Article contents
The Russian Soldier in 1917: Undisciplined, Patriotic, and Revolutionary
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 January 2017
Extract
1917. A revolution explodes, the most violent in history. Within a few weeks a society rids itself of all its leaders: the monarch and his lawyers, the police and the priests, the landowners and civil servants, the officers and employers. There is no citizen who does not feel free—free to make his own choices and decide his own future. Before long everyone has a plan in his pocket for remaking the country. As the bards of the revolution foretold, a new era in the history of man is beginning.
- Type
- Articles
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies. 1971
References
1. These facts will be presented in volume 2 of the present author's Revolution de 1917 to be published by Aubier-Montaigne this year. See the bibliography of Gerhard Wettig in “Die Rolle der russischen Armee im revolutionaren Machtkampf 1917,” Forschungen zur osteuropdischen Geschichte, 12 (1967): 46-389, which discusses revolutionary events up to July. On the behavior of the troops, three recent works should be cited: Alexander, Rabinowitch, Prelude to Revolution: The Petrograd Bolsheviks and the July 1917 Uprising (Bloomington, 1968)Google Scholar, which puts forward some very interesting points of view; Sidorov, A. L., ed., Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v armii i na flote v gody pervoi rnirovoi voiny (Moscow, 1966)Google Scholar ; Gaponenko, L. S., ed., Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v russkoi armii v 1917 g. (Moscow, 1968)Google Scholar, which publishes documents showing the Bolshevization of the army, though not others. At least these texts are published unabridged. This article is based on an analysis of certain archival records: Central State Archives of the October Revolution (TsGAOR), Moscow Regional Archives (GAOR-MO), Leningrad Regional Archives (GAOR-LO), Leningrad Historical Archives (TsGIAL), Central State Military-Historical Archives (TsGVIA). References to Soviet archives give in order the number of fond, section, file, and, if applicable, the document. The evidence for some points is to be found in archives of the French Military Mission in Russia, referred to as Vincennes, and of the Russian Chancellery in Helsinki.
2. I hope to answer the question put by Leonard Schapiro in Richard, Pipes, ed., Revolutionary Russia (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), p. 208 Google Scholar.
3. A thematic analysis of letters and resolutions sent by workers and peasants can be found in Revolutionary Russia, pp. 197-99. The appendix to this article gives a table relating to the first hundred resolutions from soldiers published in Izvestiia (see p. 512).
4. In one hundred texts, they declare their confidence in the Petrograd Soviet twenty times compared with eight times in the government; seven times they request the two to come to an agreement. These last telegrams are often cosigned by soldiers and officers. See the table appended. ”.
5. In Marc, Ferro, La Revolution de 1917: La chute de tsarisme et les origines d'octobre (Paris, 1967), pp. 252–53 Google Scholar.
6. In twenty-five resolutions out of a hundred…
7. This topic is mentioned in letters even more frequently than in resolutions; see Soldatskie pis'ma 1917 g. (Moscow, 1927), with preface by Pokrovsky. Demands for land appear only seven times in the first hundred resolutions published by Izvestiia.
8. On the Jews: GAOR-LO, 7384, 9, 143, 60, and 7384, 9, 161, 17. On other nationalities see the article by the present author in Cahiers du monde russe et sovietique, 2 (1961): 145-47.
9. As from March 10, see Isvestiia of that date, p. 8.
10. Wettig, “Die Rolle der russischen Armee,” pp. 186 ff.
11. Vincennes, Na. 6, cartons 4 and 9.
12. To this known evidence we can add General Verkhovsky's private remark to the chief of the French Military Mission: “Our officers lack political education and know how to cope with extremist parties only… . They do not even try to gain the confidence of their men.” Vincennes, Bulletin 12 of the.2e Bureau, p. 19.
13. See Revoliutsiotmoe dvishenie v Rossii posle sversheniia samodershaviia (Moscow, 1957), pp. 613 ff.
14. On the oath and reforms planned by Guchkov and Kerensky, refer to all works on the army and finally to Wettig.
15. GAOR-LO, 7384, 9, 228, 7.
16. July 28, the 136th Infantry Division, Southwest Army, TsGVIA, 2067, I, 60-71.
17. TsGAOR, 3, I, 362, 369 ff. Another writes, “The misfortune is that the soldiers, having had scarcely any military training, do not know how to obey” (TsGVIA, 2148, I, 813, 305). Regarding relations between officers and men the following example concerning Czech soldiers may be quoted: “Soldiers of the Second Regiment appalled their commanding officer, Khotkevich, by responding to his morning salute with the words, ‘Thank you, Colonel.’ The old colonel left his headquarters in great haste to confer with his aide-de-camp under the impression that his regiment had mutinied. He then learned that the title of Excellency had been abolished by a staff order.” Quoted by Bradley, J. F. N. in La Legion Tchecoslovaque en Russie, 1914-1920 (Paris, 1965), p. 52 Google Scholar.
18. On the desire for peace before the February Revolution, see Sidorov, , Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v annii i na flote, pp. 146–313Google Scholar. Of the one hundred resolutions published during March in Isvestiia fifty-one deal with the question of war and peace. Twenty-four of these confirm the determination of the petitioners to “carry out their patriotic duty.” Another twenty-four broach the question of peace, but all but three are subsequent to the appeal of the Soviet
19. TsGIAL, 1278, 5, and 1329, 1 to 4, and Revoliutsionnoe dvishenie v Rossii posle sversheniia samoderzhaviia, p. 627.
20. 202nd Mountain Regiment, GAOR-LO, 7384, 9, 244, 63a and b, 64.
21. GAOR-LO, 7384, 9, 244, 33.
22. See Ferro, , Revolution de 1917, pp. 260–64 and 278-82Google Scholar
23. GAOR-LO, 7384, 9, 259 for the soldiers, and TsGAOR, 1244, I, IS, 118 for the sailors. This psychological factor is more often expressed in novels and films than in archives. It is no less important for that and is encountered in all countries at war.
24. This fact is constantly confirmed in A., Shliapnikov, Semnadtsatyi god, 4 vols. (Moscow and Leningrad, 1925-31), 2: 136 ffGoogle Scholar., and in Sukhanov, N. N., Zapiski o revoliutsii, 7 vols. (Berlin, St Petersburg, and Moscow, 1922-23), 2: 307 ffGoogle Scholar. He explains above all the need for the workmen to form their own guard. On other aspects of the problem see Startsev, V. I., Ocherki po istorii petrogradskoi krasnoi gvardii rabochei militsii (Leningrad, 1965)Google Scholar.
25. “There are .encouraging symptoms of a military reaction“—the French ambassador, Maurice Paleologue, to his minister, toward the end of March. “The troops reproach the workmen for their despotism, their arrogance, excessive wages. This explains the patriotic demonstrations” (Vincennes, Na. 6-4, code telegram 404). On the justice of these criticisms see above. On the solidarity with the working class see GAOR-LO, 7384, 9, 158 (about forty documents). Text from the Thirteenth Hussars, GAOR-LO, 7384, 9, 158, 29. Again in May, soldiers of the Northern Army asked railway workers to stop their strike so that the soldiers could “save them.” See TsGVIA, 2031, I, 1585.
26. Soldat Grashdanin text of May 25, 1917. Other complaints, for instance those of the 302nd Reserve, are found in Spartak, June 6, p. 29. As the soldiers of the Thirteenth Motorized Section said, “We who eat only cabbage and kasha” (TsGAOR, 6978, I, 356, 40). The idea of sending to the front all those calling for “war to the bitter end” is expressed as early as March (see TsGIAL, 1278, 5, 1251, 48). This was not peculiar to Russia; for France see the trench newspapers, and for Italy the testimony collected by Isnenghi, M., vinti di Caporetto (Padua, 1967)Google Scholar.
27. This point is developed later on.
28. Wettig, “Die Rolle der russischen Armee,” pp. 192 ff., 264 ff. See also the letters published in Spartak, June 6, 1917, pp. 27 ff.
29. See the Sidorov anthology, Revoliulsionnoe dvizhenie v artnii i na flote, as well as Tsarskaia Armiia, v period mirovoi voiny v jevral'skoi revoliutsii, documents assembled by M. Volfovich and E. Medvedev (Kazan, 1932), pp. 87-91.
30. Wettig is mistaken in asserting that the Soviets were “in agreement from the beginning with fraternization.” He adds that “there is no proof that they collaborated, as the Duma accused them of doing, but they did not dissociate themselves from fraternization and tried to defend it.” The fact is that at first, surprised by fraternization, the Soviet leaders unequivocally condemned it. See Izvestiia, April 30, and documents published by the Soviets regarding Mikhailov's tour in Gaponenko, L. S. et al., eds., Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii v aprele 1917 g.: Aprel'skii krizis (Moscow, 1958), pp. 547–58 Google Scholar, and Chugaev, D. A. et al., eds., Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii v mae-iiune 1917 g. (Moscow, 1959), pp. 331–32 Google Scholar.
31. Numerous resolutions from Russian units were in favor of active operations— for example, First Light Battery of the Sixty-sixth Artillery, TsGAOR, 1244, I, IS, 246; First Siberian Rifles, Artillery Park of the Seventeenth Infantry Division, Fourteenth Don Cossacks; Fifteenth Cavalry Division; Second Siberian Corps; Seventieth Infantry Regiment; 718th Infantry; Sixth Squadron of Cossack Cavalry, TsGVIA, 2031, I, 1S8S; also the Thirty-eighth Regiment of the Third Army and the hospital ship Ariadna. All these resolutions emanated from units on the northern front, including a certain number of non- Russian units that had volunteered.
32. For example, the 669th Infantry, Second Battery of the Twelfth Heavy Artillery, TsGAOR, 1244, I, IS, 241 and 242. The Second Battery of the Twenty-fourth Siberian Regiment in item 3 asks for “action against deserters but also against shirkers,” in item 7 “that the Death Battalions be sent to the trenches instead of parading in the rear,” in GAOR-LO, 7384, 9, 243, 3.
33. The same conclusions are reached by Rabinowitch, investigating the causes of the July Days. For the general context see the present author's Revolution de 1917, pp. 438-67, and Znamensky, O. N., Iiul'skii krisis 1917 g. (Moscow, 1964), pp. 12–22 Google Scholar.
34. TsGVIA, 2148, I, 813, pp. 3-23. Gaponenko has reproduced this text in the original, Revoliutsionnoe dvishenie v russkoi armii, pp. 234-62, and every statement is backed by one or more testimonies.
35. See TsGVIA, 2048, I, 27, 14; further examples in Revoliutsionnoe dvishenie v Rossii v iiule 1917 g. (Moscow, 1959), pp. 395-451; Revoliutsionnoe dvishenie v Rossii v avguste 1917 g. (Moscow, 1959), pp. 253 ff., and in Gaponenko, Revoliutsionnoe dvishenie v russkoi armii.
36. This dispute, published in Spartak, is only one example of the soldiers’ vigilance. Who is right, we do not know. From that time they checked all statements issued by the General Staff.
37. On the French army mutinies see Guy, Pedroncini, Let Mutineries de 1917 (Paris, 1967)Google Scholar. These had no connection with the pacifist movement, just as the revolt of the Russian soldiers in France had nothing to do with the outburst of mutinies. On these questions see the present author's book, La Grande Guerre, 1914-1918 (Paris, 1968), pp. 338 ff.
38. On this feeling of moral degradation see TsGVIA, 2067, I, 60, 33 (Eleventh Army).
39. TsGVIA, 2067, I, 62, 32 (Eleventh Army). Troops of the Luga garrison sent a petition requesting that officers be disarmed, for they were all “traitors to the revolution“ (quoted in Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v avguste, p. 263).
40. In the following extracts from a private's letter, dated August 9, this anger is forcefully expressed: “In the trenches I read your newspapers and I listen to the soldiers talking… . It is all about the war, discipline, punishments, what to do with the soldiers and so on—all just good for the bourgeois… . But what have all these others got to say about the country being in danger … the Kerenskys, Skobelevs, the Chernovs …all of them. We could expect anything from Nicholas II, but from you… . I warn you that if peace is not declared before the winter you can pack up… . You are betraying Russia; you have sold her to England and France” (TsGAOR, 6978, I, 531, 4-5, quoted in Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v avguste, p. 240).
41. TsGVIA, 2067, I, 60, 52; TsGVIA, I, 60, 229; TsGVIA, 2067, I, 3829, 52 and 53, quoted in Gaponenko, Revoliutsionnoe dvishenie v russkoi armii; TsGVIA, 2067, I, 60, 61.
42. Gaponenko, , Revoliutsionnoe dvishenie v russkoi armii, pp. 278–79Google Scholar.
43. TsGVIA, 2067, I, 3821, 29-30.
44. To the sources cited in note 35 may be added documents 1 to 14 of TsGAOR, 1244, I, IS; 1236, I, 12; 123S, S3, 9; 6978, I, 580. The very pessimistic report of Generals Markov and Denikin should be mentioned (TsGVIA, 2067, I, 60, 269) and, of course, subsequent works by Russian generals and the allied missions in Russia.
45. Soldatskie pisfma, p. 110, of August 9.
46. From the middle of July, and especially in the August petitions, the letters and messages to the Soviets in Moscow and Petrograd took up the slogans of the Bolshevik newspapers. See Bol'shevisatsiia petrogradskogo garnizona v 1917 g. (Moscow, 1935) and the series of documents published in 1957, Revoliutsionnoe dvishenie v sentidbre and Oktiabr'skoe voorushennoe vosstanie v Petrograde.
47. TsGAOR, 6978, I, 3S6, 31, documents 7, 12, 35, 38, etc.; for the Army of the North see TsGVIA, 2031, I, 1S8S, and the book by Shurygin, F. A., Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie soldatskikh mass Severnogo fronta v 1917 g. (Moscow, 1958)Google Scholar.
48. Letter dated August 20, TsGVIA, 2067, I, 60, 121, 2.
49. Innumerable telegrams of support were sent to Kerensky before and during the insurrection—for example, in the Moscow region, GAOR-MO, 3, I, 164, 233 to 295; TsGAOR, 6978, 1, 359, 1; TsGVIA, 2067, I, 3821, 94; TsGAOR, 1241, 1244, I, 15. Many reports to Headquarters give the impression that all was quiet once again. Kornilov must have deluded himself about their significance. The fact is that texts revealing the anger of the troops were not addressed to him; see the archival records, TsGVIA, 2067, I, 60. Moreover, the clashes, often unpremeditated, between the Death Battalions and the Lettish riflemen, and other incidents, meant that part of the army could be won over by the General Staff. It is not the aim of this article, however, to examine the policy of the General Staff or that of the government.
50. Thirty-five soldiers from the second section of the 440th Regiment Buguruslavsky, TsGAOR, 1244, I, 15, 234 (10-7-1917 Old Style).
51. The soldiers were not all in agreement. Officers’ characters, personal choice, the greater or lesser influence of political organizations, branch of service, ethnic background —these were all factors which would explain differences in soldiers’ behavior—for example, why one regiment would mutiny while its neighbor would take part in an offensive. An attempt is made to assess the effects of some of these differences in the present author's RSvolution de 1917, vol. 2 (see note 1 above).
52. TsGVIA, 2067, 3815; and 3821 for the Eleventh Army.
53. The 507th Regiment of the Army of the Caucasus, TsGVIA, 2031, I, 1585.
54. TsGAOR, 1244, I, 15, 4, and 6978, I, 248, 1.
55. According to Tkachuk, , Revoliutsionnoe dvishenie v armiiakh iugosopadnogo i rumynskogo frontov nakunune i v period velikogo Oktiahr’ (L'vov, 1968)Google Scholar, who gives the following figures: Number of Bolshevik Groups July September November Southwestern front 44 108 135 Rumanian front 30 65 145 ∼74∼ ∼m ∼280“
56. Applied to Kerensky the phrase “He is deceiving us” appeared first on July 9. It recurred above all after the failure of the putsch, when he took” no action against Kornilov and was opposed to excluding bourgeois ministers.
57. GAOR-LO, 7384, 7, 36. The Army of the Caucasus being involved, item 5 concerns the Muslim peoples. Item 6: the existence of a committee often checked the disintegration. The reply to item 9 is the result of the pressure of public opinion. General Janin reported, about the southwestern front, that soldiers accused of cowardice were often acquitted and “carried in triumph” by those present. Vincennes, Source A, Bulletin 15, p. 8 (reported at Tarnopol, October 30).
58. TsGVIA, 2148, I, 813, 417-79. The report adds, “In the artillery things are different.“
59. August 13: desertions stopped in the Eighth Army, TsGAOR, 3, 1, 362, 396. August 19: 305 deserters and 103 returned for the Second Army, TsGVIA, 2067, I, 60, 229. September 4: still few deserters (inquiry concerning fifteen regiments of the Army of the Caucasus), TsGVIA, 2100, I, 276. October 24: few deserters (inquiry about eight regiments of the Seventh Division), TsGVIA, 2148, I, 813, 471-79. Further examples can be found in Revoliutsionnoe dvishenie v mae, iiune, avguste, passim, and for early October in Rasloshenie armii v 1917 g., pp. 140-41 ff., and so forth.
60. TsGVIA, 2067, I, 60, and Helsinki, I Otdelenie Kantseliarii finliandskogo generala- gubernatora 1917 g., Fb 1270-1276, 2, 49.
61. Leon, Trotsky, Histoire de la Revolution russe, 2 vols. (Paris: Le Seuil, 1950), 2: 287 Google Scholar.
62. For the forces in position just before October see L. M. Gavrilov and V. V. Kutuzov, “Novyi istochnik o chislennosti russkoi deistvuiushei armii nakanune Oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii,” in Istochnikovedenie istorii sovetskogo obshchestva (Moscow, 1964), pp. 131-52. On the formation of the Red Army see the various works of John Erickson.
Soldiers’ resolutions regarding deserters went through three stages: in March they condemned those taking advantage of the situation to return home; in May and June they censured them and threatened those who had not rejoined their units with exclusion from benefits from land reform—shirkers are classified together with deserters; after July the troops defended deserters, asserting that the counterrevolutionary military commanders were equally deserving of being tried by tribunals.
- 5
- Cited by