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Reason and Revelation in Luther1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 February 2009

Extract

Luther's conception of reason and revelation has not yet found the attention which it deserves. Though some new studies have tried to interpret his view of human reason, neither his conception of revelation as such nor his definition of the relation between reason and revelation has been the object of special research. This fact which at first sight seems rather surprising is not accidental. Rather it is the consequence of a very important development which had taken place already in the sixteenth century. It was primarily Melanchthon and not Luther whom Protestant theologians in the post-Reformation era followed. While Luther was the reformer of the Church, Melanchthon was the reformer of the German universities and the whole education system. With respect to their theology, Luther and Melanchchon differed considerably as is well known. The ideas by which Melanchthon reformed the German universities were, roughly speaking, a combination of Protestant theology as regards the doctrine of justification and a more or less unaltered Aristotelian system as regards the relation between theology and philosophy. The Melanchthonian reform gave the German universities their shape for centuries till the new ideas of rationalism and of modern science won the universities in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and gave them a new form. But it seems that Melanchthon's conception of reason and revelation is even today of great significance and influence. It has at least determined most modern studies which have dealt with Luther's conception of reason and revelation.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Scottish Journal of Theology Ltd 1960

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References

page 337 note 2 Stürmer, K., Gottesgerechtigkeit und Gottesweisheit bei Martin Luther, Theol. Dissertation, Heidelberg, 1939Google Scholar; Lohse, B., Ratio und Fides—Eine Untersuchung über die Ratio in der Theologie Lathers, Gottingen, 1958Google Scholar.

page 337 note 3 Harnack, T., Luthers Theologie (1862, repr. Munich, 1927). vol. I, pp. 6gff.Google Scholar

page 338 note 1 Troeltsch, E., Vernunft und Offenbarung bei Johann Gerhard und Melanchthon—Untersuchung zur Geschichte der altprotestantischen Theologie, Gottingen, 1891.Google Scholar

page 339 note 1 E. Troeltsch, op. cit., p. 56.

page 339 note 2 ibid., p. 57.

page 339 note 3 ibid., p. 190.

page 339 note 4 ibid., p. 5.

page 340 note 1 cf. p. 337, n. 2 above.

page 340 note 2 Ritschl, O., Dogmengeschichte des Protestantismus (Gottingen, 1926), vol. III, p. 175Google Scholar; Schempp, P., Luthers Stellung zur Heiligen Schrift (Munich, 1929), p. 8Google Scholar; K. Stürmer, op. cit., p. 43.

page 340 note 3 The Revolt against Reason (London, 1950), pp. 20, 51ff.Google Scholar

page 341 note 1 S.Th. I, q. 1, a. 8: ‘Cum igitur gratia non tollat naturam, sed perficiat, oportet quod naturalis ratio subserviat fidei.’

page 341 note 2 S.Th. II, 11, q. 1, a. 5: ‘rationes quae inducuntur a Sanctis ad probandum ea quae sunt fidei non sunt demonstrativae, sed persuasiones quaedam manifestantes non esse impossibile quod in fide proponitur.’

page 342 note 1 Hagglund, B., Thealogie und Philosophie bei Luther und in der occamistischen Tradition—Lathers Stellung zur Theorie von der doppelten Wahrheit, Lund, 1955.Google Scholar

page 342 note 2 Böhner, P., ‘Zu Ockhams Beweis der Existenz Gottes’, Franziskanische Studien, XXXII, 1950, pp. 50ff.Google Scholar

page 343 note 1 Concilium Vaticanum, Sess. III, cap. IV: ‘Verum etsi fides sit supra rationem, nulla tamen unquam inter fidem et rationem vera dissensio esse potest: cum idem Deus, qui mysteria revelat et fidem infundit, animo humano rationis lumen indiderit, Deus autem negare se ipsum non possit, nee verum vero unquam contradicere… Neque solum fides et ratio inter se dissidere nunquam possunt, sed opem quoque sibi mutuam ferunt, cum recta ratio fidei fundamenta demonstret eiusque lumine illustrata rerum divinarum scientiam excolat, fides vero rationem ab erroribus liberet ac tueatur eamque multiplici cognitione instruat.’

page 345 note 1 cf. the index to the Erlangen edition of Luther's works, E.A. 67.54f, sub ‘Offenbarung’.

page 345 note 2 W.A. 52.154.7ff (Hauspostille, 1544, on Luke 2.25–32).

page 345 note 3 W.A. 52.103.29ff (Hauspostille, 1544, on Matt. 3.13–17).

page 345 note 4 W.A. 52.72.22ff (Hauspostille, 1544, on Luke 2.33–40).

page 346 note 1 W.A. 46.62.7ff (Exposition of John 16, 1538). As regards Luther's doctrine of the Holy Spirit, cf. Prenter, R., Spiritus Creator, Munich, 1954.Google Scholar

page 346 note 2 Die Bekenntnisschriften der ev.-luth. Kirche (Göttingen, 1930), vol. I, p. 434, 8ff.Google Scholar

page 346 note 3 W.A. 16.17g.i4ff (Sermons on Exodus, 1524–7).

page 347 note 1 W.A. 391.424.25ff (Second disputation against the Antinomians, 1538): ‘Quando enim Evangelium proprie accipimus, est revelatio Iesu Christi, est praedicatio de filio Dei, quod antea promiserat de suo filio.’

page 347 note 2 W.A. 43.459.9f (Lecture on Genesis, 1535–45): ‘Est enim curiositas ista (sc. to get a knowledge of God) ipsum peccatum originis, quo impellimur, ut ad Deum adfectemus viam naturali speculatione. Sed est ingens peccatum, et conatus inutilis et irritus.’

page 347 note 3 cf. esp. W.A. 18.683ff.

page 347 note 4 cf. v. Lowenich, W., Luthers Theologia Crucis, Munich, 1929Google Scholar, and his retraction in the 4th edition of the same book, 1954, p. 244f.

page 347 note 5 W.A. 18.685.6f: ‘Quae supra nos, nihil ad nos.’

page 348 note 1 W.A. 43.458.35ff (Lecture on Genesis, 1535–45): ‘In libello de servo arbitrio et alibi docui. Esse distinguendum, quando agitur de notitia, vel potius de subiecto divinitatis. Aut enim disputandum est de Deo abscondito, aut de Deo revelato. De Deo, quatenus non est revelatus, nulla est fides, nulla scientia et cognitio nulla. Atque ibi tenendum est, quod dicitur: Quae supra nos, nihil ad nos. Eiusmodi enim cogitationes, quae supra aut extra revelationem Dei sublimius aliquid rimantur, prorsus Diabolicae sunt, quibus nihil amplius proficitur, quam ut nos ipsos in exitium praecipitemus, quia obiiciunt obiectum impervestigabile, videlicet Deum non revelatum. Quin potius retineat Deus sua decreta et mysteria in abscondito: non est, cur ea manifestari nobis tantopere laboremus.’

page 348 note 2 W.A. 7.838.26ff.

page 348 note 3 cf. Lohse, B., ‘Luthers Antwort in Worms’, Luther—Mitteilungen der Luthergesellschaft, 1958, pp. 124ff.Google Scholar

page 350 note 1 This nominalist view was criticised by Luther already in his Lectures on Romans, W.A. 56.355.3ff (Sch.R. 8, 3).

page 350 note 2 This is so already in his marginal notes which he wrote in 1509; cf. Lohse, B., Ratio und Fides, p. 27.Google Scholar

page 350 note 3 References in B. Lohse, op. cit., pp. 43ff, 7off.

page 350 note 4 W.A. 402.III.34ff (Commentary on Galatians, 1535): ‘Opera voluntatis concupiscibilis sunt… Rationis seu intellectus errores.’

page 352 note 1 W.A. 8.629.23ff (De votis monasticis, 1521): ‘Quinto comparemus institutum istud (sc. monasticism) etiam ad rationem naturalem, hoc est, ad crassum illud lumen naturae, quae tametsi lucem et opera dei non attingat per sese, ita ut in affirmativis (quod aiunt) fallax sit eius iudicium, in negativis tamen est certum. Non enim capit ratio, quid sit deus, certissime tamen capit, quid non sit deus. Ita licet non videat, quid rectum et bonum sit coram deo (nempe fidem), scit tamen evidenter infidelitatem, homicidia, inoboedientiam esse mala. Qua et Christus utitur, dum disserit, omne regnum in seipsum divisum desolari. Et Paulus, dum dicit, nee naturam docere, ut mulier nudato capite prophetet. Quod ergo huic rationi evidenter adversatur, certum est et deo multo magis adversari. Quomodo enim coelesti veritati non pugnabit, quod terrenae veritati pugnat?’

page 354 note 1 W.A. 18.785.26ff.

page 355 note 1 W.A. 46.667.8ff.

page 355 note 2 W.A. 46.668.11ff.

page 356 note 1 W.A. 18.784.36ff (De servo arbitrio, 1525): ‘Ecce sic Deus administrat mundum istum corporalem in rebus externis, ut si rationis humanae iudicium spectes et sequaris, cogaris dicere, aut nullum esse Deum, aut iniquum esse Deura.’

page 356 note 2 W.A. 16.143.17ff (Sermons on Exodus, 1524–7). There Luther says that man has before his eyes glasses of red or blue colour. Man cannot take these glasses away. Therefore everything he sees is red or blue. With regard to natural knowledge of God this means that man cannot by his own forces get free of his sinful attempt to create a God as he wants to have him. For man is not prepared to accept that God knows more than he knows himself.

page 356 note 3 The same criticism of man's natural knowledge of God could be shown by a discussion of other passages where Luther deals with this problem; e.g. W.A. 19.206.7ff (Exposition of Jonah, 1526).

page 357 note 1 W.A. 26.404f (Vom Abendmahl Christi, 1528).

page 358 note 1 W.A. 392.4.28f (Disputation on John 1.14, 1539).

page 360 note 1 C.R. 21.89.

page 360 note 2 C.R. 21.89: (sc. the sophistic theologians taught) ‘contingentiam et libertatem voluntatis nostrae, ut a veritate scripturae molliculae aures abhorreant.’

page 360 note 3 C.R. 21.102.

page 360 note 4 C.R. 21.106.

page 360 note 5 C.R. 21.107.

page 360 note 6 See B. Lohse, Ratio und Fides, p. 48, n. 4.

page 360 note 7 C.R. 21.655 (Loci communes, tertia aetas): ‘certum est homines non habere libertatem deponendi hanc pravitatem nobiscum nascentem aut deponendi mortem.’

page 361 note 1 C.R.21.652.

page 361 note 2 C.R. 21.658.

page 361 note 3 C.R. 21.659.

page 361 note 4 C.R. 13.649.

page 361 note 5 C.R. 16.22f.

page 361 note 6 C.R. 21.653f

page 361 note 7 C.R. 21.657.

page 361 note 8 C.R. 13.647.

page 362 note 1 C.R. 21.641ff.

page 362 note 2 C.R. 13.651.

page 363 note 1 In a similar way Melanchthon defines the relation between natural and revealed truths, e.g. C.R. 16.25: ‘Est autem erudita philosophia proprie et vere explicatio legis naturae, ut igitur piis lege Dei seu lege naturae uti licet, ita licet uti morali philosophia, quod ad externos mores attinet. Porro cum pii fidem et agnitionem Christi et timorem Dei addunt ad hanc diligentiam in regendis moribus, eamque praestant propter Christum, et referunt ad ornandam gloriam Christi: ita hi mores fiunt bona opera et cultus Dei.’

page 363 note 2 cf. Sperl, A., Melanchthon zwischen Humanismus und Reformation (Munich, 1959), pp. 130ff.Google Scholar