Two general tendencies can be detected in theological enquiries on nature, ecology and the environment. The first tendency stresses the inadequacy of ‘traditional’ or mainstream Christianity to engage with the crisis in human relations with non-human nature. The positions under this tendency draw on other resources—process thought, the writings of Teilhard de Chardin, the ‘common creation story’ of the natural sciences—to construct anew the Christian contribution to the healing of our relations with damaged nature. For this tendency, standard Christian responses such as reinterpretations of dominion as stewardship presuppose the distinction of humanity from non-human nature. Such unrevised constructs thereby remain part of the problem rather than part of the resolution.

The three most common criticisms of Stanley Hauerwas' work are that he is a sectarian, that he is a fideist, and that he lacks a doctrine of creation. My intention in this essay is to show that how greater attention to the eschatological implications of his theological ethics would enable Hauerwas successfully to respond to his critics.

Critics of the idea of universal salvation have frequently raised issues such as biblical evidence, human free will, and divine justice; however, somewhat less attention has been paid to the problems surrounding the concept of punishment used by some universalists. Since most universalists recognise the obvious objection that many (if not most) people appear not to be in a position in this life to be saved, there have been various suggestions as to how salvation can occur after the death of the individual. Many have taken the view that a period of post-mortem punishment will cleanse individuals of their sin. In other words, these universalists are not so much denying hell altogether, as denying an eternal hell. Whilst this idea may seem preferable to that of an eternal hell, there are various important theological and philosophical difficulties associated with it.

In a recent series of essays, John Milbank has continued his impressive project of narrating a theological path beyond secular reason in both its modern and postmodern versions by attempting to develop an ‘ontology of the gift.’ In order to overcome the ontology of violence in which he claims that secular rationality is rooted, Milbank argues for the need to reclaim a specifically Christian understanding of ethics, and suggests that the best resources for doing so can be found in the logic of gift and gift-exchange. Among other things, he claims that the logic of gift involves a rejection of the notion of command, a notion whose theological significance has perhaps been expressed most forcefully by Karl Barth. It is therefore appropriate to examine Milbank's appeal to the ontology of the gift as an objection to Barth's divine command ethics. Given his construal of ethics in terms of command and obligation, it might be suggested that Barth's ethics is problematic to the extent that it retains the structure of the Kantian categorical imperative. At the same time, however, it is noteworthy that Barth develops his account of the command of God in the context of gift, and in particular the specifically theological context of the gracious gift of God in Jesus Christ. Such a combination of command and gift has led some to suggest that Barth's ethics is actually significantly anti-Kantian in structure.

The theme of this article is the reconstruction of the doctrine of God offered by the German theologian and historian of doctrine Isaak August Dorner (1809–84), in his treatise ‘On the Proper Conception of the Doctrine of God's Immutability, with Special Reference to the Reciprocal Relation between God's Suprahistorical and Historical Life.’ Although the theme of God's immutability has received wide attention in the last years, Dorner's essay has gone largely unnoticed, and its contribution to the current debate still awaits appreciation. The following argument shall provide some building-blocks for this goal. It presupposes that Dorner's theology was shaped in dialogue with the thought of Schelling, Hegel, and Schleiermacher, but it will extend this perspective and ask for the particular systematic-theological link between Schleiermacher and Karl Barth that Dorner's essay represents.

Of what are we speaking when we speak of the Holy Spirit? This most fundamental of all the questions asked in the field of Pneumatology has not received an answer widely accepted in the theology of the twentieth century. Karl Barth could write that the ‘Holy Spirit is nothing else than a certain relation of the Word to man’; while to Rudolph Bultmann, the Spirit was ‘the power of futurity,’ and was to be counted among the mythological forms of New Testament speech. Heribert Mühlen, on the other hand, interpreting the Latin pneumatological tradition in terms of the personalism of Ebner and Bubner, calls the Spirit ‘we,’ the unity of T and ‘thou.’ And David Gelpi reflects current feminist concerns when he designates God's Spirit as ‘The Divine Mother,’ the feminine in God. Finally, most recendy, Michael Welker has adopted the language of the natural sciences mediated through process thought and calls the Holy Spirit a ‘force field,’ while Jürgen Moltmann terms God's Spirit ‘the Spirit of Life’; a notion echoed in Mark Wallace's thesis that the Spirit is ‘the power of life-giving breath (r¨ah) within the cosmos who continually works to transform and renew all forms of life—both human and nonhuman.‘