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The Origins of Revolutionary Defensism: I. G. Tsereteli and the “Siberian Zimmerwaldists”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2017

Ziva Galili y Garcia
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Extract

The Moscow Station in Petrograd was the scene of a familiar ritual of the Revolution late on the night of March 20, 1917 — the triumphant return of exiled revolutionary leaders. The red banners on the locomotive from Irkutsk read “Train of the Social Democratic Deputies of the Second Duma.” On board were the legendary leader of the arrested Social Democratic faction, the Georgian Menshevik I. G. Tsereteli, and a group of his followers known as the Siberian Zimmerwaldists. They were experienced in revolutionary politics, closely knit, and completely dedicated to the policies and leadership of Tsereteli. Within ten days of their arrival in the capital, these men would take control of the bloc of Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries which held the majority in the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet and the First All-Russian Conference of Soviets. In the coming months they would provide effective, often forceful leadership for the Soviets, guiding them by a new and distinctive political strategy which they called Revolutionary Defensism.

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Articles
Information
Slavic Review , Volume 41 , Issue 3 , Fall 1982 , pp. 454 - 476
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Copyright © Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies. 1982

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References

1. The term “Revolutionary Defensism” here denotes the whole set of ideas and policies — concerning both the question of power and that of war and peace — that were advocated by the “Revolutionary Defensist” faction of the Menshevik Party between March and October 1917. The term “revolutionary defensism” in lower case refers to the issue of defense alone.

2. The Menshevik-Internationalist leaders in emigration expressed their pleasure with the “two strongly pronounced internationalist journals” from Irkutsk in private letters and in the press (Pis'ma P. B. Aksel'roda i lu. O. Martova [Berlin, 1924], pp. 319-21, 323; [Martov], L. M., “Sibirskie Marksisty o voine,” Nashe slovo [Paris], February 26, 1915, no. 25 Google Scholar). N. N. Sukhanov recalled that lu. Larin, a staunch Internationalist, had urged him to organize a large reception for Tsereteli's arrival in Petrograd since he believed (as did Sukhanov) that Tsereteli and his group would strengthen the Internationalist wing in the Petrograd Soviet ( Sukhanov, N. N., Zapiski o revoliutsii, vol. 2 [Berlin, 1922], pp. 277–78, 288-91Google Scholar).

3. This assumption was expressed in formal debates and private discussions at the First All-Russian Conference of Soviets, which also adopted a resolution in favor of the continuation of “dual power” (Vserossiiskoe soveshchanie sovetov rabochikh i soldatskikh deputatov [Moscow- Leningrad, 1925], pp. 165, 176; Sukhanov, Zapiski, p. 399; V. S. Voitinskii, “Gody pobed i porazhenii,” typescript intended as a third volume of the author's memoirs, Nicolaevsky Collection, Hoover Institution, p. 101).

4. For a discussion of the realignment that took place in the Menshevik Party after the Bolshevik seizure of power, see L. H. Haimson, “The Mensheviks After the October Revolution,” Russian Review, 38, no. 4 (October 1979): 456-73 and ibid., 39, no. 2 (April 1980): 181-207.

5. This characterization of the sources of Menshevik behavior in 1917 is elaborated in Z. Galili y Garcia, “The Menshevik Revolutionary Defensists and the Workers in the Russian Revolution of 1917” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1980).

6. Many early histories of the Revolution, as well as retrospective accounts by contemporaries, made no mention of the “Siberian Zimmerwaldist” group and ascribed whatever change had occurred in the activity of the Executive Committee in late March 1917 to Tsereteli alone. The change noted in these accounts was, in fact, one not of political strategy, but merely of organization and leadership. The Trudovik V. B. Stankevich, for instance, spoke of two periods in the history of the Executive Committee: “The first period was one of coincidence, hesitation, and vagueness…. With Tsereteli's arrival, however, the character of the committee changed completely…. The random hodgepodge of people was transformed into an institution” ( Stankevich, V. B., Vospominaniia, 1914-1919 [Berlin, 1920], pp. 87–88Google Scholar). W. H. Chamberlin described Tsereteli as having imparted to the Executive Committee a “more organized and definite policy” ( Chamberlin, W. H., The Russian Revolution, vol. 1 [New York, 1971], pp. 110–11Google Scholar). Another type of misrepresentation was given credence in a study by a veteran Menshevik who argued that the Siberian Zimmerwaldists and the Menshevik Secretariat Abroad had belonged to the same brand of Internationalism ( |Dvinov, B., Pervaia mirovaia voina i rossiiskaia sotsialdemokratiia [New York, 1962], p. 67 Google Scholar). More recently, Rex Wade has described not only Tsereteli's contribution to the Soviet's policy on the war and national defense, but also the roots of his revolutionary defensism in the ideas developed by the Siberian Zimmerwaldists prior to 1917 ( Wade, Rex A., The Russian Search for Peace [Stanford, California, 1969 Google Scholar] and Wade, Rex A., “Irakli Tsereteli and Siberian Zimmerwaldism,” Journal of Modern History, 39, no. 4 [December 1967]: 425-31CrossRefGoogle Scholar). Because Wade's study was dedicated mainly to the issues of war and peace, other concerns of Tsereteli and his colleagues, most importantly their notions about the social content and political shape of the coming revolution, were of necessity left undiscussed. The evolution of Tsereteli's thought on these latter issues has received greater attention from W. H. Roobol in the first comprehensive biography of Tsereteli (Tsereteli — A Democrat in the Russian Revolution. A Political Biography [The Hague, 1976]). However, Roobol's deliberate focus on Tsereteli and on his commitment to political democracy leaves the reader without a firm sense of the social and political background against which Tsereteli's peculiar interpretation of Menshevism had developed prior to the revolution. Moreover, Roobol does not, in my opinion, sufficiently emphasize the importance of Tsereteli's notion of the united “vital forces of the nation” when discussing his political activity in 1917.

7. The description of Tsereteli's Georgian background, his early political involvement in the student movement, and exile to Siberia is drawn from the following sources: “Vospominaniia detstva,” “Detskie i iunosheskie vospominaniia,” and “I. G. Tsereteli o svoem dede i ottse,” Nicolaevsky Collection, Hoover Institution and from B. I. Nikolaevskii, “I. G. Tsereteli. Stranitsy biografii,” Sotsialisticheskii vestnik, no. 6(730), pp. 119-22; no. 7(731), pp. 141-43; no. 8-9(732- 33), pp. 159-64; no. 10(734), pp. 196-200; no. 11(735), pp. 219-23; no. 12(736), pp. 243-45, June-December 1959.

8. For discussions of the peculiarities of Georgia and Georgian Social Democracy see Zhordania, Noi, Moia zhizn’ [Stanford, California, 1968]Google Scholar; Uratadze, Georgii, Vospominaniia gruzinskogo sotsial demokrata [Stanford, California, 1968]Google Scholar. See also L. H. Haimson's introductions to Zhordania, Moia zhizn’ and Uratazde, Vospominaniia, as well as Ronald G. Suny, “The Emergence of Political Society in Georgia,” Occasional Papers, no. 90, Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Washington, D.C.

9. The discussion of the ideas Tsereteli borrowed from his father and uncle is drawn from Tsereteli's early memoirs (see above note 7), Nikolaevskii's biographical sketches (“I. G. Tsereteli“), and Roobol's recent biography of Tsereteli (Tsereteli —A Democrat, pp. 4-8). Georgii Efimovich told his son that he had turned over his journal, Kvali, to the Marxists because he believed they were best suited to achieve the goal of unity of all Georgian social groups. He did so in spite of his deep disagreement with the Marxists’ emphasis on internationalism and on the primacy of the class struggle (Tsereteli, “Vospominaniia detstva,” pp. 75-77).

10. Nikolaevskii, “I. G. Tsereteli,” p. 122 and pp. 141-42.

11. Ibid., p. 143.

12. Tsereteli, “Vo vtoroi Gosudarstvennoi Dume (Iz vospominanii),” Nikolaevsky Collection, Hoover Institution, pp. 6-7; emphasis added. In commenting on Tsereteli's interpretation, Nikolaevskii noted correctly that “the conclusion of some concrete agreement with the Kadets was not under discussion but rather the establishment of tactical rules which would define the relations between the SDs and all the other ‘revolutionary and oppositional groups’ in the State Duma” (Nikolaevskii, “I. G. Tsereteli,” p. 197). The strategy that was dictated to the Duma faction by the Menshevik leaders had been endorsed by the Fourth (“Unification“) Congress of RSDRP in the spring of 1906. See Chetvertyi (Ob“edinitel'nyi) s“ezd RSDRP (aprel'skii). 1906 goda. Protokoly (Moscow, 1959), pp. 525, 56S-69.

13. Tsereteli, “Vovtoroi Gosudarstvennoi Dume,” pp. 13-17; RechiI. G. Tsereteli v Rossii ina Kavkaze, vol. 2: Parliamentskie rechi (Tiflis, 1918), pp. 8-9; Nikolaevskii, “I. G. Tsereteli,” p. 220; B. I. Nikolaevskii, “I. G. Tsereteli i ego ‘vospominaniia,'” in I. G. Tsereteli, Vospominaniia o fevral'skoi revoliutsii, vol. 1 (Paris, 1963), p. xii. Tsereteli's strategy was both to exempt the moderate opposition parties from his attack on the government and the Duma's extreme Right and to avoid any mention of the Social Democratic program.

14. Piatyi (Londonskii) s“ezd RSDRP. Aprel'-mai 1907 goda. Protokoly (Moscow, 1963), pp. 191-92, 336-39.

15. Ternii bez roz (Sbornik v pol'zu osuzhdennykh SD deputatov vtoroi Gosudarstvennoi Dumy) (Geneva, 1908), pp. 40-41.

16. Piatyi (Londonskii) s“ezd, pp. 272-74; V. I. Lenin, “Otkrytie vtoroi Gosudarstvennoi Dumy,” Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 5th ed., 55 vols. (Moscow, 1958-65), 5:19-22.

17. Tsereteli, “Vo vtoroi Gosudarstvennoi Dume,” p. 17.

18. This was the impression of Lidia Dan who visited Tsereteli in Irkutsk in the fall of 1914 (Interview no. 21, Inter-University Project on the History of Menshevism, Columbia University, pp. 17-18).

19. Tsereteli is often described as a speaker who was sensitive to the mood of his listeners and quick to adjust his words accordingly. Yet he is also remembered for the ability to convey a compelling sense of faith in the correctness of his political beliefs and for a proud defiance of his political detractors. These qualities were noted by such diverse individuals as: Lidia Dan, who had heard Tsereteli speak on many occasions in the Duma and later in the course of the February Revolution in 1917 (Interview no. 16, Inter-University Project on the History of Menshevism, Columbia University, p. 18); the Kadet V. A. Maklakov, who was himself a famous Duma orator (Vtoraia Duma [Paris, n.d.], p. 89); and the Menshevik N. Cherevanin, who described Tsereteli's answer to the Bolsheviks at the Fifth Congress debate on the Duma faction (Londonskii s“ezd RSDRP 1907 [St. Petersburg, 1907], p. 36).

20. For biographical details about Voitinskii, see his memoir Cody pobed i porazhenii, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1923), 1:353-57; and Nikolaevskii, B. I., “V. S. Voitinskii,” Sotsialisticheskii vestnik, no. 8-9 (744-45) (August-September 1960), pp. 165-69Google Scholar. Information regarding Rozhkov was found in Chetvertyi (Ob“edinitel'nyi) s“ezd, p. 670; Piatyi (Londonskii) s“ezd, p. 883; and V. S. Voitinskii, Gody, 1:364-65. According to Voitinskii, there were fundamental political differences between himself and Rozhkov, but they found themselves in agreement on “tactical questions.” During his nine-year exile Rozhkov dedicated much of his time to the publication of “legal” journals and newspapers that were often “only a shade more liberal than other local papers, but with more attention to labor” ( Woytinsky, W. S., Stormy Passage [New York, 1961], pp. 203–206, 228Google Scholar).

21. Short biographies of Vainshtein (pseudonym Zvezdin), Gol'dman (pseudonym Akim), and Ermolaev may be found in the unpublished biographical dictionary at the Inter-University Project on the History of Menshevism, Columbia University. Ermolaev was one of three Mensheviks who refused to serve in the Central Committee with the Bolsheviks in 1910. His exile began in Minusinsk, but he was transferred to Usol'e in 1915. For biographies of Vainberg and Anisimov, see Deiateli revoliutsionnogo dvizheniia v Rossii. Bio-bibliograficheskii slovar’ (Moscow, 1931), vol. 5. Voitinskii, Anisimov, and Gol'dman were arrested in 1907, Rozhkov in 1908, Vainshtein in 1910, Vainberg in 1911, and Ermolaev in 1914. Tsereteli himself believed that exile and the “influence of study and reflection” had been responsible for the lack of factionalism among the exiles and also accounted for his group's cohesiveness (Vospominaniia, p. 11).

22. I. G. Tsereteli to P. B. Aksel'rod, Letters to Aksel'rod, vol. 52, no. 1, Axelrod Archives, International Institute on Social History, Amsterdam.

23. Ibid.

24. For an analysis of the changing mood of Russian workers during the years 1912-14 and the explanations and conclusions offered by various Mensheviks, see L. H. Haimson, “The Problem of Social Stability in Urban Russia, 1905-1917,” Slavic Review, 23, no. 4 (December 1964): 619-42 and ibid., 24, no. 1 (March 1965): 1-22.

25. Two single issues were published — Sibirskii zhurnal on December 10, 1914 and Sibirskoe obozrenie on January 1, 1915 — and were promptly confiscated. According to Voitinskii, the publication of a third issue had been made impossible by the local authorities so that some of the articles were instead sent to the Menshevik Samara daily, Golos (Voitinskii, Gody, 2:397-98). Golos, which appeared throughout 1915 and 1916 (also under the titles Nash golos and Golos truda), was the only “legal” Menshevik organ in Russia during the war; it drew its contributors from both the Defensists and the Internationalists. Several articles by Dan and Tsereteli were published in the daily on November 17, 1915, January 10, 1916, and October 7, 1916.

26. Voitinskii, Gody, 2:391-92; Woytinsky, Stormy Passage, pp. 224-26. Lidia Dan, who visited Irkutsk around the time these discussions were taking place, told an interviewer that she believed Tsereteli's personality and thinking to have been crucial in bringing the “Siberian Zimmerwaldists” together (Interview no. 21, p. 22).

27. For information on the favorable reception of the Siberian publications by some Bolsheviks, see Levin, Sh. M., “Sotsialisticheskaia pechat’ vo vremia imperialisticheskoi voiny,” Krasnyi arkhiv, no. 2 (1922), pp. 211–12.Google Scholar

28. Kvirilskii [Tsereteli], “Internatsional i voina,” Sibirskii zhurnal, December 10, 1914, pp. 14-21.

29. Ibid., p. 14.

30. Ibid., pp. 17-18.

31. Ibid., p. 18.

32. Ibid., p. 22.

33. Kvirilskii [Tsereteli], “Demokratiia sredi voiuiushchei Rossii,” Sibirskoe obozrenie, January 1, 1915, pp. 35-44.

34. Tsereteli, Vospominaniia, pp. 5-6.

35. Skvirskii [Tsereteli], “Za dva goda,” Golos, October 7, 1916, no. 3, p. 2.

36. Ibid.

37. Tsereteli, Vospominaniia, p. 7.

38. Tsereteli was convinced that the nature of the war would readily become apparent to the Western socialist parties through the experience of the war itself. In the true spirit of Menshevik tradition, he declared that “only those theoretical assumptions that were proved in practice would find their way into the consciousness of the working class” (“Za dva goda,” p. 2).

39. Ibid.

40. B. I. Nikolaevskii, “Gruppa ‘Sibirskikh Tsimmervardistov,'” a typescript lent to me by Anna M. Bourguina, p. 10.

41. The concern of the Siberian Zimmerwaldists over Russia's ability to survive the war was expressed also by Narov [Rozhkov] in his article “Voina i khoziaistvo Rossii,” Sibirskii zhurnal, December 10, 1914, pp. 21-30.

42. Voitinskii, Cody, 2:392.

43. Tsereteli, Vospominaniia, p. 13. Tsereteli informed all the other exiled deputies of the Second Duma of this exchange. Several Bolshevik deputies wrote back that it was a mistake to have allowed the proletariat to become involved in “the defense of national interests” and that all of its class energies should go toward promoting its own “class interest.“

44. Tsereteli, “Internatsional i voina,” p. 20.

45. Tsereteli, “Demokratiia,” p. 37; emphasis in the original.

46. Tsereteli, “Souvenirs sur la revolution russe” (French typescript of fifty-seven articles which were published in 1927-29 in the Swedish newspaper Ny Tid), Nicolaevsky Collection, Hoover Institution, article no. 3, p. 5.

47. Tsereteli, Vospominaniia, pp. 9-10.

48. N. Novitskii [Voitinskii], “Voiuiushchaia Rossiia,” Sibirskoe obozrenie, January 1, 1915, pp. 24-36.

49. Tsereteli himself did not address the question directly in his wartime writings, but his position was probably identical to that of Vainshtein, who, according to Tsereteli's own testimony, shared his evaluation of the revolutionary prospects for Russia. In two articles for the Siberian publications, Vainshtein treated the question of cooperation with the “progressive bourgeoisie” from the vantage point of its immediate, tactical advantages to the workers’ organizations. He described the gains made by the Russian labor movement during the ten years from 1905 to 1915 in the first article: the opportunity for the Social Democratic representatives of the workers “to speak from the height of the Duma's rostrum“; the construction of broad working-class organizations — unions, sick funds, and cooperatives; and, finally, the rise of a new type of educated worker who was not the passive pupil of the intelligentsia, but an active seeker of enlightenment. These developments, Vainshtein concluded, “have changed Russian ‘society.'” In the past, he argued, “society” had always been comprised “exclusively of the upper strata of the population, the intelligentsia, and the raznochinnaia demokratiia.” Now, it has been broadened, for “a new member, the worker” had appeared. And he had come into it “as an equal, as a citizen” (Stellin [Vainshtein], “Za desiat’ let. Ot ianvaria 1905 g. k ianvariu 1915 g.,” ibid., pp. 11-20). Vainshtein also believed that the war made it even easier for the working class to be accepted as an independent political actor, for “in the name of the vital public interest of maintaining the war effort, the working class could combine its tasks and aspirations with those of other classes and foster political self-activity (Stellin [Vainshtein], “Voina i rabochaia samopomoshch',” Sibirskii zhurnal, December 10, 1914, pp. 29-32).

50. Tsereteli himself is the main source of information regarding these differences (Vospominaniia, pp. 9-10). But in a letter to Aksel'rod dated January 3, 1916, Martov quoted a letter that he had received from Lidia and Fedor Dan in which they described the differences between their “Minusinsk Group” and Tsereteli, Vainshtein, and Gol'dman (Pis'ma, p. 355). See also Nikolaevskii, “Gruppa ‘Sibirskikh Tsimmervardistov,“’ pp. 11-12.

51. “Deklaratsiia russkikh internatsionalistov-Menshevikov,” Izvestiia zagranichnogo sekretariata Organizatsionnogo Komiteta RSDRP, Zurich, February 5, 1916, no. 3, pp. 7-8. The “declaration” was written as an answer to Plekhanov's “open letter” to Burianov and the rest of the Social Democratic faction of the Fourth Duma that had been printed in Rech’ on September 14,1914. Most of the text of the “declaration” had already been written in late 1914, when Dan was still in Minusinsk, but the final version was prepared only after he had been transferred to Irkutsk (Eva Broido, Memoirs of a Revolutionary [London-New York, 1967], pp. 147-48; Pis'ma, p. 356). Among the signatories of the “declaration” were Fedor and Lidia Dan, two other Mensheviks (M. I. Khachaturov and E. L. Broido), and one Bolshevik, A. I. Golubkov-Pavlovich.

52. Compare, for example, the article “Pered novoi bytvoi,” Nachalo, no. 4 (1905) with the articles “Sotsialdemokratiia i Gosudarstvennaia Duma,” Otkliki sovremennosti, no. 4 (1906) and “Sotsialdemokraticheskaia fraktsiia v Gosudarstvennoi Dume,” Otkliki sovremennosti, no. 5 (1906).

53. See, for instance, F. D. [Dan], “Sovremennoe polozhenie i zadachi SD fraktsii,” Nasha zaria, 1913, no. 7-8; Dan to lu. O. Martov, May 2, 1913, and Dan to P. B. Aksel'rod, May 22,1913 and summer 1913 (n.d.), Letters to Aksel'rod, folder for 1913, nos. 6-7, Axelrod Archives, International Institute on Social History, Amsterdam.

54. Dan's view, stated in a letter to Martov, was reported by Martov in his letter to Aksel'rod, dated January 3, 1916 (Pis'ma, p. 355).

55. F. D. [Dan], “Dve voiny,” Sibirskoe obozrenie, January 1, 1915, pp. 12-18; Tsereteli, Vospominaniia, p. 9.

56. Nad [Dan], “Vnutrenniaia politika v 1915 godu,” Nash golos, January 10, 1916, no. 16, p. 1; Tsereteli, Vospominaniia, p. 9.

57. Narov [Rozhkov], “Rossiia nakanune voiny,” Sibirskoe obozrenie, January 1, 1915, p. 24. Rozhkov agreed with his friend Voitinskii that the war-time economy had created an irresolvable conflict in the Russian propertied classes between the “semifeudal” elements and those of “civilized capitalism“; but he also concluded that the latter was politically incapable of supporting a revolution (ibid., pp. 19-24). It was over this conclusion that he and Dan differed with Voitinskii and Tsereteli.

58. Tsereteli, Vospominaniia, p. 4; Nikolaevskii, “Gruppa ‘Sibirskikh Tsimmerval'distov,'” p. 12; Nikolaevskii, “I. G. Tsereteli i ego ‘Vospominaniia,'” pp. xiv-xv; Lidia Dan, Interview no. 21, p. 22.

59. Nad [Dan], “Vnutrenniaia politika v 1915 godu,” p. 1.

60. Tsereteli's concern for the unity of a broad spectrum of “progressive” forces was never spelled out in print during the war years. But in my opinion, there is circumstantial evidence to justify the assertion made above. Tsereteli's record from his term in the Second Duma, for example, shows an undisturbed pursuance of a united front with the “liberal bourgeoisie” (see notes 14 and 17 above). In “Demokratiia,” Tsereteli's article of January 1915, he alludes to the formation of a “democratic front” against tsarism. Finally, he asserts in his memoir that in 1915 and 1916 he had conceived of a front consisting of “the whole nation, with the exception of the bureaucracy, the nobility, and small groups of privileged bourgeoisie” (see note 45 above).

61. Nad [Dan], “Rabochie i voenno-promyshlennye komitety,” Nash golos, November 17, 1915, no. 10, p. 1. The information about the consultations between Dan and Tsereteli comes from Voitinskii, Gody, 2:398.

62. “Deklaratsiia russkikh internatsionalistov-Menshevikov,” p. 8.

63. Ibid. See also the testimony of Lidia Dan, Interview no. 21, pp. 24-25.

64. Voitinskii, “Gody,” pp. 3-5; Tsereteli, Vospominaniia, p. 15. The same experience is reported by exiles from Chernyi Iar (Astrakhan province) and Minusinsk (P. A. Garvi, “Unpublished Memoirs, 1917,” Inter-University Project on the History of Menshevism, Columbia University, pp. 39-40; F. Samoilov, “Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia v Minusinskoi ssylke,” Proletarskaia revoliutsiia, no. 9[56] [1926], pp. 193-98).

65. Tsereteli, Vospominaniia, pp. 15-18; Voitinskii, “Gody,” pp. 7-9, 17-18; I. I. Serebrenikov, “Vospominaniia, 1917-1922,” vol. 1, unpublished manuscript collection, Hoover Institution, pp. 4-6. Similar arrangements are described by Garvi (“Unpublished Memoirs, 1917,” pp. 40-41) and Samoilov (“Fevral'skaia revoliutsiia,” p. 196). The ease with which the moderate socialists in Irkutsk (and other Siberian localities) took over the local government and the absence of any overt opposition to the measures they enacted may be explained by local peculiarities such as the absence of large industries and a significant body of workers, the relative wealth and political sophistication of the local peasantry (which had elected Social Democrats to all of the four Dumas), the town's role as a regional administrative center which accounted for the large contingent of white-collar employees as well as the presence of thousands of political exiles, and, finally, the position of prestige that many of these exiles had attained among the municipal and provincial “public” institutions and the local intelligentsia.

66. Tsereteli, “Souvenirs,” article no. 7. Tsereteli's confidence regarding the latter part of that policy was somewhat exaggerated, even for Irkutsk, and revealed his tendency to underestimate facts that contradicted his expectations. He wrote in his memoirs that the local industrialists “had accepted the revolution with no hesitation … and saw in us the legitimate government [vlast1]” (Vospominaniia, p. 16). Yet, I. I. Serebrenikov, the Irkutsk town secretary until 1917 and thereafter during 1917 the secretary of the Siberian Factory-Owners’ Assembly, testified that his own feelings toward the Revolution and the Irkutsk socialists “had not been very friendly” and had in fact induced him to resign his municipal post (“Vospominaniia, 1917-1922,” pp. 4-6). Voitinskii comments in his memoirs that he, in fact, was aware of the existence of a “silent opposition on the right” in Irkutsk (“Gody,” pp. 12-13; emphasis in the original).

67. Tsereteli, “Souvenirs,” article no. 24, pp. 1-2.

68. Ibid.

69. Izvestiia Petrogradskogo Soveta Rabochikh i Soldatskikh Deputatov, March 6, 1917, no. 7, p. 5; emphasis added.

70. Tsereteli, “Souvenirs,” article no. 24, pp. 1-2.

71. Izvestiia Petrogradskogo Soveta, March 7, 1917, no. 8, p. 3; emphasis added.

72. Voitinskii, “Gody,” pp. 12-18; Tsereteli, Vospominaniia, pp. 20-22; Serebrenikov, “Vospominaniia, 1917-1922,” pp. 11-12, 28.

73. Voitinskii, “Gody,” p. 20.

74. Tsereteli, Vospominaniia, p. 24. See also Voitinskii, “Gody,” p. 21.

75. The lines of this argument are already apparent in Tsereteli's last wartime article (“Za dva goda,” Golos, October 7, 1916, no. 3, p. 2). Aspects of this argument are further hinted at, though never fully articulated, in Tsereteli's first address to the Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies (Izvestiia Petrogradskogo Soveta, March 21, 1917, no. 20, p. 3) and in his memoirs (Vospominaniia, pp. 24, 30, 41-42, 46-47; “Souvenirs,” article no. 2).

76. Izvestiia Petrogradskogo Soveta, March 21, 1917, no. 20, pp. 2-3.

77. Ibid., p. 3; emphasis added.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid.

81. See the discussion of labor relations and the political situation in Petrograd in March 1917 in Galili y Garcia, “The Menshevik Revolutionary Defensists,” chap. 2.

82. Tsereteli, Vospominaniia, p. 28.

83. This doctrine was outlined by Martov in his article “Na ocheredi — rabochaia partiia i ‘zakhvat vlasti,’ kak nasha blizhaishaia zadacha,” Iskra, March 17, 1905, no. 93, pp. 2-5; it was adopted as official party doctrine by the First Conference of Party Workers in Geneva in May 1905 (Pervaia obshcherossiiskaia konferentsiia partiinykh rabotnikov, supplement to Iskra, May 15,1905, no. 100, pp. 23-24). Many Mensheviks expressed their adherence to that doctrine at the First Conference of Soviets in late March 1917 and even as late as the end of April 1917, when the question of coalition was being considered more seriously (Rossiiskoe Soveshchanie sovetov, pp. 165, 176; Sukhanov, Zapiski, 2:399; Voitinskii, “Gody,” p. 101; Tsereteli, Vospominaniia, pp. 127-31).