29–33, 61, 164–170.

12. RGVA f. 25893, op. 1, d. 292, 11. 112–117. To use the term “unhealthy” was quite out of the ordinary. All other reports from the XXI Rifle Division and from every other unit in the army that I read would begin their assessment thus, “The political-moral situation of unit X is healthy. However, …” and then go on to explain the problems it was experiencing.

13. James Hughes, “Capturing the Russian Peasantry: Stalinist Grain Procurement Policy and the Ural-Siberian Method,” Slavic Review 53, no. 1 (1994): 76–103.

14. Pavlovskii Kak Krasnaia armiia gotovit boitsa-grazhdanina (Moscow/Leningrad: Gosizdat, 1929), 12.

15. Krasnaia zvezda, 15 November 1928.

16. RGVA f. 9, op. 26, d. 487, 11. 69, 70; Vasilii I. Varenov, Pomoshch’ krasnoi armii v razvitii kolkhoznogo stroitel'stva 1929–1933 gg. (Moscow: Nauka, 1978), 88–89.

17. V. Varenov, “Uchastie krasnoi armii v sotsialisticheskom pereustroistve derevni,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 10 (1972): 80; Krasnaia zvezda, 20 October 1929; Kozlov, V.A., Dozornye Zapadnykh Rubezhei (Kiev: Politizdat Ukraine, 1972), 69–70.Google Scholar

18. RGVA f. 9, op. 26, d. 490, 1. 25; f. 1293, op. 5782, d. 6, 1. 28; Krasnaia zvezda, 25 Oct 1929.

19. RGVA f. 9. op. 26, d. 487, 1. 50; Geller, Iosif I., Pod krasnoi zvezdoi: krasnaia armiia na fronte kollektivizatsii (Samara: Gosizdat, 1931), 40–53 Google Scholar.

20. Varenov, Pomoshch’ krasnoi armii v razvitii kolkhoznogo stroitel'stva, 32, 33, 50, 51.

21. RGVA f. 9, op. 26, d. 487, 1. 78; Krasnoarmeets 1 Nov 1929; Geller, Pod krasnoi zvezdoi, 47–48.

22. RGVA f. 9, op. 26, d. 490, 11. 34, 41.

23. RGVA f. 9, op. 26, d. 487, 11. 85, 120; d. 490, 11. 41, 44, 52.

24. RGVA f. 9, op. 26, d. 487, 1. 109.

25. RGVA f. 9, op. 26, d. 487, 1. 26; d. 490, 1. 44; f. 37837, op. 21, d. 23, 1. 143.

26. Ibid., 4–5.

27. Geller, Pod krasnoi zvezdoi, 30–32; Varenov, Pomoshch’ Krasnoi Armii v razvitii kolkhoznogo stroitel'stva, 159, 161.

28. RGVA f. 9, op. 26, d. 487, 1. 31; f. 37837, op. 21, d. 23, 1. 28.

29. Varenov, Pomoshch' krasnoi armii v razvitii kolkhoznogo stroitel'stva, 139–145.

30. RGVA f. 9, op. 26, d. 490, 11. 21, 22, 30.

31. RGVA f. 9, op. 26, d. 487, 11. 51, 56–58; f. 9, op. 26, d. 490, 11. 27, 82, 113.

32. RGVA f. 9, op. 26, d. 490, 1. 51.

33. RGVA f. 9, op. 26, d. 487, 11. 55, 88.

34. Krasnaia zvezda, 15 October 1929; Varenov, Pomoshch' krasnoi armii v razvitii kolkhoznogo stroitel'stva, 43–46.

35. RGVA f. 9, op. 26, d. 487, 11. 26–29; f. 1293, op. 5782, d. 6, 1. 27; Govorkova, A.A., ed., Kollektivizatsiia sel'skogo khoziastva zapadnoi sibiri 1927–1937 gg. (Tomsk: Zapadnosibirskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1972), 87, 88Google Scholar; Za liniiu partii protiv opportunisticheskikh shatanii: liniia partii v voprosakh kollektivizatsii v dokumentakh i materialakh (Kharkov: Proletarii izdatel'stvo, 1930), 5–10; Panov, N.N. and Karev, F.A., eds., Kollektivizatsiia sel'skogo khoziaistva v Srednem Povolzh'e (1927–1937gg.) (Kuibyshev: Kuibyshevskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1970), 165.Google Scholar

36. J.V. Stalin, “Problems of Agrarian Policy in the USSR” (Speech delivered at the Conference of Marxist Students of the Agrarian Question, 27 December 1929), reprinted in Problems of Leninism, 326.

37. RGVA f. 9, op. 26, d. 487, 1. 30.

38. Ibid., 1. 31.

39. RGVA f. 9, op. 26, d. 490, 1. 57; f. 1293, op. 5782, d. 6, 1. 27; f. 25893, op. 1, d. 292, 1. 22.

40. RGVA f. 9, op. 26, d. 490, 11. 78–81.

41. Joseph Stalin, “The Policy of Eliminating the Kulaks as a Class,” Krasnaia zvezda, 21 January 1930, reprinted in Problems of Leninism, 328–32.

42. “Iz postanovleniia biuro sibkraikoma VKP (b) ‘O proshenii fraktsii soiuza soiuzov o dopushchenii kulakov v kolkhozy.’ 4 oktiabria 1929 g.” in A.A. Govorkova, Kollektivizalsiia sel'skogo khoziastva zapadnoi sibiri 1927–1937gg, . 87–88.

43. RGVA f. 9, op. 26, d. 490, 11. 104–10, 112–115.

44. Ibid., 121–22, 123–28. Ths was the final delo in the RGVA available on the SMD.

45. RGVA f. 9, op. 26, d. 490, 11. 10, 22, 121–128; d. 487, 11. 26, 29; f. 25893, op. 1, d. 292, 1. 22; D. Fedotoff-White, The Growth of the Red Army, 278, 284.

46. RGVA f. 1293, op. 5782, d. 6, 11. 39–41.

47. According to Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Among the [resistance] strategies Russian peasants used to cope with collectivization were those forms of ‘everyday resistance’ (in James C. Scott's phrase) that are standard for unfree and coerced labor all over the world, viz: foot dragging, failure to understand instructions, refusal to take initiative … and so on. This was a behavioral repertoire familiar to Russian peasants from serfdom… .” (Stalin's Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after Collectivization [New York: Oxford University Press, 1994], 5). She cites James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak, Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), and refers readers to Hoch, Steven L., Serfdom and Social Control in Russia (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986 Google Scholar, ch. 5; and Frederickson, George M. and Lasch, Christopher, “Resistance to Slavery,” in Lane, Ann J., ed., The Debate over Slavery (Urbana: University of Illinois Press., 1971), 223–44.Google Scholar

48. RGVA f. 9, op. 26, d. 487, 1. 57; d. 490, 1. 24; f. 25893, op. 1, d. 292, I. 127; f. 1293, op. 5782, d. 6, 1. 51; Krasnaia zvezda, 3, 5 January 1930, 7 February 1930.

49. RGVA f. 9, op. 26, d. 487, 11. 77, 78; d. 490, 11. 3, 9, 16, 113–115.

50. RGVA f. 9, op. 26, d. 490, 1. 17; Oleg F. Suvenirov, “Narkomat oborony i NKVD v predvoennye gody,” Voprosy Istorii, no. 6 (1991): 26.

51. RGVA f. 887, op. 1, d. 86, 1. 6; f. 25893, op. 1, d. 292, 11. 40, 47–49, 75.

52. Harvard University Refugee Interview Project #18, RF, A3, 8, 28–30; RGVA f. 9, op. 26, d. 490, 11. 23–24.

53. Harvard University Refugee Interview Project #18, RF, A3, 28.

54. RGVA f. 887, op. 1, d. 86, 11. 6, 7, 9, 11–13, 24, 25.

55. RGVA f. 25893, op. 1, d. 292, 1. 104.

56. RGVA f. 887, op. 1, d. 86, 11. 6, 7.

57. RGVA f. 9, op. 26, d. 487, 11. 78, 87; Aleksandr Vrublevskii and Tat'iana Prot'ko, IZ Istorii Repressii protiv Belorusskogo Krest'ianstva 1929–1934 gg. (Minsk: Navuka i Tekhnika, 1992), 121–23.Google Scholar

58. Varenov, Pomoshch’ krasnoi armii v razvitii kolkhoznogo stroitel'stva, 109.

59. Joseph Stalin, “Reply to Collective Farm Comrades,” Pravda, 3 April 1930, reprinted in Problems of Leninism, 355–56.

60. In a comparison of the Harvard Refugee Interview Project, work by Inkles and Bauer and more recent interviews and surveys of Russians and Ukrainians, Donna Bahry concludes that from the Stalin era to the present an absolute majority of people preferred that agriculture remain in private hands in an NEP-like economy ( “Society Transformed? Rethinking the Social Roots of Perestroika,” Slavic Review 52, no. 3 [1993]: 524–25).

61. Enlisted men usually accounted for only a quarter of army party members; officers made up the majority. Despite the fact that most soldiers were peasants, most party members were from the working class. In 1930, more than 58% of army party members were workers, only 29% were peasants and 12% were classified as “others.” Of the peasants that did join the Party, the majority were bedniaki. Batraki were classified as workers. The Komsomol, in contrast, had higher peasant representation than the party. See “Partorganizatsiia i politprosvetrabota k XVI s “ezdu VKP(b): statisticheskii material,” Voennyi Vestnik 10, no. 14 (1930): 80; A. Korobchenko, “Voprosy Komsomol'skoi raboty,” Voennyi Vestnik 10, no. 22 (1930): 39, 40.

62. Belitskii, Semen, Besedy o voennom dele i Krasnoi Armii: Sbornik dlia kruzhkov voennykh znanii nafabrikakh, zavodakh, pri klubakh i shkolakh (Moscow: Voennyi Vestnik, 1926), 68.Google Scholar

63. RGVA f. 9, op. 26, d. 487, 1. 9.

64. Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution, 287, 289.

65. Jonathan Haslam, Soviet Foreign Policy, 1930–33, 121–22. John Erickson denies that the generals, as a group, opposed Stalin saying, “The private fears and the genuine anxieties of the [high] command, aware of the impact of collectivisation on morale, never reached at this stage the proportions of a collective protest,” and calls reports of opposition by the high command “unsubstantiated rumours” (The Soviet High Command, 356–57). He was most likely referring to J.M. Mackintosh, who in 1956 wrote: The professional soldiers watched with increasing alarm the morale of the peasant soldiers deteriorate, and called upon the Government to modify collectivization of the land in defence of the country. In this stand the commissars, many of them peasants themselves in origin, supported the soldiers’ demands.” He went on to claim that Bliukher, commander of the far eastern army, managed to “wring some concessions out of the Party,” delaying collectivization in his domain, and that other generals asked that their districts likewise be spared but were denied. Despite this rejection, he says, “The Army leaders continued to press their case” ( “The Red Army, 1920–1936,” in Liddell Hart, B.H., ed., The Red Army [New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1956], 63).Google Scholar