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Yugoslavia's National Minorities Under Communism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 January 2017
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The Yugoslav nationalities question has always been a source of fascination for Western scholars. Inevitably, discussion has centered on the differences between the major Slav nationalities—the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, and Montenegrins. Less attention has been paid to the problem of the national minorities, although this issue has bedeviled the Yugoslav state since its formation in 1918. Minorities make up approximately a fifth of the Yugoslav population. In times of peace they have been the object of discrimination and exploitation. In times of crisis, the minorities have been the greatest single threat to the internal security of the Yugoslav state.
Over the years since 1918, four nationalities have proven particularly troublesome for the Yugoslavs: the Albanians, Hungarians, Germans, and Italians. The majority of the Albanians live in the autonomous oblast of Kosovo-Metohija (Kosmet) and are Moslem, belonging to the northern, Gheg, Albanian clan.
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References
1 Three censuses have been taken in Yugoslavia since World War II: in 1948, 1953, and 1961. References in this article to the 1948 census are taken from FNRJ Savezni zavod za statistiku, Konačni rezultati popisa stanovništva od 1? marta, 1948 godine, Book IX: stanovništvo po narodnosti (Belgrade, 1954). Figures for 1953 were provided the author by the Yugoslav statistical bureau. The results of the 1961 census were not available at the time this article was written.
2 A Yugoslav census immediately after the war gave trie number of Italians in the newly acquired territories (Istria, Zone B and Pula, excluding Rijeka) as 85, 814. The census was carried out on the basis of registers of names (not direct inquiry) and has been largely discounted. See Cadastre National de L'htrie: L'après le Recensement du ler Octobre 1945 (Zagreb, 1946). The Austrian districts comprising Istria and Rijeka at the time of the 1910 census had 147, 843 Italians. (Derived from figures given in J. Roglić, he Recensement de 1910: ses Methodes et son Application dans la Marche Julienne [Zagreb, 1946] and Moodie, A. E., The Italo-Yugoslav Boundary: A Study in Political Geography [London, 1945]Google Scholar.)
3 The Turkish minority is located almost entirely in Macedonia. Their present numbeT is difficult to estimate, since postwar figures fluctuate wildly, but is probably around 100, 000. If one agrees that the Macedonians should not be considered Bulgarian, there exists a Bulgarian minority of some 60, 000, forming almost the entire population of the Caribrod and Bosilgrad districts of Serbia. The Rumanians number some 60, 000 and are found in the Alibunarski, Vrsacki, and Pancevacki districts of the Banat. There are some 85, 000 Slovaks in Vojvodina and 34, 000 Czechs, chiefly in Slavonia. In addition, the census of 1953 listed some 37, 000 Ukrainians (in Vojvodina and Croatia) and 20, 000 Russians (in Serbia).
4 The Yugoslav constitution of 1921, while not mentioning the minorities directly, provided, in Article 4, that all citizens were “equal.” In the Agreement on Minorities signed at St. Germain in 1919, the Yugoslavs pledged not to discriminate against the minorities, that schools with instruction in minority tongues would be permitted, and adequate financial means provided for educational and cultural purposes. The treaties of Rapallo (1921), Santa Margherita (1922), and Nettuno (1925) granted special privileges to the Italian minority. The Bled agreement of 1933 with the Rumanians guaranteed the existence of Rumanian sections in schools when over twenty students applied. For provisions governing the legal status of the minorities in Yugoslavia between the two world wars, see Ammende, Erwald, ed., Die Nationalitdten in den Staaten Europas (Vienna, 1931)Google Scholar, and Chmelar, Josef, Die Nationalen Minderheiten in Mitteleuropa (Prague, 1937).Google Scholar
5 The Treaty of St. Germain did not apply to those areas which had become part of Serbia prior to January, 1913, and thus failed to protect the minorities acquired by Serbia during the Balkan wars.
6 For a child to be refused entry into a Hungarian school, for example, it was sufficient 5 for one of the parents to have a name such as Horvat, Rac, or Orosz, which was taken as an j indication of the parent's Slavic origins, for it was claimed that these names in Hungarian meant “Croat,” “Serb,” “Russian,” and so on. After 1929, opening minority schools was made particularly difficult by the Law on National Schools of that year, which permitted * minority sections or schools for basic education alone, and only upon permission of the Ministry of Education.
7 The Catholic Bachelors’ Association (Katholikus Legény Egylet) was the first of these j organizations; it was replaced by the People's Circle (Nép Kör). By 1941, the Hungarians were organized in Nép Kör and its rightist competitor, the Southern Hungarian Civic j Union or DMKS (Délividéki Magyar Közmüvelödési Szövetség).
8 The privileged position of the Germans in education was established in the early ! 1930's when a series of decrees gave them the right to their own schools. “Name analysis” j was forbidden in their case; “family language” was to be taken into consideration in “j determining nationality, and the Germans were permitted to establish their own private j schools. For the German schools, see Türcke, K. E., Das Schulrecht der deutschen Yolks grupben in Ost und Sudost-europa (Berlin, 1938), pp. 460–61.Google Scholar
9 See the statement of policy on the nationalities question made at the IV, Dresden, Congress of the CPY in 1928 in Istorijski arhiv Komunističke partije Jugoslavije, Vol. II: Kongresi i zemaljske konferencije KPJ 1919-1937 (Belgrade, 1949), p. 163.
10 See the report of the fifth party conference of November, 1940, in V Kongres Komunističke partije Jugoslavije (Belgrade, 1949), p. 197. The conference demanded freedom and equality for the minorities but did not mention self-determination, and attacked fascist designs on Yugoslavia.
11 The Italian Pino Buducin battalion, the Albanian Zejnel Ajdini unit and the Emin Durak brigade, the Bulgarian brigade Hristo Botev, the Czech-Slovak brigade Janišikova, the Hungarian Petöfi Sándor unit, and the German Ernst Thälmann unit. For official accounts of these brigades, see Ljubiša Stojković and Milš; Martić, , Nacionalne manjine u Jugoslaviji (Belgrade, 1953)Google Scholar; Dedijer, V., “Italijanske, Bugarske, Čehoslovačke i Madjarske, jedinice u sastavu naše vojske,” Za otadibinu, No. 4 (Apr., 1950), p. 21 Google Scholar; “Nacionalne manjine FR Jugoslavije,” Informatitmi priručnik, No. 10-12, Book II (1952), pp. 10-12.
12 Istorijski arhiv KPJ, Vol. VII: Makedonija u narodno-oslobodilačkom ratu i narodnoj revoluciji, 1941-1944 (Belgrade, 1951), pp. 238-39.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., p. 289.
15 Ibid., p. 228.
16 Jugoslovenska narodna armije, Glavna politička uprava, Stvaranje i razvoj Jugoslovenske armije, II (Belgrade, 1951), 359–60.Google Scholar
17 Evidence of the unreliability of the minorities can be seen in the fact that at the end of the war, of 800 Hungarians who volunteered from Backa Topola, 200 later deserted; of 180 who volunteered from Sente, 50 later deserted. Rumanians conscripted into the Partisans deserted en masse and fled to Rumania. As a countermeasure, the Partisans set up camps in which the Rumanians’ families were interned. At the end of the war these deserters were pardoned, and most returned to their homes. From unpublished reports to the Regional Party Committee of the CPY for Vojvodina.
18 The CPY dominated the Communist Party of Albania and was able to dictate the settlement of the question of Kosovo-Metohija. At the end of 1943 the CPY sent a letter to the Albanian party in which annexation of the area by Albania was rejected. Parts of this letter are quoted in Dedijer, V., Jugoslovenski-Albanski odnosi (1939-1945) (Belgrade, 1949), p. 133 Google Scholar. During the war the CPY laid claim to the Julian region, then in the possession of Italy. The Italian CP finally accepted the Yugoslav claim in 1944, much to the anger of the Trieste Communists and the non-Communist Italian resistance. For the Yugoslav position on the Julian problem, see Mikuž, Metod, Pregled razvoja NOB u Sloveniji, Vol. I (Belgrade, 1956)Google Scholar; for an Italian anti-Communist view, G. F., “Sacrifice of Free Men,” Trieste, No. 2 (July-Aug., 1954), p. 20. In 1943 the Slovenian Communists, as part of their effort to swing over the Italian CP, promised autonomy for the Italians of the Julian region after the war. See Gersković, Leon, ed., Dokumenti o raxvoju narodne vlasti (Belgrade, 1948), p. 189 Google Scholar. The pledge was never honored. The Yugoslavs claim the Hungarian CP approved outright the annexation by Hungary of Yugoslav territory. The postwar relations of the Hungarians and Yugoslav Communists over the minority question are discussed below. The Bulgarian CP bitterly contested the right of the CPY to operate in Macedonia, but was overruled by Moscow.
19 The action of the Partisan commanders at this time was the subject of criticism at the first congress of the Serbian CP held in May, 1945. Speaking to the congress, Alexander Ranković, secret police chief, cited the following incident: “On the occasion of transporting one group of Albanians to strengthen the IV army one incident occurred which was such that it could not be localized [and] whose results could not be contained…. One Albanian provoked by some guard took down his rifle and killed him. That is, he killed one of our fighters. But our comrades obviously didn't recover their wits and instead of settling the whole thing so as to prevent any further clash, wished to punish them, wished to carry out reprisals, wished to execute forty Albanians for one dead fighter. This stupid intention and completely foreign method for us was taken advantage of by enemy elements in that group of Albanians and [they] succeeded in provoking a revolt…. On that occasion about 200 Albanians were killed.” Ranković, A., Izabrani govori i čland, 1941-1945 (Belgrade, 1951), p. 46 Google Scholar. Another incident which was described as the result of “bureaucracy“ took place when a group of Albanians was locked in what had been a powder magazine. 130 smothered. Ibid., p. 47.
20 The Yugoslavs claim that the Albanian uprising was planned by t h e Germans and sparked by the remnants of the Skanderbeg division which had fought the Partisans during the war. See Jedinstvo (Pristina), Aug. 4, 1946, p. 1.
21 See Jedinstvo, Jan. 21, 1946, p. 3, which makes reference to Drenica, the center of the lighting. “It is known that this uprising [in Drenica] cost thousands of lives,” the report said. Other areas of fighting were Tropče, Urosevac, and Gnjilane. Ibid., July 9, 1946, p. 2, and Aug. 4, 1946, p. 1.
22 Ibid., July 7, 1947, p. 1.
23 For reference to his death, ibid., Mar. 18, 1946, p. 1.
24 See Jedinstvo, Aug. 4, 1946, p. 1, where mention is made of the continued existence of opposition groups. The Albanians concerned probably used the title the Albanian National Democratic Army (Ushtrija Kombëtare Demokratike Shqiptare) rather than the National Democratic Army of Albania. The Communists refer to the Albanian opposition as “Balista“—followers of t h e Balli Kombetar movement which opposed t h e Communists in Albania during the war. For t h e trial of a group of Albanians in Macedonia who were said to have established connections with the National Democratic Army, see Nova Makedonija (Skoplje), Jan. 28-31, 1947.
25 See the report of Fadilj Hodza given at the seventh conference of the Kosmet regional party organization, in which he mentions the great Albanian chauvinism still being spread by “various committees of the National Democratic [Movement].” Sedma konferencija Saveza komuniste Srbije za Kosovo i Metohija (Pristina, Sept., 1956), p. 135.
26 In an effort to ease the minority problem a plan was worked out in Paris, in 1946, between Kardelj for t h e Yugoslav party and Gero, for t h e Hungarian party, which foresaw the exchange of 40, 000 Hungarians from Yugoslavia for an equal number of Serbs from Hungary. (From information supplied by a member of the Hungarian Foreign Office present in Paris at the time.) The plan was never acted upon.
27 At the second session of the Anti-Fascist Council in 1943. See Djilas, M., članci, 1941-1946 (1st ed.; Belgrade, 1947), p. 183.Google Scholar
28 Decision No. 2 of Nov. 2 1, 1944, published in Službeni list Demokratske Federativne ‘ Jugoslavije, No. 2, p. 13. Decision No. I, never published, stripped the Germans of all civil rights, including citizenship. For mention of this decision, and an interpretation which excluded from its provisions those who fought in the Partisans, non-Germans in mixed marriages, or those assimilated before the war, see Privremena narodna skupStina: DFJ, Rad zakonodavnih odbora pretsednistva A VNOJ … (Belgrade, n.d.), pp. 85-86.
29 The most careful estimate, published in 1954, calculated that 320, 000 Germans were ‘ known to be in Germany and Austria, some 50, 000 had been deported to Russia, and some 183, 000 remained unaccounted for. Markert, Werner, ed., Jugoslawien: Osteuropa-Handbuch (Cologne/Graz, 1954), p. 36 Google Scholar. For other estimates of the size of the German exodus from ‘ Yugoslavia, see Schechtman, J. B., “The Elimination of German Minorities in Southeastern Europe,” Journal of Central European Affairs, VI, No. 2 (July, 1946), pp. 160–62Google Scholar, and ‘ Vogelnik, Dolfe, “Demografski gubici Jugoslavije u drugom svetskom ratu,” Statistička revija, ‘ II, No. 1 (May, 1952), p. 29.Google Scholar
30 In Kosovo-Metohija more registered voters (97.68 per cent) went to the polls than in any other region. Of those who voted, only 3.2 per cent opposed the government list, the lowest number of opposition votes with the exception of Montenegro. Informativni priručnik, 1948, p. 66.
31 “Law on the Prohibition of the Incitement of National, Racial and Religious Hatred and Discord,” SI. L. DFJ, No. 36, 1945, p. 198. The provisions of the law are now incorporated in the criminal law of 1951; see Službeni List FNRJ, No. 13, 1951, p. 185.
32 The number of convictions brought under the law in 1945 a n d 1946 is not known ‘, to the author, but was certainly high. For t h e number and type of convictions brought between 1947 a n d 1959, see theauthor ‘ s unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, “Communism and i the National Question i n Yugoslavia” (Columbia University, 1961), p. 111.
33 See, for example, For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy, Nov. 23, 1951, p. 4: “Before me are two documents. One consisting of hundreds of pages, shows how the Tito- Rankovic clique is exterminating the 200, 000 Albanian people in Yugoslavia…. This document describes how the Titoists machine-gunned thousands of Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia; how thousands of Albanians were killed by means of poison gas and by spreading typhus; how the fascist degenerates bury people alive and subject others to brutal torture before death …“
34 The Soviets did attempt to organize the White Russians as spies, according to Yugoslav charges. Many White Russians were arrested after 1948 by the Yugoslavs, bringing bitter threats and demands for their release from the Soviets. See White Book on Aggressive Activities by the Governments of the USSR, Poland … (Belgrade, 1951), p. 40.
35 In some degree, the Hungarians were sympathetically inclined toward Budapest. In a report to the Regional Party Committee of the CPY for Vojvodina, it was admitted that “In general, the influence of Budapest is, in a pretty strong measure, harmful to the Hungarian masses regardless of social composition,” and it was described how information from Radio Budapest was spread through the Hungarian villages by word of mouth. In Kosovo- Metohija, the Yugoslav Communists turned the tables on Albania and organized, in August, 1949, the “Albanian League” for refugees from Albania. For details on the Albanian League, see Charlotte Saikowski, “Albania in Soviet Satellite Policy, 1945-1953” (M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1953), and Eric Bourne's report in the Christian Science Monitor, Apr. 4, 1953.
36 Rezmi Ismail, the most prominent Turk in the Macedonian government, was arrested for Cominform sympathies. For a Bulgarian account of the case, see Rabotnichesko delo (Sofia), Mar. 24, 1950, p. 4. A Cominform publication, La Yugoslavie sous la terreur de la Clique Tito (Paris, 1949), mentions the arrest of Jitsa Kok, editor of the journal Magyar and Istvan DoboS, Minister of Industry of the Executive Committee of Vojvodina. But the most prominent Hungarian Communist, Paul Soti, remained loyal to Tito. So did leading Albanians (Dušan Mugoša, Fadjil Hodša), and the prominent Bulgarian Communist. Ivan Karaivanov.
37 Article 13 of the constitution of 1946.
38 In Kosovo-Metohija, bilingual administration is provided for in the statute of the oblast (infra). For the use of Italian, see the directive of the Croatian government of Aug. 20, 1948, “Obligatory Directive on the Use of Italian Language,” Narodne novine, No. 67, 1948, p. 231. Bilingual administration is not practiced in Vojvodina, although it was once proposed for the city of Subotica. See Borba, Jan. 26, 1953, p. 2.
39 See Article 120 of the constitution, which provides that the individual has the right to be acquainted with the entire material of the trial in his native tongue; “The Law on Criminal Procedure,” SI. L., No. 40, 1953, p. 421, which states the same principle in more detail, and “ T h e Law on Marital Procedure,” SI. L., No. 4, 1957, p. 63.
40 Until 1958, the subject of minority schools was regulated by a single unpublished directive of August, 1945, which stipulated that minority schools would be formed if there were twenty or more students, that teachers must belong to the minority in question, that the administration of the school would be carried out in the minority language, and that registration in a minority school would depend on the wishes of the parents. The general law on schools of 1958 states broadly that minorities have the right to education in their native tongue, that courses will include material from the national history and culture of the minority, and that within a period of two years the republics will bring further laws on the subject. See “Introductory Law for the General Law on Schools,” Sl.L., No. 28, 1958, p. 745.
41 These societies, or cultural unions, were most powerful in Vojvodina. Some like the “Queen Bee” (Matica Slovačka) of the Slovaks had been active in the interwar period. The first postwar cultural union of the Hungarians, the “Hungarian Union of Vojvodina,” was renamed the “Cultural Union of Hungarians” after a purge of unreliable elements at the end of 1947 or the beginning of 1948. In 1948 the coordination of these cultural unions was made the responsibility of a new organ, The Union of Cultural-Education Societies of Vojvodina (Savez Kulturno-prosvetnih drustava Vojvodine). The creation of this coordinating body marked the first step in the dissolution of the cultural unions of each minority (infra).
42 Autonomy had been promised the Italians in 1943 (supra), and the Communists of Sandiak were led to believe during the war that their region might be granted special status. Serb and Croat Communists were at odds over the question of Vojvodina. The former group wished the area to be included in Serbia (the eventual solution), the latter group in Croatia.
43 See Statut Autonomne Pokrajine Vojvodine (Novi Sad, 1948) and SI. L., Autonomne Kosovske-Metohijske Oblasti, No. 10, 1948, p. 74.
44 The number of their legislative acts has been small, and limited to such matters as setting prices, founding schools and other institutions, and approving the budget and economic plan. In 1950, there were only two acts passed by the Oblast Committee for Kosovo-Metohija: the budget and the audit!
45 The Rumanians in the Alibunarski district of Vojvodina were a source of concern to the Yugoslav Communists in the late 1940's and early 1950's. They had put up a stiff resistance to collectivization, and party members of the district were considered under the influence of “kulaks” and “remnants of the Iron Guard.” In order to correct this situation, it was recommended that: (a) “Practice has shown in Vrsacki district that the use of ‘good' Rumanians, members of the CP, for political work among the Rumanians in the villages has been very useful, (b) For the time being, use good Rumanians from Vrsacki district in the Alibunarski district, and send cultural groups from the former area to activate cultural life, (c) Investigate people in the districts carefully, and send those approved to party schools to assure the necessary cadres, (d) Weed out enemy elements.” (From an unpublished report to the Regional Party Committee of the CPY for Vojvodina.)
46 For the national composition of the party in Vojvodina and Kosovo-Metohija in 1958, see Statisticki podaci organtzacije Saveza Komunista Srbije od III do IV kongres (Belgrade, May, 1959), p. 10.
47 In Macedonia, the Albanians made up 12.5 percent of the population (1953) and 6.28 per cent of the party (1958); Tur s 15.6 per cent of the population (officially, although certainly less in fact) and 2.29 per cent of t h e party. See III kongres na Sojuzot komunistite na Makedonija (Skoplje, 1959), p. 119. In Croatia, the Italians made up 0.9 per cent of the population (1953) and 0.3 per cent of the party (1958); Czechs, 0.7 per cent of the population and 0.3 per cent of the party. See Statistički podaci organitacije Saveza komunista u NR Hrvatshoj … (Zagreb, Feb. 27, 1959), p. 19.
48 Crvenkovski, Krste, “ Trebase upornije i sistematskije boriti za sprovodjenje pismo CK u delo,” Komunist, No. 9 (Sept., 1953), p. 65.Google Scholar
49 On the basis of the 1953 census and the party membership figures for 1958, one out of every seven Montenegrins in Kosovo-Metohija belongs to the party.
50 Elections are manipulated to assure equal representation of the minorities in local, republic, and federal assemblies, but these posts are of little real importance. The first Albanian was made a member of the Central Committee of the CPY in 1953; there are now two Albanians in the Central Committee, as well as one Hungarian and one Bulgarian. ‘ There are now five Hungarians and five Albanians in the Central Committee of the Serbian party; one or two representatives from the minorities have served in the republic governments in Serbia a n d Macedonia over t h e years.
51 Of 195 members of five district party committees in Kosmet only 20 per cent were Albanian in 1956; by 1959, however, 40 per cent were Albanian. See Bujalić, Krsto, “Savez komunista Jugoslavije i nacionalne manjine,” Socijalizam, II, No. 3, p. 24 Google Scholar. Of the forty-three members of the party oblast committee in 1956, at least twenty were Albanian. Sedma konferencija, op. tit., pp. 151-53. In 1958, 38.5 per cent of the functionaries serving in government organs in Kosmet were Albanian. Bujalić, op. cit., p. 11. This is still well below the percentage of Albanians in the population of Kosovo-Metohija (64 per cent). In Vojvodina, where the minorities are equal or superior to the Yugoslav population in education and culture, the situation in government posts is probably more favorable to the minorities than in Kosovo-Metohija.
52 The process of reorganization actually began when the Union of Cultural-Educational Societies of Vojvodina (supra) was replaced by the Cultural-Educational Community of Vojvodina (Kulturno-prosvetna zajednica Vojvodina), which administered the cultural activities of the autonomous province along strictly functional (not national) lines. Provincial cultural committees continued to exist for each of the minorities, but only on paper, and were finally abolished in 1957. Figures for the dissolution of the cultural societies at the local level, given above, can be found in Hadzic, Milos, ed., Vojvodina, 1944-1945 (Novi Sad, 1954), p. 1954 Google Scholar. The only organization in Yugoslavia today actively responsible for the over-all cultural program of a minority is the Union of Italians of Istria (Unione degli Italiani dell’ Istria) located in Rijeka.
53 Teaching of the official language now begins in the third year of primary school.
54 Yugoslav statistics do not give the number of consolidated and separate schools. The author has been told by a member of the Commission for Education and Culture of Kosovo- Metohija that in 1958 there were 344 separate and 202 consolidated primary and secondary schools for Albanians in the oblast. In 1951-52, there were only seven consolidated schools in Yugoslavia for Albanians. See Stojković and Martić, English ed., pp. 200-1.;
55 See Bujalić, op. cit., pp. 22-23. In the spring of 1961, draft laws were under preparation 1 in the republics for bilingual schools.
56 T h e author knows of only one article, appearing in 1956, which attacked the nationalistic attitude of the cultural societies of the minorities, and explained that under the new socialist relations established in Yugoslavia, there was no need for independent schools and cultural organizations for the minorities. See “Jedan aspekt problematike kulturne delatnosti u Vojvodine,” Naša stvarnost, No. 7-8 (July-Aug., 1956), p. 96.
57 Somborske novine, May 25, 1956, p. 3. The press complained that the integration of schools was being falsely pictured as a move to eliminate instruction in Hungarian.
58 Zrenjanin, Aug. 13 and Aug. 27, 1955. The Croatian paper Hrvatska rijeć, Mar. 30, j 1956, p. 6, also complained of misunderstandings that had arisen in Subotica over the merger of schools.
59 See Melvinger, Ivan, “Znacaj statuta Autonomne Pokrajine Vojvodine,” Narodni odbor, No. 7 (1953), p. 1 Google Scholar. It should be noted that the federal system as a whole is likewise being divorced from the nationalities problem in Yugoslav constitutional theory.
60 Ten billion dinars annually in gross investment was guaranteed the oblast in the plan. Gross investment between the years 1952 and 1956 had come to 4.9 billion. The new Perspective Five-Year Plan for the years 1961-65 foresees a gross investment of 184 billion dinars from federal funds for the five-year period.
61 Bujalić, op. cit., p. 7.
62 In 1948 the Germans became citizens; in 1951 they were allowed to buy back property confiscated at the end of the war. Markert, Jugoslawien, p. 36. German schools have been re-established, and a teachers’ seminar exists in Subotica.
63 The rights of the Italians in what was formerly Zone B of Trieste are spelled out in an annex appended to the 1954 four-power agreement on Trieste. Language rights are guaranteed, and the closing of Italian schools is made conditional upon prior agreement of a mixed Yugoslav-Italian commission. See “Memorandum o soglasnosti izmedju vlade Italije, Ujedinjene Kraljevine, Sjedinjenih Drzava i Jugoslavije…” Medjunarodni ugovori FNRJ, No. 2, 1955.
64 Approximately 100, 000 Italians emigrated between 1945 and 1948. For this and other estimates of the size of the Italian emigration, see Myers, Paul F. and Campbell, A. A., The Population of Yugoslavia (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 21.Google Scholar
65 Lazar Koliševski, leading Macedonian Communist, answered questions on the subject of Turkish emigration in the press in 1954, and it was obvious that the whole matter had caused quite a stir. He attacked those who urged leaving while the getting was good, and denied that anyone who wished to leave would be refused permission to do so. Up until that time, he reported, 2, 204 families had received permission to emigrate. Borba, Mar. 28, 1954, p. 2.
66 Of the “Turks” of Macedonia, 32, 392 gave Macedonian as their native tongue, 27, 087 Albanian. In Kosovo-Metohija 6, 041 “Turks” gave their native tongue as Serbo-Croatian, 7, 343 as Albanian.
67 In 1957 Fadjil Hodža stated that in Kosovo-Metohija only 291 Albanians received permission to leave for Turkey. Although his statement was not absolutely clear, Hodža apparently wished to say that only this number had applied and that all had received permission to leave. Borba, Mar. 21, 1957, p. 2.
68 Borba, Apr. 18, 1961. For recent trials of Albanian agents accused, among other things, of attempting to foment national discontent, see Borba, Mar. 3, 4, and 5, 1961; Politika, Apr. 5 and 6, 1961; Borba, June 1, 1961.
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